

**2024 ELECTIONS**

# **COUNTING CENTER**

**□ HAWAII  
□ VOTES**

This manual has been created through the contributions of the staff of the Office of Elections and the County Elections Divisions, as well as many other interested persons. We appreciate the help and support of all involved. The manual is not a substitute for the statutes and rules governing elections. Any errors are unintentional. If any exist, the errors are ours alone.

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## A MESSAGE FROM THE CHIEF ELECTION OFFICER

Thank you for volunteering at the counting center for the 2024 Elections! We could not conduct the elections without the hundreds of volunteers statewide who dedicate their time, effort, and support.

Counting center operations is responsible for processing, tabulating, and disseminating the election results in an accurate and timely manner, statewide. Volunteers work to test and certify the voting equipment, open the voted ballot return envelopes, track and log the voted ballots containers for counting, duplicate defective ballots, and release and audit the results. As a counting center volunteer, you ensure the security and integrity of our elections.

We appreciate your service and we look forward to working with you.

Very truly yours,

SCOTT T. NAGO

Chief Election Officer

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# VOTING IN HAWAII

The Office of Elections and County Elections Divisions administer elections in Hawaii. The Office of Elections, based on the island of Oahu, is responsible for managing candidate filing, the printing and counting of ballots, and voter education. There are 4 County Elections Divisions, each operated by the respective counties: Hawaii, Maui, Kauai, and the City & County of Honolulu. The County Elections Divisions are responsible for voter registration, the mailing and receipt of ballots, and in-person voting.

The qualifications to register to vote in Hawaii are that the applicant must be a U.S. citizen, a Hawaii resident, and at least 18 years of age. Hawaii allows pre-registration for applicants 16 years of age and up, however, they must be at least 18 years old to vote. Hawaii voters receive their ballot in the mail at least 18 days before Election Day. The mail ballot packet includes the ballot, a secrecy sleeve, and a return envelope. Voters who do not receive their ballot in the mail should check that their voter registration is up-to-date and contact their County Elections Division for a replacement.

## VOTING THE BALLOT

The Primary Election ballot includes candidates who filed nomination papers by the candidate filing deadline. Hawaii conducts a single-party Primary Election to nominate the candidates to represent a political party (or nonpartisan) in the General Election. On the Primary Election ballot, voters must select a political preference, and then only vote for candidates within that political preference. Votes for candidates of another political preference are not counted. While a voter must select a political preference for partisan contests on the Primary Election ballot, this does not register a voter with that political party. Everyone may vote for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and County contests, regardless of selected political preference.

The General Election ballot includes the candidates nominated to represent their political affiliation through the Primary Election and ballot questions. In a presidential election year, the president and vice president candidates only appear on the General Election ballot. The General Election ballot does not require the selection of a political preference; voters may vote for any candidate across parties. The General Election may also include ballot questions to amend the Hawaii State Constitution or County Charter.

If a voter makes a mistake, damages the ballot, or changes their mind while voting, they may request a replacement from their County Elections Division. Voters should not attempt to fix voting errors using correction tape or by initialing the error.

The voted ballot is folded into the optional secrecy sleeve before sealing it in the return envelope. The secrecy sleeve ensures the voter's right to secrecy as ballots are prepared for counting. Part of the ballot should stick out, but the votes are concealed. Then, voters must sign the return envelope.

### **Electronic ballot**

For each election, the electronic ballot is available to voters with accessibility needs and uniformed and overseas voters. The electronic ballot is emailed to voters to mark using a compatible device like a computer or tablet. The electronic ballot is also available to voters who have not received a ballot or need a replacement within 5 days of Election Day. Voters request an electronic ballot from their County Elections Division.

## **RETURNING THE VOTED BALLOT**

The return envelope is postage-paid and pre-addressed to the respective County Elections Division for voters to drop it back in the mail. Voters can also return their ballots by hand delivery to a place of deposit (e.g., ballot drop box). Drop boxes are located throughout the county and the ballots are collected by the County Elections Division. After returning their ballot, voters can confirm it has been received at **elections.hawaii.gov** or by calling their County Elections Division. The return envelope must be received by the County Elections Division by 7:00 PM on Election Day to be counted. Return envelopes postmarked by the deadline but not received by the deadline cannot be counted.

### **Signature Verification**

Voted ballot return envelopes are received by the County Elections Divisions from USPS and collected from ballot drop boxes. The return envelopes are scanned upon receipt and validated by matching the signatures on the return envelopes to the signatures attached to the voter registration records. If the signature is missing or does not match, it is reviewed by the County Elections Division, and the voter is contacted to remedy the signature. The signature can be corrected within 5 business days after Election Day to be validated and counted. If it is not corrected, the ballot remains invalid and not counted. If a signature matches, the record is tagged “voted” and the valid return envelopes are transferred from the County Elections Division to the state-operated counting center.

### **Voter Service Centers**

Voter service centers (VSCs) are established in each county to provide accessible in-person voting, same-day registration, and replacement ballots. On closing, the voted ballots and voting equipment from the VSCs are transferred to the counting center.

A voter may only cast 1 ballot. If a voter has submitted their ballot by mail and then arrives at a voter service center to vote, they will not be allowed to vote in person. Likewise, if a voter votes in person at a voter service center, their mail ballot is canceled. If that mail ballot is received by the County Elections Division, it cannot be accepted as the barcode would indicate the ballot has been canceled.

## **TIMELINE OF VOTING**

- 45 days before Election Day - Ballots are sent to uniformed and overseas voters.
- 18 days before Election Day - Voters start receiving their ballot packet and places of deposit may open.

Dates and hours of the places of deposit may vary by location.

- 10 business days before Election Day - Voter service centers open. Dates and hours may vary by location.
- Election Day - Voting closes at 7:00 PM. Voted ballots returned by USPS mail must be received (not postmarked) by the County Elections Division by the close of voting and the places of deposit are closed. Any voter in line at a voter service center at the close of voting will be allowed to cast their ballot. Results reports may be released starting after the last voter, statewide, has voted.
- 5 business days after Election Day - Deadline for voters to cure a deficiency with their return envelope. The return envelope must have been received by the close of voting and the voter may only correct the signature to confirm that their ballot should be counted.

# COUNTING CENTER OPERATIONS

Counting Center Operations is a section of the Office of Elections responsible for processing, tabulating, and disseminating election results in an accurate and timely manner, statewide. The goals and objectives are:

- To develop an audit trail that accounts for ballots and election materials.
- To conduct operations following federal laws, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS), and Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR).
- To maintain the integrity of the electoral process by conducting activities with the highest professional and ethical standards.

The operations include testing that the voting system is counting ballots logically and accurately, processing voted ballots, reporting the election results, conducting automatic recounts when applicable, and auditing the election results. Counting center operations take place in a secure area - only persons authorized by the Chief Election Officer shall be permitted.

## TESTING

Official Observers test and certify that the voting equipment is counting votes logically and accurately and reporting correctly. To test the voting equipment, Official Observers mark test ballots and create a tally of expected results. The test ballots are scanned and counted by the voting equipment to print test results. Then, the Official Observers compare their tally of expected results to the test results tabulated by the voting system. The Statewide Counting Center Manager or the Counting Center Manager directs the operations of the logic and accuracy test.

### **Voting equipment**

Hawaii uses Hart InterCivic's Verity voting system. The components of the voting system are Verity Central at the counting center; Verity Print, Verity Scan, and Verity Touch Writer at the voter service centers; and Verity Count, Verity Transmit, and Verity Relay to tabulate the results reports. Verity vDrives are used with the components of the voting system to define voting equipment for the election and store votes for tabulation.

## PROCESSING VOTED BALLOTS

There are 3 work areas within the counting center to process voted ballots: Ballot Opening, Duplication, and VBC Processing. Additionally, the voting system vendor, Hart InterCivic, operates and maintains the scanner stations counting the voted ballots. The handling and security of ballots and other sensitive election materials within the counting center are monitored by Official Observers. **See Processing Voted Ballots Work Flow on page 203.**

- Ballot Opening Team opens the return envelopes and removes the ballots for counting.
- VBC Processing Team controls the counting, tabulation, and security of the voted ballots. The VBC Processing Team works with the Hart Technicians operating the scanner stations to count the voted ballots and write counted ballots to vDrives.
- Duplication Team tracks defective ballots and recreates one-for-one duplicates to count.

### **A Day of Processing Voted Ballots**

- *Check-In.* Only authorized personnel are permitted in the counting center.
- *Ballots Arrive.* Return envelopes are run through the automatic envelope opener. Sliced return envelopes are distributed to groups of the Ballot Opening Team.
- *Open Ballots.* The Ballot Opening Team removes the ballot from the return envelopes and secrecy sleeve. Ballots are packed into VBCs to transfer to the VBC Processing Team. Empty return envelopes are collected, checked, and packed. The Ballot Opening Team removes the ballots from the secrecy sleeves, unfolds them, and places them into a voted ballot container (VBC) for transport and storage.
- *Scan and store the ballots.* The VBC Processing Team logs VBCs to and from the scanner stations operated by Hart InterCivic. Ballots are scanned 1 VBC at a time per station and then returned to the VBC Processing Team for secure storage.
- *Duplicate Defective Ballots.* The Duplication Team remakes one-for-one duplicates of damaged ballots and voted electronic ballots. Each duplicated ballot is then reviewed and signed by an Official Observer once they confirm it is an exact duplicate. Duplicated ballots are transferred to VBC Processing for scanning.
- *Secure the work area.* Once finished with handling their tasks, the Teams secure the sensitive election materials at their work area. Teams can check out when their tasks are completed.

## **REPORTING**

Result reporting starts on Election Day. Hart Technicians operate the Count work area. The Counting Center Manager coordinates the release of results with the VBC Processing Team, Hart Technicians, and the Statewide Counting Center Manager.

The first release of results reports is after all voter service centers, statewide, confirm that the last voter in line has cast their ballot. Additionally, after voting closes, the voted ballots and voting equipment are transferred from the voter service centers to the counting center. The results reports released on Election Day are the preliminary results. Ballots will also be counted after Election Day including return envelopes that required additional review by the County Elections Divisions and that voters corrected the signature.

## AUTOMATIC RECOUNT

An automatic recount may be triggered based on the difference between 2 candidates who would qualify to appear on the General Election ballot or would be elected. State and County Election Officials review the results reports to determine if any contest requires an automatic recount. The ballots where the impacted candidates appear are rescanned using the scanner stations at the counting center.

## AUDITING

Election audits confirm the election results. Election officials check that the voting equipment counted the ballots accurately and that there are no systemic issues impacting the validity of the results. Auditors create a hand tally of expected results to compare to the results report tabulated by the vote counting system.

## OFFICIAL OBSERVERS

Official Observers volunteer as the “eyes and ears” of the public by testing and certifying the voting equipment and observing the processing, handling, and transfer of election materials within the counting center. Official Observers may be required to stand for long periods of time during shifts that may be more than 12 hours. Additionally, Official Observers walk between work areas to monitor the transfer and handling of voted ballots. Official Observers are expected to monitor the operations of the counting center for the duration of the assigned shift and ensure coverage within the counting center.

Counting center operations must be monitored by Official Observers. Work areas may not begin handling sensitive election materials, like ballots or vDrives, without Official Observers present. As such, Official Observers must remain in their designated work areas.

Official Observers do not supervise the counting center work areas. Any procedural issues should be reported to the Official Observer Chairperson or Counting Center Manager to address and resolve. Additionally, Official Observers are encouraged to ask questions about the processes and what they should be monitoring and observing of the Counting Center Manager or returning Official Observers. The Official Observers only handle ballots in designated situations like comparing and certifying that the defective and duplicate ballots match at the Duplication work area.

The Official Observer Chairperson determines the schedule and rotation of Official Observers within the counting center. Coverage must be maintained in all counting center work areas for operations to proceed and to report the results in an accurate and timely manner.

## TIMELINE OF COUNTING CENTER OPERATIONS

- About 8 weeks before the election - Test ballots are distributed to Official Observers.
- About 6 weeks before the election - Voter service center voting equipment is tested and certified by Official

Observers.

- 18 days before the election - Counting center operations to process voted ballots may start.
- Before processing voted ballots - Counting center voting equipment is tested and certified by Official Observers.
- Election Day - Results reports may start to be released after voter service centers close statewide.
- Up to 5 business day after the election - Complete automatic recount, if triggered.
- 5 business days after the election - Deadline for voters to cure a deficient return envelope.
- After the curing deadline - Valid corrected return envelopes are transferred to the counting center to process and tabulate results reports.
- Before the deadline to file an election contest - Audit the election results.

## ORGANIZATION

- Chief Election Officer directs operations of the State of Hawaii, Office of Elections.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operations of the 4 counting centers.
- Counting Center Manager directs activities as a representative of the Chief Election Officer and reports to the Statewide Counting Center Manager. The Counting Center Managers direct the operations of the counting center, ensuring that Teams are working in flow. They may assign tasks to volunteers and provide support and assistance in the work areas.
- County Elections Divisions advise and assist the Neighbor Island Counting Center Managers.
- Hart InterCivic is the voting system vendor. Hart Technicians operate, maintain, set up, and break down the voting equipment. This includes operating the scanner stations and tabulation of results.
- Counting Center Volunteers complete the duties and tasks of an assigned operational work area or serve as an Official Observer.
  - Team Chairperson may be direct a work area. The Chairperson reports directly to the Counting Center Manager.
  - Team members carry out the tasks and responsibilities under the direction of the Team Chairperson and Counting Center Manager.
  - Official Observers are volunteers who serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public at the counting center.

## STANDARD OF CONDUCT

All counting center volunteers are expected to follow the standard of conduct and the policies of the counting center:

- Professionalism: Using the manual to understand counting center processes.
- Integrity: Abiding by all rules and not interfering with the handling and counting of voted ballots.
- Trustworthy: Helping to stop the spread of mis/dis/mal-information.
- Civility: Engaging with volunteers and election officials constructively.
- Honesty: Speaking to the security and integrity of the election, not a desired outcome.
- Teamwork: Providing feedback to improve future elections.

### **Policies**

- Wear your badge at all times. Only authorized personnel are allowed in the counting center.
- Be aware of the security and handling of election materials like ballots.
- No food or drinks in the work area. Food and drinks may be consumed in a designated area.
- No electronic mobile devices including mobile phones and tablets.
- Personal items must be stored in the designated area away from the work area.
- Be alert to safety hazards, and follow health, safety, and security protocols.

# TEST BALLOT PACKETS

Test ballot packets are distributed to Official Observers to conduct logic and accuracy tests of the voting equipment. Official Observers mark test ballots in any manner of their choosing and create a tally of expected results. The logic and accuracy tests include:

- Official Observers' Test for the voting equipment deployed to the voter service centers. **See page 19.**
- Statewide Observers' Test for the voting equipment used at the counting center. **See page 34.**
- Pre-Election Test conducted on the first day of processing ballots. **See page 58.**
- Election Day Test conducted after the Election Day final report is released. **See page 138.**
- Recount Test is conducted on the first day of an automatic recount if triggered. **See page 175.**
- Post-Recount Test is conducted after the automatic recount report is released, if any. **See page 197.**

To ensure the security and integrity of the election, test ballots are inventoried before distribution and on return by the Official Observers. The number of test ballot packets issued is based on the estimated number of Official Observers required to monitor the operations of the counting center. Test ballot packets will not be split and reissued based on an increased number of Official Observers.

# ISSUING TEST BALLOT PACKETS

Official Observers are issued a test ballot packet which includes mail test ballots and voter service center test ballots for a set of district/precincts (D/Ps). For each D/P, there are 2 defined ballots, or precinct-splits (e.g., 01-01, 01-01-VSC), to ensure that a mail ballot cannot be cast at a voter service center. Additionally, each test ballot packet contains a tally worksheet and preview ballots the Official Observers may use to create their tally of expected results, and supplies to organize and inventory the test ballots.

## PERSONNEL

- Election officials from the Office of Elections or County Elections Divisions distribute test ballot packets to the Official Observers.
- Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots, creating a tally of expected results, and matching their results to the voting equipment results reports.

## FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

### **Can another Official Observer pick up my test ballot packet for me?**

Yes. An Official Observer may ask another Official Observer to pick up or return a test ballot packet.

### **Can you mail my packet to me?**

No. Official Observers are asked to pick up their test ballot packet from the designated election office.

### **I cannot attend one of the tests. What should I do? Do I still take a test ballot packet?**

Official Observers may take a test ballot packet even though they cannot attend either the Official Observers' Test or the Statewide Observers' Test. The test ballot packet must be returned to the Counting Center Manager and secured before Election Day.

### **Can another Official Observer return my test ballot packet for me?**

Yes. An Official Observer may ask another Official Observer to pick up or return a test ballot packet. Test ballot packets returned by an Official Observer are securely stored.

## SUPPLIES

- test ballot packet sets, mail & voter service center (VSC)
- *Test Ballot Tracking*

# TASKS

**1**

## Assign the test ballot packets

- Complete the *Test Ballot Tracking* for each test ballot packet. **See sample on page 15.**
- Ask the Official Observer to date and initial to accept custody of the test ballot packet.
- Provide the 2 corresponding test ballot packets to the Official Observer.

**NOTE:** *The Official Observer picking up the test ballot packet provides their initials, not the initials of the Observer named on the packet.*

**2**


## Inventory the test ballot packets

Go over the contents of the test ballot packets.

- paper clip, 1 per D/P-split
- pens, black, 1 per packet
- preview ballots, 2 per D/P-split
- rubber bands 2 per packet
- test ballots, mail, 15 per D/P
- test ballots, voter service center (VSC), 10 D/P
- Test tally worksheets, 1 per D/P-split, see page 17

# ASSIGN THE TEST BALLOT PACKETS

Test Ballot Tracking



## SAMPLE

**TEST BALLOT TRACKING**

Packet	Official Observer	D/P			Serial Nos.		Issued		Returned	
		00-00-VSC	1	10	date	initials	date	initials		
1	Observer A	00-00	11	25	mm/dd	oa				
2					date	initials	date	initials		
3					date	initials	date	initials		
4					date	initials	date	initials		
5					date	initials	date	initials		
6					date	initials	date	initials		
7					date	initials	date	initials		
8					date	initials	date	initials		
9					date	initials	date	initials		
10					date	initials	date	initials		

A

**Assign the test ballot packets (see page 14)**

- Print name.
- Official Observer dates and initials.

# MARKING THE TEST BALLOTS

The procedures for **Marking the Test Ballots** are conducted by Official Observers.

Before test day, develop your test pattern and your tally of expected results for each precinct-split. You may vote as many of the test ballots as you like. Mark your test ballots to create your test deck and make your tally of expected results for each precinct-split.

At the test, your test deck is scanned to tabulate test results to compare to your tally of expected results. Keep in mind, that the logic and accuracy tests confirm that the voting equipment is counting the ballot correctly following the instructions provided to voters. These tests are not meant to guess what the voting equipment will or will not read (e.g., voting the ballot in highlighter).

**NOTE:** *Voting equipment used in Hawaii elections is federally tested and certified. Before the logic and accuracy testing, Hart InterCivic conducts preventative maintenance and acceptance testing ensuring the voting equipment is functioning properly.*

## PERSONNEL

Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots, creating a tally of expected results, and matching their results to the voting equipment results reports.

## SUPPLIES

- paper clip, 1 per D/P-split
- pens, black, 1 per packet
- preview ballots, 2 per D/P-split
- rubber bands 2 per packet
- test ballots, mail, 15 per D/P
- test ballots, voter service center (VSC), 10 D/P
- Test tally worksheets, 1 per D/P-split, see page 17

## TASKS

1

### Develop a test pattern

Consider the types of marks and voting positions to create a test pattern. The contest indicates the number of candidates that may be selected. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**

OPTIONAL: Prepare a test tally worksheet for each D/P-split. Use the serial number of the test ballot to track the corresponding tally on the worksheet. The lowest serial number of your test ballots corresponds to “1” on the tally worksheet. **See sample on page 17.**

**NOTE:** *It is permissible to number the test ballots (e.g., 1 to 10, 1 to 15) by writing on the ballot. Do not write near any barcodes or the ballot will not be counted.*

**Test Ballot**

STATE OF HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT **00-00-VS**

B

**Start Voting Here**

You MUST select ONE island below:

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)

Kauai Party (K)

D/P-split: **00-00-VSC**

No. of ballots in test deck: **10**

**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hapuna

Kiholo Bay

**Office of Shave Ice Affairs**

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Azuki Beans

Condensed Milk

Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**  
Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

Guava

Kiwi

Li Hing Mui

Lychee

Mango

Pineapple

Strawberry

Vanilla

Watermelon

**Maui Party (M)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hookipa

Kaanapali

Makena

**Kauai Party (K)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kalua Pork

Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Poipu

**Oahu Party (O)**

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Lanikai

Sunset

Waikiki

**VSC TEST TALLY**

Contest/Candidate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
Hawaii Party (H)	/	/									2
Maui Party (M)			/	/							2
Kauai Party (K)					/	/					2
Oahu Party (O)							/	/			2
blank									/		1
over										/	1
<hr/>											
(H) Favorite Plate Lunch - Chicken Katsu									/		1
(H) Favorite Plate Lunch - Garlic Shrimp	/	/									2
blank											0
over											0
<hr/>											
(H) Favorite Beach - Hapuna								/			1
(H) Favorite Beach - Kiholo Bay	/	/									2
blank											0
over											0
<hr/>											
(M) Favorite Plate Lunch - Loco Moco											0
blank											0
over											0
<hr/>											
(M) Favorite Beach - Hookipa											0
(M) Favorite Beach - Kaanapali											0
(M) Favorite Beach - Makena											0
blank											0
over											0

**A** **Develop a test pattern**

- D/P-split
- Contest/candidate

**B** **Create the tally of expected results**

- Mark the votes by ballot number. In the example, 10 of the 10 VSC test ballots are used for the test deck and the test ballot serial number is 1 (noted in the right margin on the sample test ballot).
- Add totals for each voting position (line).

**2****Vote the test ballots**

The test ballots you mark and prepare to be scanned by the voting equipment comprise your test deck.

- Mark your test ballots based on the pattern and marks of your choosing.
- Your test deck may include blank test ballots.
- Test ballots that have been ripped or marked near/through the barcode will be rejected and not counted by the voting equipment.

**3****Create the tally of expected results**

Create a tally of expected results of the test deck for the voting position for each contest. Your tally of expected results is compared to the printout from the voting equipment.

A *Test Tally* worksheet and preview ballot are provided which you may use to develop your tally of expected results. Use of either is optional.

**4****Organize the test ballot packet**

All test ballots must be returned, whether voted or not, to be securely stored. Election officials inventory your test ballot packet before the test ballots are counted. When returning your test ballot packet, notify the election official if any blank test ballots are part of your test deck.

- Separate your test deck from any unused or spoiled test ballots.
- Paper-clip your test deck ballots together by D/P-split.
- Rubberband your test decks together.
- Store test ballots by D/P-split in their respective packets. Return all test ballots in your test ballot packets for inventory and secure storage.

# OFFICIAL OBSERVERS' TEST

Official Observers test the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment and certify that the ballots are counted correctly. At the Official Observers' Test, or OT 1, Official Observers use the voter service center voting equipment and the tabulation application.

- vDrives are used to define the election and write ballots for tabulation.
- Verity Count is the tabulation application to compile and print the results.
- Verity Print is a ballot-on-demand device for the County Elections Divisions to issue blank ballots.
- Verity Scan is an in-person ballot counter for voters to cast their ballot. Voted ballots are collected in the attached secure ballot box.
- Verity Touch Writer is an accessible ballot marking device (BMD) that allows voters to mark and print a tabulation-ready ballot.

The voter service center voting equipment is defined to accept ballots issued at the voter service center only (e.g., 01-01-VSC). As such, only VSC D/P-split test ballots are scanned and tabulated at the Official Observers' Test. However, Official Observers should return all test ballots for election officials to inventory and securely store.

# INVENTORY TEST BALLOTS

Official Observers return their test ballot packet for election officials to inventory. Unused test ballots are removed from the test ballot packet to store in a corresponding unused test ballots envelope. Additionally, an Official Observer may return a test ballot packet on behalf of another Official Observer for inventory and secure storage.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager assists with inventorying the test ballots.
- Office of Elections staff inventory the test ballots.
- Official Observers return all test ballots for inventory.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operation of the Official Observers' Test.

## SUPPLIES

- marker, red
- *Official Observer Sign In*
- pens, red
- rubber fingers
- *Test Ballot Inventory*, see page 21
- *Test Ballot Tracking*
- unused test ballots envelopes

## TASKS

### 1 Check in the Official Observers

On arrival, each Official Observer completes the *Official Observer Sign In* and the *Test Ballot Tracking*.

### 2 Inventory the test ballots

- Ask the Official Observer for their test ballot packets and confirm they are returning all test ballots. If they discarded or removed any test ballots, record the discrepancy on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. Ask the Official Observer to return any removed test ballots before Election Day.
- Check that the test decks - VSC & mail, are segregated and identifiable from unused test ballots.
- Complete "Check In" on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. **See sample on page 21.**
- Remove only the unused test ballots and store them in the corresponding unused test ballots envelope. Record the Official Observer's name on the unused test ballots envelope, as necessary using a red marker.

# INVENTORY THE TEST BALLOTS

Test Ballot Inventory



Packet No.	D/P	Check In			Official Observers'			Statewide	Pre-Election	Election Day	Recount	Post-Recount
		test deck	unused	total	test deck	touch writer	total					
1	00-00-VSC	10	0	10	10	0	10					
	00-00	15	0	15	15	0	15					
				10								
				15								

TEST BALLOT INVENTORY  
 official observer  
**OBSERVER A**

**A** Inventory the test ballots at check in (see page 20)

- Official Observer, first name & last name
- district/precincts (D/Ps)
- number of test ballots in test deck
- number of unused test ballots

**B** Inventory the test ballots after reconciling (see page 31)

- district/precincts (D/Ps)
- number of test ballots in test deck
- number of Verity Touch Writer ballots added, if any

### 3

#### Return the VSC test ballot packet

- Provide the VSC test ballot packet to the Official Observer.
- Store the mail test ballot packet in the ETC by packet number.
- Store the unused test ballots envelopes (VSC & mail) in the ETC by packet number.

**OAHU:** *One ETC is for unused test ballots envelopes; another is for test ballot packets.*

### 4

#### Using the Verity Touch Writer voting equipment

Ask each Official Observer if they would like to vote test ballots on the Verity Touch Writer before proceeding to a Verity Scan device. **Use of the Verity Touch Writer is OPTIONAL.**

Official Observers may only use their assigned test ballot district/precincts (D/Ps) when voting on the Verity Touch Writer as the use of a different D/P will impact the test results for another Official Observer.

A Hart Technician provides instructions to the Official Observers to vote, verify, and print a test ballot.

##### Marking a Ballot

Official Observers operate the Verity Touch Writer to mark and print a test ballot.

- Select “To Get Started, Touch Here,” or turn the move wheel clockwise.
- Choose whether to use the accessibility features by selecting either “Yes, Help Me Change the Settings” or “No, Skip Straight to Voting.”
- Start voting by selecting “Begin Voting.” Mark the ballot using the touchscreen or using the move wheel and select button on the Access controller. A selected choice displays a green box with a check mark to the left of the choice. Use the “Next” or “Skip” buttons to advance to the next contest, and review the ballot by selecting “Review Your Choices.”
- On the “Review your Ballot screen,” select a specific contest to return to or select “Return to Ballot”.
- Then, select “Print” and confirm by selecting “Yes, Print My Ballot.” The ballot is 2-sided so do not grab the ballot until printing has stopped.

Official Observers add their printed ballot to their test deck. Once an Official Observer has printed their additional test ballots, they proceed to scan their test ballots.

# SCAN TEST BALLOTS

Official Observers cast their VSC test ballots at a Verity Scan device, and then their test ballots are removed from the ballot box before allowing the next Official Observer to scan test ballots. The ballots are written to a vDrive installed on the device. After the Official Observers have scanned their test ballots, the vDrive is removed to tabulate the results. Each Official Observer receives test results to match with their tally of expected results.

Official Observers are assigned for an accumulation test, completed at the Statewide Observers' Test, to test the tabulation of the statewide results reports.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager assists Official Observers by providing directions and answering questions.
- Hart Technicians open and operate the voting equipment.
- Office of Elections staff assists Official Observers by providing directions and answering questions.
- Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots and running them through the voting equipment.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operation of the Official Observers' Test.

## SUPPLIES

- accumulation tags
- pens, red
- *Test vDrive Log*, see page 25
- test zero report envelope
- vDrives, blank, test

## TASKS

**1**

### **Assign accumulation Official Observer(s)**

The Official Observer Chairperson or Statewide Counting Center Manager assigns accumulation Official Observers. Their test ballots (and their test ballots only) are written to their selected vDrive.

## 2

### Issue test vDrives

Blank test vDrives are issued for each Verity Scan device (rather than each Official Observer).

- Ask an Official Observer to select a blank test vDrive and record it on the *Test vDrive Log*. An accumulation vDrive and the voter service center are identified by attaching an accumulation tag.  
**See sample on page 25.**
- Direct the Official Observer to the Hart Technician at a Verity Scan device to install the blank test vDrive and open voting.

## 3

### Open the voting equipment

Hart Technicians open the voting equipment and explain each step to the Official Observers.

When installing a new blank test vDrive in the Verity Scan device, Official Observers verify and sign that the ballot count is zero. The certified reports tape is provided to the Counting Center Manager to pack in the test zero report envelope.

## 4

### Operate the voting equipment

Hart Technicians operate the voting equipment and explain each step to the Official Observers.

- Verity Scan can accept ballots when “Ready to Use” is displayed. Insert the test ballot following the flashing green arrow indicators. Ballots must be fed short-edge first but in any other orientation.
- Wait while the ballot is processed. The ballot has been cast when the American flag is displayed on the screen. If there are any voting errors, the Official Observers cast their ballot as-is.
- If an Official Observer has a spoiled ballot (e.g., marked in the barcode), ask them to record SPOILED on the ballot indicating it was not counted as part of their test deck.
- Once the Official Observer has finished scanning, remove the test ballots from the Verity Scan ballot box and return them to the Official Observer before allowing the next Official Observer to scan their test deck.

**NOTE:** *After an accumulation Official Observer has cast their test ballots, the Hart Technician powers down the Verity Scan and removes the test vDrive.*

## 5

### Remove the Verity Scan test vDrives

- Power down the device and remove the test vDrive.
- Transfer the test vDrives to the Verity Count work area to print the test results.



vDrive No.	to write	No. of Ballots	Device	Print test results	from Count	Accumulation	Local Tally	from Count	Comments (Packet Nos.)
4	date mm/dd time hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit	date mm/dd time hh:mm	date mm/dd time hh:mm	date time	<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	date time	Accumulation Packet 1
11	mm/dd hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit	mm/dd hh:mm	mm/dd hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		Accumulation Packet 10
7	mm/dd hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit	mm/dd hh:mm	mm/dd hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		Packets 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12
			<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit				<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
			<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit				<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
			<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit				<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		

SAMPLE

**TEST VDRIVE LOG**  
Store test vDrives in Test vDrive envelope in the ETC.

**A** Issue test vDrives (see page 24)

- vDrive no.
- date & time
- No. of ballots = blank
- device = Scan

**B** Remove the Verity Scan test vDrives (see page 24)

- Print test results, date & time to Count
- from Count, date & time

**C** At the Statewide Observers' Test, compile the accumulation vDrives (see page 46)

- Accumulation, date & time to Count
- Local Tally
- from Count, date & time

# PRINT THE TEST RESULTS & RECONCILE

Before tabulating the test vDrives, Official Observers verify that there are no votes in Verity Count, the tabulation application. Then, the test vDrives are read into Verity Count to print the test results by packet number. Official Observers reconcile their test results with their tally of expected results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager collects the zero report, disseminates the test results, and assists Official Observers in resolving discrepancies when reconciling.
- Hart Technicians operate Verity Count, the tabulation application, to print the zero report, and then the test results. Each Official Observer is provided printed test results based on their assigned district/precincts (D/Ps). Test results are printed in flow as test vDrives are transferred to the Verity Count work area.
- Office of Elections staff assists the Counting Center Manager with disseminating the test results and helps Official Observers resolve discrepancies when reconciling.
- Official Observers certify that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling the test results. Then, Official Observers receive their test results to reconcile with their tally of expected results. After reconciling, the test ballot packet is provided to election officials to inventory and securely store.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operation of the Official Observers' Test.

## SUPPLIES

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- test vDrives envelope
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Certify the zero report**

- Provide the Verity Count zero report to the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests.
- Ask Official Observers to sign and date the first page of the zero report. Pack the certified report in the test zero report envelope.

**2****Distribute the test results**

- Provide the test vDrives to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area. The Hart Technician prints the test results in ballot face order by packet number.
- Collect the tabulated test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope at the Verity Count work area.
- Identify the Official Observer by packet number to provide the test results.
- Instruct each Official Observer to match the test results to their tally of expected results. Then, they sign and date the first page of the test results and pack their materials back into their test ballot packet.

**3****Certify the test results**

The following procedures are completed by the Official Observers.

- Match the test results to the tally of expected results. Confirm the number of ballots, and votes for candidates, blank (under) votes, and over votes in each contest.
- Certify by signing and dating the first page of the test results.
- Pack the test ballots and certified test results into the test ballot packet and return them to the Counting Center Manager for inventory.

**Resolving discrepancies**

- Confirm the test ballots are organized by D/P-split.
- Review the ballots and sort them into stacks by voting position. The number of stacks depends on the number of candidates. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**
- For each stack, count the number of ballots and compare them to the Verity Count test results.

# SEAL THE VOTING EQUIPMENT

With Official Observers, secure a vDrive in each Verity Print, Verity Scan, and Verity Touch Writer device for use by the County Elections Divisions (e.g., at the voter service center). The voting equipment is sealed until it is transferred to the counting center by the County Elections Division.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager assists with securing the voting equipment.
- Hart Technicians define the voting equipment to the voter service center location.
- Office of Elections staff seals the voting equipment with Official Observers.
- Official Observers certify the security of the voting equipment.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operation of the Official Observers' Test.

## SUPPLIES

- pens, red
- seals
- *Verity Print Seal Certification*
- *Verity Scan Seal Certification*
- *Verity Touch Writer Seal Certification*
- vDrive(s), blank, official

## TASKS

**1**

### Secure the Verity Scan devices

An election official with the Official Observers:

- Read the location, device number, vDrive number, and seal number aloud. Correct any discrepancies or replaced equipment on the *Verity Scan Seal Certification*. Official Observers verify the information matches the *Verity Scan Seal Certification* and sign each page.
- Insert the blank official vDrive.

A Hart Technician defines the Verity Scan to the identified voter service center. Spare voting equipment is sealed, but not assigned.

An election official with the Official Observers secures the vDrive compartment with a seal.

# SEALING THE VOTING EQUIPMENT

## Verity Print, Verity Scan, and Verity Touch Writer Seal Certification

Location	Device No.	vDrive No.	Seal No.	Sealed		From Voter Service Center	Unsealed		Unsealed by	
				date mm/dd	time hh:mm		date	time	print	sign
Hawaii 1	P000001	###	0000516	Official Observer Observer a	Observer a					
Hawaii 2	P000002	###	0000517	Observer a	Observer a					

Location	Device No.	vDrive No.	Seal No.	Sealed		From Voter Service Center	Unsealed		Unsealed by	
				date mm/dd	time hh:mm		date	time	print	sign
Hawaii 1	S000001	###	0000510	Official Observer Observer a	Observer a					
Hawaii 2	S000002	###	0000511	Observer a	Observer a					

Location	Device No.	vDrive No.	Seal No.	Sealed		From Voter Service Center	Unsealed		Unsealed by	
				date mm/dd	time hh:mm		date	time	print	sign
Hawaii 1	TW00001	###	0000512	Official Observer Observer a	Observer a					
Hawaii 2	TW00002	###	0000513	Observer a	Observer a					
Hawaii 3	TW00003	###	0000514	Observer a	Observer a					
Hawaii 4	TW00004	###	0000515	Observer a	Observer a					

VERITY TOUCH WRITER SEAL CERTIFICATION

**2****Secure the Verity Touch Writer devices**

An election official with the Official Observers:

- Read the location, device number, vDrive number, and seal number aloud. Correct any discrepancies or replaced equipment on the *Verity Touch Writer Seal Certification*. Official Observers verify the information matches the *Verity Touch Writer Seal Certification* and sign each page.
- Insert the vDrive.

A Hart Technician defines the Verity Touch Writer to the identified voter service center. Spare voting equipment is sealed, but not assigned.

An election official with the Official Observers secures the vDrive compartment with a seal.

**3****Secure the Verity Print devices**

An election official with the Official Observers:

- Read the location, device number, vDrive number, and seal number aloud. Correct any discrepancies or replaced equipment on the *Verity Print Seal Certification*. Official Observers verify the information matches the *Verity Print Seal Certification* and sign each page.
- Insert the vDrive.

A Hart Technician defines the Verity Print to the identified location. Spare voting equipment is sealed, but not assigned.

An election official with the Official Observers secures the vDrive compartment with a seal.

The test materials are securely stored in the equipment transport container (ETC). The ETC is secured with a seal and padlock. The combination is determined by the Official Observer Chairperson and may be shared with Official Observers only.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Hart Technicians archive Verity Count to USB.
- Office of Elections staff inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots and vDrives.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operation of the Official Observers' Test.

## SUPPLIES

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- rubber fingers
- padlock
- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*, see page 33
- *Test Ballot Inventory*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Inventory the test ballots**

As each Official Observer returns their test ballot packet, complete "Official Observers" on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. Store inventoried test ballot packets in the ETC, lowest to highest.

**2****Pack the test vDrives**

- Pack the accumulation vDrives in the accumulation vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.
- Check the *Test vDrive Log* to confirm the number of test vDrives. Pack the test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.

**3****Archive Verity Count**

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.

**4****Pack the test materials into the ETC**

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- test ballot packets, mail & VSC
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope
- unused test ballots envelopes, mail & VSC
- vDrives, blank, official
- vDrives, blank, test

**5****Seal the ETC**

- With Official Observers, complete 2 *Seal Certification* forms. Place 1 copy in the container before closing, and copy 2 is stored on top of the container. **See sample on page 33.**
- Close the ETC and hook on the seal. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.
- Ask the Official Observer Chairperson, or designee, to set the padlock. The combination should be shared with at least 1 other Official Observer. The Official Observers secure the ETC with the padlock.

**OAHU:** *Unused test ballots envelopes are securely stored in a second ETC with a seal.*

SAMPLE

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

**CERTIFICATION OF SEALING**

page 1 of 2

<b>1</b> Date <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">MM/DD</span>	Time <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">HH:MM</span>	Seal No. <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">0002001</span>
--	--	--

<b>2</b> Container <input type="checkbox"/> ballot transport container (BTC) <input type="checkbox"/> discard box <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> equipment transport container (ETC) <input type="checkbox"/> security cage <input type="checkbox"/> voted ballot container (VBC) <input type="checkbox"/> voting equipment <input type="checkbox"/> written vDrive can <input type="checkbox"/> other:	Content <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> certified results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive <input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots <input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock <input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> test ballots <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> test results <input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test & accumulation) <input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written & audit) <input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit <small>device no. _____</small> <input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted) <input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted) <input type="checkbox"/> other:
---	--	--

<b>3</b>	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Observer a	Observer A
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Observer b	Observer B
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign

# STATEWIDE OBSERVERS' TEST

Official Observers test the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment and certify that the ballots are counted correctly. At the Statewide Observers' Test, or OT 2, Official Observers use the counting center voting equipment and the tabulation application.

- Scanner stations use the Verity Central application to count the voted ballots.
- vDrives are used to define the election and write ballots for tabulation.
- Verity Count is the tabulation application to compile and print the results.
- Verity Transmit is the device used to send and accept vDrive transmissions to the Oahu Counting Center.

# OPEN THE COUNTING CENTER

The Statewide Observers' Test is conducted simultaneously at the 4 counting centers to verify the compilation of the result reports statewide.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the Statewide Observers' Test including the inventory and security of the test ballots and vDrives.
- County Elections Divisions assist and support the Counting Center Manager at the neighbor island counting centers.
- Hart Technicians operate the voting equipment and tabulate the test results.
- Office of Elections staff assists and supports operations of the Oahu Counting Center.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager oversees the 4 counting centers from the Oahu Counting Center.

## SUPPLIES

- cut seals envelope
- marker, red
- pens, red
- rubber fingers
- *Statewide Observers' Test Sign In*
- *Test Ballot Inventory*, see page 37
- *Test Ballot Tracking*
- transparent tape
- unissued test ballot packets, remaining
- unused test ballots envelopes
- wire cutter

## TASKS

**1**

### Identify the work areas

- Set up a check in area for Official Observers. The check in area should be positioned near the ETC, as practicable. The space allowed should also account for Official Observers returning their test ballot packet which must be inventoried.

- Identify an area for Official Observers to reconcile their test results.
- Identify the scanner stations and Verity Count work area operated by the Hart Technicians.

## 2

### Check in the Official Observers

- Ask each Official Observer to complete the *Statewide Observers' Test Sign In*. If the Official Observer is returning their test ballot packet for the first time or another Official Observer, the test ballots must be inventoried.
- Ask personnel to store personal belongings including phones and water. Food, drink, and electronic mobile devices are not allowed at the counting center.

### Inventoried test ballots, as necessary

Test ballots are inventoried to ensure the security and integrity of the election. The test ballot packets in the ETC have already been inventoried.

- Ask the Official Observer for their test ballot packets and confirm they are returning all test ballots. If they discarded or removed any test ballots, record the discrepancy on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. Ask the Official Observer to return any removed test ballots before Election Day.
- Check that the test decks - VSC & mail, are segregated and identifiable from unused test ballots. Then, ask the Official Observer to wait on the side while their ballots are inventoried.
- Complete "Check In" on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. **See sample on page 37.**
- Remove only the unused test ballots and store them in the corresponding unused test ballots envelope. Record the Official Observer's name on the unused test ballots envelope, as necessary using a red marker.
- Provide both test ballot packets - VSC & mail, to the Official Observer.
- Hold the unused test ballots envelopes (VSC & mail) to store in the ETC after it is unsealed.

**OAHU:** One ETC is for unused test ballots envelopes; another is for test ballot packets.

## 3

### Unseal the ETC

- Ask the Official Observers to remove the padlock from the ETC.
- Complete the "Certification of Unsealing" on the *Seal Certification* form and unseal. **See sample on page 38.**
- Store the completed *Seal Certification* form in a cut seals envelope.

# INVENTORYING TEST BALLOTS, AS NECESSARY

Test Ballot Inventory



Packet No.	D/P	Check In			Official Observers'			Statewide	Pre-Election	Election Day	Recount	Post-Recount
		test deck	unused	total	test deck	touch writer	total	test deck	test deck	test deck	test deck	test deck
<b>2</b>	00-01-VSC	6	4	10				6				
		comments			comments			comments				
	00-01	12	3	15				12				
		comments			comments			comments				
				10								
		comments			comments			comments				
				15								
		comments			comments			comments				

TEST BALLOT INVENTORY  
 official observer  
**OBSEVER B**

**A** Inventory the test ballots at check in (see page 36)

- Official Observer, first name & last name
- district/precincts (D/Ps)
- number of test ballots in test deck
- number of unused test ballots

**B** Inventory the test ballots after reconciling (see page 48)

- district/precincts (D/Ps)
- number of test ballots in test deck

# CERTIFICATION OF UNSEALING

## Seal Certification

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

### CERTIFICATION OF UNSEALING

page 2 of 2

1	Date	MM/DD	Time	HH:MM AM	Seal No.	0002001
---	------	-------	------	----------	----------	---------

2	Unsealed by (print name)	TINA SAMPLE	Sign	Tina Sample
---	--------------------------	-------------	------	-------------



3	Witnessed by (print name)	Observer a	Sign	Observer A
	Witnessed by (print name)	Observer b	Sign	Observer B
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	

# SCAN TEST BALLOTS

The scanner stations count voted ballots at the counting centers. The ballots are written to a test vDrive to tabulate the test results. Official Observers match the test results to their tally of expected results. Official Observers are also assigned to write an accumulation vDrive to be used to verify the tabulation of the statewide test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the Statewide Observers' Test.
- Hart Technicians operate and write test vDrives at a scanner station.
- Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots, creating a tally of expected results, and matching their results to the voting equipment results report.
- Office of Elections staff assists and supports operations of the Oahu Counting Center.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager oversees the 4 counting centers from the Oahu Counting Center.

## SUPPLIES

- accumulation tags
- pens, red
- *Test vDrive Log*, see page 41
- test zero report envelope
- vDrives, blank, test

## TASKS

**1**

### **Assign accumulation Official Observers**

- Designate 1 Official Observer per scanner station for the accumulation vDrive(s). The Official Observer Chairperson or Counting Center Manager may assign accumulation Official Observers. The accumulation Official Observers are the first to scan their test ballots at each scanner station.
- Provide the accumulation Official Observers BOTH (VSC & mail) test ballot packets to scan.

### **Scanner stations**

Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations.

- Print a zero *Configuration Report* for the Official Observers to certify. The certified report is provided to the Counting Center Manager to pack in the test zero report envelope.

- Collate the Official Observer's test decks (VSC & mail) as a batch to be scanned. A batch is scanned for each Official Observer.
- Scan batch explaining each step taken to the Official Observers. The voting type is set to MAIL.
- After scanning, return the test ballots to the Official Observer. Official Observers store their test ballots in their test ballot packets.
- Wait until the Central-accumulation vDrive is written before allowing remaining Official Observers to scan their test ballots.

## 2

### Write accumulation vDrive

- Ask an accumulation Official Observer to randomly select a blank test vDrive.
- Record the vDrive number on the *Test vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 41.**
- Attach an accumulation tag to identify it as the Central-accumulation vDrive.
- A Hart Technician writes the Central-accumulation vDrive.
- Transfer the test Central-accumulation vDrive to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area to print the test results. **See Print the Test Results & Reconcile on page 43.**

## 3

### Scan test ballots

- Provide Official Observers with BOTH (VSC & mail) test ballot packets.
- Instruct the Official Observers to collate their test decks (VSC & mail) by removing any paper clips or rubber bands.
- Queue the Official Observers to start scanning their test decks after the accumulation vDrive is written.

### Scanner stations

Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations.

- Collate the Official Observer's test decks (VSC & mail) as a batch to be scanned. A batch is scanned for each Official Observer.
- Scan batch explaining each step taken to the Official Observers. The voting type is set to MAIL.
- After scanning, return the test ballots to the Official Observer. Official Observers store their test ballots in their test ballot packets.

# TRACKING ACCUMULATION & TEST VDRIVES

Test vDrive Log



vDrive No.	to write	No. of Ballots	Device	Print test results	from Count	Accumulation	Local Tally	from Count	Comments (Packet Nos.)
4	date mm/dd time hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit	date mm/dd time hh:mm	date mm/dd time hh:mm	date MM/DD time HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	date MM/DD time HH:MM	Accumulation Packet 1
11	mm/dd hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit	mm/dd hh:mm	mm/dd hh:mm		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	MM/DD HH:MM	Accumulation Packet 10
	mm/dd hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit	mm/dd hh:mm	mm/dd hh:mm		<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		Packets 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12
6	MM/DD HH:MM	##	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit	MM/DD HH:MM		MM/DD HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	MM/DD HH:MM	ACCUMULATION PACKET 2 + 3
			<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit				<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
			<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit				<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
			<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer <input type="checkbox"/> Transmit				<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count for local tally <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		

SAMPLE

TEST VDRIVE LOG  
Store test vDrives in Test vDrive envelope in the ETC.

**A** Write test vDrives

- vDrive no.
- to write, date & time
- No. of test ballots
- Device = Central

**B** Print the test results

- Print test results, date & time to Count
- from Count, date & time

**C** Compile the accumulation vDrives (see page 46)

- Accumulation, date & time to Count
- Local Tally
- from Count, date & time

**4****Write test vDrive**

- Ask an Official Observer to randomly select a blank test vDrive.
- Record the vDrive number on the *Test vDrive Log*.
- A Hart Technician writes the test Central vDrive.
- Transfer the test Central vDrive to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area to print the test results. **See Print the Test Results & Reconcile on page 43.**

# PRINT THE TEST RESULTS & RECONCILE

Before tabulating the test vDrives, Official Observers verify that there are no votes in Verity Count, the tabulation application. Then, test vDrives are read into Verity Count to print the test results by packet number. Official Observers reconcile their test results with their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager collects the zero report, disseminates the test results, and assists Official Observers in resolving discrepancies when reconciling.
- Hart Technicians operate Verity Count to print the zero report, and then test results. Each Official Observer is provided printed test results based on their assigned district/precincts (D/Ps). Test results are printed in flow as test vDrives are transferred to the Verity Count work area.
- Office of Elections staff assists at the Oahu Counting Center with disseminating the test results and helping Official Observers resolve discrepancies when reconciling.
- Official Observers certify that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling the test results. Then, Official Observers receive their test results to match to their tally of expected results.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager oversees the 4 counting centers from the Oahu Counting Center.

## SUPPLIES

- accumulation vDrives
- accumulation vDrives envelope
- pens, red
- rubber fingers
- *Test Ballot Inventory*
- test vDrives
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Certify the zero report**

Before tabulating written test vDrives, the Hart Technician prints a zero report.

- Provide the zero report to the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests.

- Ask Official Observers to sign and date the first page of the zero report. Pack the certified report in the test zero report envelope.

## 2

### Distribute the test results

- Provide the test Central vDrives to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area. The Hart Technician prints the test results in ballot face order by packet number.
- Collect the accumulation vDrives in the accumulation vDrives envelope.
- Collect the tabulated test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope at the Verity Count work area.
- Identify the Official Observer by packet number to provide the test results. Instruct each Official Observer to reconcile the test results with their tally of expected results, and certify their test results.

## 3

### Certify the test results

The following procedures are completed by the Official Observers.

- Match the test results to the tally of expected results or previous test results. Confirm the number of ballots, and the votes for candidates, blank (under) votes, and over votes in each contest.
- Certify by signing and dating the first page of the test results.
- Pack the test ballots and certified test results into the test ballot packet and return them to the Counting Center Manager for inventory.

### Resolving discrepancies

- Confirm the test ballots are organized by D/P-split.
- Review the ballots and sort them into stacks by voting position. The number of stacks depends on the number of candidates. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**
- For each stack, count the number of ballots and compare them to the Verity Count test results.

## 4

### Inventory the test ballots

- Complete "Statewide" on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. **See sample on page 37.**
- Store inventoried test ballot packets in the ETC, lowest to highest.
- Explain the next phase of the test to compile the statewide test results from the 4 counting centers.

# RELEASING THE ACCUMULATION TEST RESULTS

The accumulation test is a wide-area network test ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the tabulation of the results reports. Releasing the accumulation test results mimics the release of the Election Day final report. At the Neighbor Island Counting Centers, Hart Technicians use Verity Transmit to send the vDrives data to the Oahu Counting Center. At the Oahu Counting Center, Hart Technicians accept the transmissions, write vDrives, and read the vDrives into Verity Count to compile and print the results reports. The accumulation Official Observers work together to reconcile the results report with their test results. After reconciling, the test results are posted for the media to test.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs the Hart Technicians and updates the Oahu Counting Center as vDrives are transmitted and results received, and assists the accumulation Official Observers to reconcile, as necessary.
- Hart Technicians operate the Verity Count work area. The Oahu Verity Count work area notifies the neighbor island Hart Technicians when the results reports are available to print.
- Office of Elections staff assists and supports operations of the Oahu Counting Center.
- Official Observers review and certify the results reports.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager oversees the 4 counting centers from the Oahu Counting Center.

## SUPPLIES

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- calculator
- seal
- *Seal Certification*
- *Test vDrive Log*, see page 41
- test zero report envelope
- transparent tape

## TASKS

**1**

### **Certify the Verity Count zero report**

- Ask the Hart Technician to confirm the computer system time, as it appears on the report. Then, ask them to print a zero report.

- Ask the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests indicating that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling their test results. Official Observers certify by signing and dating the first page of the report.
- Pack the zero report in the test zero reports envelope.

*Oahu Counting Center*

Verify the zero Statewide Summary report.

**2**

### **Compile the accumulation vDrives**

The accumulation vDrives is provided to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area. Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of vDrives at all times.

*Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

Hart Technicians contact the Oahu Hart Technicians to send vDrives. The Hart Technicians at each counting center confirm the number of vDrives read into Verity Transmit and the number of ballots sent and received.

*Oahu Counting Center*

Hart Technicians receive transmissions from the Neighbor Island Counting Centers and write vDrives. The Transmit-accumulation vDrives and the written Central-accumulation vDrives from the Oahu Counting Center are read into Verity Count. The results reports are printed in order by the number of votes (winner to the top).

**3**

### **Distribute the accumulation County Summary report**

Oahu Hart Technicians notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager and Neighbor Island Hart Technicians when the results reports are compiled and available to print.

The Statewide Counting Center Manager also notifies the Counting Center Manager to work with their Neighbor Island Hart Technician to print and distribute the results reports.

Hart Technicians print the accumulation County Summary report for the Official Observers.

- Provide the accumulation Official Observers the County Summary report to reconcile. Accumulation Observers work together to reconcile the County Summary report using their certified test results. The total turnout on the County Summary report is the total number of test ballots counted by the accumulation Official Observers.
- Official Observers certify the accumulation County Summary report by signing the first page of the report.

**4****Compile local tally***Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

The Neighbor Island Counting Centers confirm the results were transmitted correctly by reconciling an accumulation local tally with the accumulation County Summary report.

- Ask the Hart Technician to read the accumulation vDrives into Verity Count. Ask the Hart Technician to print a cumulative report.
- Provide the accumulation County Summary report and accumulation cumulative report to the Official Observers to match; and resolve any discrepancies.

**5****Certify the accumulation test results**

Ask the Official Observers to certify the accumulation County Summary report and the accumulation local tally report by signing and dating. Store the certified reports in the accumulation vDrives envelope.

**6****Secure the Verity Transmit device**

- Complete a *Seal Certification* to secure the Verity Transmit device.
- Tape the *Seal Certification* form to the top of the Verity Transmit device.

# PACK THE ETC

Test materials, including the test vDrives and test ballot packets, are securely stored in the equipment transport container (ETC).

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Hart Technician archives Verity Count to USB.
- Office of Elections staff at the Oahu Counting Center inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots and vDrives.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager oversees the 4 counting centers from the Oahu Counting Center.

## SUPPLIES

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- Count USB envelope
- rubber fingers
- pens, red
- *Test Ballot Inventory*
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Inventory the test ballots**

Test ballots are inventoried as each Official Observer returns their test ballot packet.

- Complete “Statewide” on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. **See sample on page 37.**
- Store inventoried test ballot packets in the ETC, lowest to highest.

**2**

### **Pack the accumulation & test vDrives**

- Check the *Test vDrive Log* to confirm the number of test vDrives.
- Pack the accumulation vDrives in the accumulation vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.
- Pack the test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.

**3****Archive Verity Count**

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.

**4****Pack the test materials into the ETC**

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- test ballot packets, mail & VSC
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope
- unused test ballots envelopes, mail & VSC
- vDrives, blank, official
- vDrives, blank, test

**NOTE:** *Do not secure any forms in sealed containers!*

**5****Secure the counting center**

Proceed to secure the counting center. **See page 50.**

# SECURE THE COUNTING CENTER

Check that sensitive election materials in all work areas are sealed, including the equipment transport container (ETC), and lock the counting center.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager secures the counting center.
- County Elections Divisions assist at the neighbor island counting centers.
- Hart Technicians manage the Verity Count and scanner stations work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- padlock
- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*

## TASK

**1**

### Secure the ETC

- Complete 2 *Seal Certification* forms. **See sample on page 51.**
- Place 1 copy in the container before closing, and copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Close the ETC and hook on the seal. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.
- Official Observers secure the ETC with the padlock.

**2**

### Pack forms and supplies

Store the forms and supplies.

**3**

### Lock the counting center

When leaving the counting center, check that all access points are secured.

SAMPLE

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

CERTIFICATION OF SEALING

page 1 of 2

<b>1</b>	Date <b>MM/DD</b>	Time <b>HH:MM</b>	Seal No. <b>0002001</b>
----------	----------------------	----------------------	----------------------------

<b>2</b>	<p>Container</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> ballot transport container (BTC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> discard box</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> equipment transport container (ETC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> security cage</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballot container (VBC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voting equipment</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> written vDrive can</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>	<p>Content</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> certified results</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> test ballots</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> test results</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets</p>	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test &amp; accumulation)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written &amp; audit)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>
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<b>3</b>	Witnessed by (print name) <b>Observer a</b>	Sign <b>Observer A</b>
	Witnessed by (print name) <b>Observer b</b>	Sign <b>Observer B</b>
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign

# OPENING THE COUNTING CENTER

The counting center is a secure area; only authorized personnel are allowed in the counting center. Personnel at the counting center must wear their ID badge, including State and County Election Officials, Hart Technicians, and counting center volunteers. Additionally, remember that Official Observers must be present before sealed containers are opened for processing.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager opens the counting center and directs the operations of the work areas.
- County Elections Divisions assist and support the Counting Center Manager on the neighbor islands.
- Office of Elections staff assists and supports operations at the Oahu Counting Center.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager oversees the 4 counting centers from the Oahu Counting Center.

## SUPPLIES

- cut seals envelope
- ID badges
- pens, green (Official Observers)
- pens, red
- transparent tape
- *Volunteer Time Log*
- wire cutter

## TASKS

### **1** Identify the work areas & equipment

- Audit
- Ballot Opening
- Check In
- Counting Center Manager phone
- Duplication
- Equipment transport container (ETC)
- VBC Processing

#### **Hart Technician work areas**

- Verity Count
- Scanner stations

**2****Issue ID badges**

- Ask each volunteer to complete the *Volunteer Time Log*. This log is used to track payment.
- Issue ID badge to authorized personnel and direct them to their work area. If an ID badge is not printed, consult with the County Elections Division or Statewide Counting Center Manager to authorize access. Personnel must wear their badge and return it before leaving.
- Ask personnel to store personal belongings including phones and water. Food, drink, and electronic mobile devices are not allowed at the counting center.
- If the Official Observer is returning their test ballot packet for the first time, it needs to be inventoried. Direct them to the ETC to wait until their test ballot packet can be inventoried. **See *Inventorizing test ballots, as necessary*.**

**3****Unseal the ETC**

- Ask the Official Observers to remove the padlock from the ETC.
- Complete the “Certification of Unsealing” on the *Seal Certification* form and remove the seal. **See *sample on page 54*.**
- Store the completed *Seal Certification* form in a cut seals envelope.

**Pre-Election Observers’ Test**

On the first day of counting, conduct the Pre-Election Observers’ Test. **See page 58.**

**Inventorizing test ballots, as necessary**

- Ask the Official Observer for their test ballot packets and confirm they are returning all test ballots.
- Complete “Check In” on the *Test Ballot Inventory*.
- If they discarded or removed any test ballots, record the discrepancy on the *Test Ballot Inventory*. Ask the Official Observer to return any removed test ballots before Election Day.
- Store the test ballot packets in the ETC by packet number.

# CERTIFICATION OF UNSEALING

## Seal Certification

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

### CERTIFICATION OF UNSEALING

page 2 of 2

1	Date	MM/DD	Time	HH:MM AM	Seal No.	0002001
---	------	-------	------	----------	----------	---------

2	Unsealed by (print name)	TINA SAMPLE	Sign	Tina Sample
---	--------------------------	-------------	------	-------------



3	Witnessed by (print name)	Observer a	Sign	Observer A
	Witnessed by (print name)	Observer b	Sign	Observer B
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	

# SECURING THE COUNTING CENTER

Volunteers secure their work areas before leaving the counting center. The Counting Center Manager confirms the work areas are secured and sensitive election materials are sealed.

**Do not secure any of the Team form folders in sealed containers!**

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager secures the counting center.
- County Elections Divisions assist the Counting Center Manager at the neighbor island counting centers.
- Hart Technicians support, operate, and archive the voting equipment.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of sensitive election materials.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager oversees the 4 counting centers from the Oahu Counting Center.

## SUPPLIES

- padlock
- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*
- *Volunteer Time Log*

## TASKS

**1**

### **Secure the work areas**

As Teams finish their assigned processes, confirm that sensitive election materials in the work areas are sealed shut including:

- defective ballots
- duplicate ballot stock
- duplicated VBCs
- empty return envelopes
- equipment transport container (ETC)
- invalidated ballots
- scanned VBCs
- queued VBCs
- unopened return envelopes

- unprocessed control packets
- written vDrive can

## 2 Collect ID badges

Ensure volunteers return their ID badge and sign out on the *Volunteer Time Log*.

## 3 Pack the ETC

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- test ballot packets, mail & VSC
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope
- unused test ballots envelopes, mail & VSC
- vDrives, blank, official
- vDrives, blank, test

## 4 Secure the ETC

- Complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. **See sample on page 57.**
- Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Close the ETC and hook on the seal. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.
- Official Observers secure the ETC with the padlock. Only the Official Observers know the combination of the padlock.

## 5 Lock the counting center

When leaving the counting center, check that all access points are secured.

SAMPLE

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

**CERTIFICATION OF SEALING**

page 1 of 2

<b>1</b>	Date <b>MM/DD</b>	Time <b>HH:MM</b>	Seal No. <b>0002001</b>
----------	----------------------	----------------------	----------------------------

<b>2</b>	<p>Container</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> ballot transport container (BTC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> discard box</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> equipment transport container (ETC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> security cage</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballot container (VBC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voting equipment</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> written vDrive can</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>	<p>Content</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> certified results</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> test ballots</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> test results</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets</p>	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test &amp; accumulation)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written &amp; audit)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>
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<b>3</b>	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	<i>Observer a</i>	<i>Observer A</i>
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	<i>Observer b</i>	<i>Observer B</i>
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign

# PRE-ELECTION OBSERVERS' TEST

Official Observers test the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment and certify that the ballots are counted correctly. The Pre-Election Test is conducted on the first day of counting using the counting center voting equipment and tabulation application. One (1) Official Observer is assigned to run their test ballot packet per scanner station.

- Scanner stations use the Verity Central application to count the voted ballots.
- vDrives are used to define the election and write ballots for tabulation.
- Verity Count is the tabulation application to compile and print the results.

# SCAN TEST BALLOTS

Test ballots are counted by the scanner stations, using the Verity Central application, at the counting center. The test ballots are written to a test vDrive to tabulate the test results. The Official Observers match the test results with their previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager administers the logic and accuracy test.
- Hart Technicians operate and write test vDrives at a scanner station.
- Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots, creating a tally of expected results, and matching their results to the voting equipment results report.

## SUPPLIES

- pens, red
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### Scan test ballots

- Assign 1 Observer per scanner station and provide them with their test ballot packets from the equipment transport container (ETC).
- Instruct the Official Observers to collate their test decks removing any paper clips or rubber bands.

### Scanner stations

Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations.

- Collate the Official Observer's test decks (mail & VSC) as a batch to be scanned.
- Scan batch explaining each step taken to the Official Observers. The voting method is set to MAIL.
- After scanning, return the test deck to the Official Observer. Official Observers store their test ballots in their test ballot packets.

**2**

### Write test vDrive

- Ask an Official Observer to select a blank test vDrive and record it on the *Test vDrive Log*.
- Transfer the test vDrive to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area to print the test results.

# PRINT THE TEST RESULTS & RECONCILE

Before tabulating the test vDrives, Official Observers verify that there are no votes in Verity Count, the tabulation application. Then, test vDrives are read into Verity Count to print the test results. Official Observers reconcile their test results with their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager collects the zero report, disseminates the test results, and assists Official Observers in resolving discrepancies when reconciling.
- Hart Technicians operate Verity Count to print the zero report, and then test results. Each Official Observer is provided printed test results based on their assigned district/precincts (D/Ps).
- Official Observers certify that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling the test results. Then, they receive their test results to match to their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## SUPPLIES

- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Certify the zero report**

Before tabulating written test vDrives, the Hart Technician prints a zero report.

- Provide the zero report to the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests.
- Ask Official Observers to sign and date the first page of the zero report. Pack the certified report in the test zero report envelope.

**2**

### **Distribute the test results**

- Provide the test vDrives to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area. The Hart Technician prints the test results in ballot face order by packet number.
- Collect the tabulated test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope at the Verity Count work area.
- Identify the Official Observer by packet number to provide the test results. Instruct each Official Observer to reconcile the test results with their tally of expected results, and certify their test results.

**3****Certify the test results**

The following procedures are completed by the Official Observers.

- Match the test results to the tally of expected results or previous test results. Confirm the number of ballots, and votes for candidates, blank (under) votes, and over votes in each contest.
- Certify by signing and dating the first page of the test results.
- Pack the test ballots and certified test results into the test ballot packet and return them to the Counting Center Manager for inventory.

**Resolving discrepancies**

- Confirm the test ballots are organized by D/P-split.
- Review the ballots and sort them into stacks by voting position. The number of stacks depends on the number of candidates. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**
- For each stack, count the number of ballots and compare them to the Verity Count test results.

# PACK THE ETC

The test materials are securely stored in the equipment transport container (ETC). This includes the test ballot packets, test vDrives, and the Count USB backup.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Hart Technician archives Verity Count to USB.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- Count USB envelope
- rubber fingers
- padlock
- pens, red
- *Pre-Election Test Certification*, see page 63
- *Test Ballot Inventory*
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

1

### Inventory the test ballots

Test ballots are inventoried as each Official Observer returns their test ballot packet.

- Complete “Pre-Election” on the *Test Ballot Inventory*.
- Store inventoried test ballot packets in the ETC, lowest to highest.
- Ask each Official Observer who conducted the test to sign the *Pre-Election Test Certification*. **See sample on page 63.**

2

### Pack the test vDrives

Check the *Test vDrive Log* to confirm the number of test vDrives. Pack the test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.



## LOGIC & ACCURACY TEST CERTIFICATION

<b>1</b>	Pursuant to the rules and regulations governing elections, we the undersigned certify to have conducted a logic and accuracy test of the voting and vote counting system at the date and time stated and approve the same as being correct.		Date	Time
			MM/DD	HH:MM
<b>2</b>	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		
	<i>Observer a</i>	<i>Observer A</i>		
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		
	<i>Observer b</i>	<i>Observer B</i>		
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign		

**A** Inventory the test ballots (see page 62)

- date
- time
- Official Observers, print and sign

**3****Archive Verity Count**

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.

**4****Pack the ETC**

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- test ballot packets, mail & VSC
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope
- unused test ballots envelopes, mail & VSC
- vDrives, blank, official
- vDrives, blank, test

**5****Lock the ETC**

When the counting center is open, the ETC may be secured using the padlock when not directly monitored by Official Observers.

---

**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

---

Return envelopes are transferred from the County Elections Divisions to the Ballot Opening Team at the counting center to open and prepare ballots for scanning. The Ballot Opening Team works in sub-groups to process ballots in flow, including using the automatic envelope opener, opening the return envelopes, and removing the ballot.

The Team slices open the return envelopes using an automatic envelope opener. Ballots are then removed in multiple steps to prevent a voter’s identity from being connected to their ballot.

First, the secrecy sleeve is taken out of the return envelope without removing the ballot. When handling the return envelope, the voter’s information is faced down to ensure their secrecy. The empty return envelopes are collected, checked, packed, and secured. Then, once the return envelopes are cleared, the ballots are removed from the secrecy sleeves, unfolded, and packed into voted ballot containers (VBCs) to transfer to the VBC Processing Team for scanning.

Additionally, the Ballot Opening Team identifies defective ballots that cannot be scanned because they are damaged or not tabulation-ready. These ballots are inventoried and transferred to the Duplication Team to remake one-for-one duplicates. The Ballot Opening Team must also track and record issues that invalidate the ballot like if the return envelope or secrecy sleeve is empty or contains more than 1 ballot.

Most tasks of the Ballot Opening Team are sedentary, including removing the secrecy sleeves and unfolding the ballots. However, volunteers may need to be able to stand for long periods of time to use the automatic letter opener and distribute and retrieve return envelopes for processing. Trays of return envelopes for processing and full voted ballot containers weigh up to 10 pounds. Additionally, repetitive motions of standing and crouching may be required to pack empty return envelopes into discard boxes.

## TEAM PROCESSES

- Receiving Return Envelopes, page 66
- Opening the Return Envelopes, page 70
- Removing the Ballot, page 72
- Curing Defective Ballots, page 74
- Invalidating a Ballot, page 78
- Secure the Work Area, page 81

# RECEIVING RETURN ENVELOPES

As voters submit their return envelope, the County Elections Division validates the signature on the return to accept it for counting. Valid return envelopes are securely stored and transferred to the counting center Ballot Opening Team.

The County Elections Division also transfers electronic ballots. An electronic ballot is a record of a voter's selections that must be remade onto a tabulation-ready ballot. The Ballot Opening Team receives and inventories the electronic ballots to transfer to the Duplication Team to make one-for-one duplicates.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team receives and opens valid return envelopes to prepare the ballots for scanning. The Team works in sub-groups to process ballots in flow. Members are also designated to 1) prepare defective ballots (e.g., electronic ballots or damaged ballots) for duplication and 2) track invalid ballots.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots. At Ballot Opening, this includes unsealed containers of return envelopes as they are waiting to be processed.

## SUPPLIES

- automatic envelope opener
- compressed air
- cut seals envelope
- defective stamp
- empty return envelope containers
- pens, red
- transparent tape
- wire cutter

## TASKS

**1**

### **Unseal the container of validated return envelopes**

Verify and remove the seals following the *Seal Certification* form provided by the County Elections Division. **See sample on page 67.**

CERTIFICATION OF UNSEALING

Seal Certification

SAMPLE

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

CERTIFICATION OF UNSEALING

page 2 of 2

1	Date	MM/DD	Time	HH:MM AM	Seal No.	0002001
---	------	-------	------	----------	----------	---------

2	Unsealed by (print name)	TINA SAMPLE	Sign	Tina Sample
---	--------------------------	-------------	------	-------------



3	Witnessed by (print name)	Observer a	Sign	Observer A
	Witnessed by (print name)	Observer b	Sign	Observer B
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	
	Witnessed by (print name)		Sign	

## 2

### Sort the return envelopes

Keep sorted return envelopes together and organized as they are processed. Handle sorted materials 1 container at a time. The sorting makes a potential recount more efficient.

## 3

### Slice open the return envelopes

- Grab a stack of return envelopes. Tap the stack on the table to seat the contents ensuring the ballots are not accidentally cut as it is run through the opener.
- Load the return envelopes into the hopper and turn the automatic envelope opener on.
- Collect the cut envelopes and distribute them to the sub-groups opening return envelopes. **See Opening the Return Envelopes on page 70.**

#### Cleaning the automatic envelope opener

The automatic envelope opener alerts the user or stops when the discard tray needs to be emptied. Reconnect the discard tray to the letter opener as it will not operate if it is not in place. When not in use, clean the envelope opener by wiping the dust and spraying the sensors with compressed air. Improper use of the compressed air may damage the sensors on the automatic envelope opener.

## 4

### Inventory the electronic ballots

- Check that the district/precinct (D/P) is printed on the electronic ballot. If there is no way to identify the D/P, **see Invalidating a Ballot on page 78.**
- Separate the secrecy waiver that may be attached to the electronic ballot, if any. Securely store the secrecy waiver in an empty return envelope container.
- Electronic ballots are transferred to the Duplication Team to remake. Designate a member to collect and process defective ballots. **See Curing Defective Ballots on page 74.**

**DEFECTIVE**

**PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT  
PRECINCT 00-00**



Summary of your votes. Ensure full summary has printed and return to your County Elections Division.

---

**YOU MUST select ONE political party or nonpartisan ballot below**

You selected the **Hawaii Party (H)**

---

**Favorite Plate Lunch, Vote For Not More Than One (1)**

You voted for: **Chicken Katsu**

---

**Favorite Hawaii Beach, Vote For Not More Than One (1)**

You voted for: **Hapuna**

---

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping, Vote For Not More Than One (1)**

You voted for: **Mochi Balls**

---

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors, Vote For Not More Than Three (3)**

You voted for: **Guava**

---

End of Summary Page. Return full summary to your County Elections Division.

# OPENING THE RETURN ENVELOPES

As return envelopes are sliced open, they are distributed to sub-groups tasked with removing the content. Return envelopes are handled so that the voter's information is faced down. Once the content is removed, the ballot can no longer be tied to a voter. The emptied return envelopes are collected, checked, packed, and secured.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team receives and opens valid return envelopes to prepare the ballots for scanning. The Team works in sub-groups to process ballots in flow. Members are also designated to 1) prepare defective ballots (e.g., electronic ballots or damaged ballots) for duplication and 2) track invalid ballots.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots. At Ballot Opening, this includes confirming that return envelopes are cleared from the work area before unfolding the ballots and checking that no ballot is accidentally thrown away.

## SUPPLIES

- empty return envelope containers
- handheld letter openers

## TASKS

### 1 Distribute the cut return envelopes

As return envelopes are cut open, members distribute containers to sub-groups to remove the content (i.e., secrecy sleeve concealing the ballot).

### 2 Remove the content

Remove the secrecy sleeve from the return envelope.

- Accumulate the secrecy sleeves in a stack. Do not remove the ballot from the secrecy sleeve at this time. If the voter did not use the secrecy sleeve, keep the ballot with the stack of secrecy sleeves.
- In a separate stack, accumulate the emptied return envelopes.
- If the return envelope is empty or contains more than 1 ballot, it is invalid. Designate a member to collect and process invalid ballots. As the designated member, **see Invalidating a Ballot on page 78.**

**NOTE:** *Orienting the return envelopes and secrecy sleeves so that they are facing the same direction makes removing the content more efficient.*

**3****Collect the return envelopes**

A sub-group is assigned to collect the empty return envelopes to pack and secure.

- Orient the return envelopes to align the hole, and check that no ballot is accidentally left in the envelope. Manually check the envelope if there is no hole.
- Neatly pack the empty return envelopes in an empty return envelope container.
- Official Observers ensure the empty return envelopes are cleared from the work area before removing the ballot from the secrecy sleeve.

# REMOVING THE BALLOT

The Ballot Opening Team clears the empty return envelopes from the work area before removing the ballot from the secrecy sleeves. Voters use the optional secrecy sleeve to conceal their votes as their ballot is opened.

Once the emptied return envelopes are cleared from the work area, Ballot Opening members remove the ballot from the secrecy sleeve. Unfolded ballots are packed into voted ballot containers (VBCs) to transfer to the VBC Processing Team to be counted.

Ballot Opening members may notice that the ballot is damaged. For example, if a ballot is torn in half, a Ballot Opening member tapes the pieces back together and prepares it for duplication.

**NOTE:** *If the ballots were sorted, ensure the grouping is kept organized.*

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team receives and opens valid return envelopes to prepare the ballots for scanning. The Team works in sub-groups to process ballots in flow. Members are also designated to 1) prepare defective ballots (e.g., electronic ballots or damaged ballots) for duplication and 2) track invalid ballots.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots. At Ballot Opening, this includes confirming no ballot is accidentally thrown away and walking the VBCs to the VBC Processing Team.
- VBC Processing Team receives VBCs from the Ballot Opening Team to log and queue for scanning.

## SUPPLIES

- mail VBCs
- markers, red
- trash bags, clear

## TASKS

### **1** Remove the ballot from the secrecy sleeve

If the ballots are sorted, be sure that sub-groups work with 1 grouping at a time.

- Take the ballot out of the secrecy sleeve, unfold it, and accumulate them in a stack.
- If a ballot is damaged (e.g., torn in half), it must be transferred to the Duplication Team. Designate a member to collect and process damaged ballots. As the designated member, **see Curing Defective Ballots on page 74.**

- If the secrecy sleeve is empty or it contains more than 1 ballot, the ballot is invalidated. Designate a member to collect and process invalid ballots. As the designated member, **see Invalidating a Ballot on page 78**.

## **2** Collect empty secrecy sleeves

A sub-group collects the emptied secrecy sleeves and checks that no ballot is accidentally left inside.

- Orient the secrecy sleeve to align the hole. Verify that no ballot is accidentally left in a return envelope by checking that no ballot is visible from the opening and feel that no extra paper is folded into the secrecy sleeve.
- Discard the empty secrecy sleeve into a clear trash bag.

## **3** Pack VBCs

- If the ballots are sorted, flip through the stacks of ballots to check the grouping is correct. Record the sort on the container label on the VBC with a red marker.
- If any voted ballots appear to be lightly damaged or possibly damaged, pack them at the top of the stack in the VBC. A ballot that needs to be duplicated will be rejected by the scanner station and collected for duplication by the VBC Processing Team.
- Pack unfolded voted ballots in VBCs. Smooth the creases in the ballots by reversing the folds and rolling small stacks of ballots to flatten them out.
- Close the VBC and transfer it to the VBC Processing Team with Official Observers.
- Notify the Counting Center Manager and VBC Processing Team when the last VBC has been transferred.

# CURING DEFECTIVE BALLOTS

A defective ballot is unreadable by the scanner station. Common reasons for duplication include:

- Electronic ballots are records of voters' selections that must be remade onto a tabulation-ready ballot.
- Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWABs) are records of voters' selections that must be remade onto a tabulation-ready ballot.
- Physical damage may occur during the normal marking and handling of the ballot.

The defective ballots are collected, inventoried, and transferred in numbered control packets, to ensure no ballots are added or removed between work areas, with Official Observers. Unprocessed control packets may be securely stored until the Duplication Team is available.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team designates a member to prepare defective ballots for the Duplication Team.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team remakes one-for-one duplicates of defective ballots.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots, like control packets between work areas.
- VBC Processing Team receives completed control packets from the Ballot Opening Team to secure the defective ballots and prepare the duplicated ballots for scanning.

## SUPPLIES

- control packet, see page 76
- *Control Packet Time Log*, see page 77
- defective stamp
- pens, red
- transparent tape

## TASKS

**1**

### **Prepare defective ballots**

- Use transparent tape, as necessary, to repair damaged ballots.

- Stamp the top left on the front of each damaged ballot with the red defective stamp. Avoid stamping near the barcodes.

## **2** Transfer the control packet(s) to Duplication

- Prepare the control packet by recording the number of defective ballots and initialing. **See sample on page 76.**
- Record the time out on the *Control Packet Time Log*. **See sample on page 77.**
- Walk the control packet to the Duplication work area with Official Observers. Wait while the Duplication Team inventories and initials the control packet.
- The Duplication Team returns the completed control packet to the Ballot Opening Team.

## **3** Check in the completed control packet

The Duplication Team returns the completed control packet to the Ballot Opening Team. All outstanding control packets must be received by the Ballot Opening Team and transferred to the VBC Processing Team before securing the work area.

- Work with 1 control packet at a time. Confirm the inventory and check that each defective and corresponding duplicate is stamped with a control number.
- Initial the control packet to confirm the ballot inventory. If the inventory is incorrect, return the control packet to the Duplication Team to correct.
- Record the time on the *Control Packet Time Log*.

## **4** Transfer the completed control packet

- Complete the *Control Packet Time Log*. Walk the control packet to the VBC Processing work area with Official Observers.
- Wait for the VBC Processing Team to remove the ballots and return the empty control packet.
- Notify the VBC Processing Team when transferring the last control packet.

A
B
C

SAMPLE

**CONTROL PACKET 11** Return to Ballot Opening

Set	Electronic	Damaged	Defective	to Duplication		Duplicated	from Duplication		to VBC Processing			
				Ballot Opening initials	Duplication initials		Duplication initials	Ballot Opening initials	Ballot Opening initials	VBC Processing initials		
1	10	+	1	=	11	ha	DU	11	DU	ha	ha	PA
2	10	+		=	10	ha	DU					
3		+		=								
4		+		=								
5		+		=								
6												
7												
8												
9												
10												

**A** **Transfer the control packet(s) to Duplication (see page 75)**

- Number of electronic defective ballots
- Number of damaged defective ballots
- Total number of defective ballots
- Ballot Opening initials to confirm inventory
- Duplication initials to accept custody

**B** **Check in the completed control packet (see page 75)**


- Number of duplicated ballots
- Duplication initials to confirm inventory
- Ballot Opening initials to accept custody

**C** **Transfer the completed control packet (see page 75)**

- Ballot Opening initials to confirm inventory
- VBC Processing initials to accept custody

# TRACKING CONTROL PACKETS

## Control Packet Time Log



Packet No.	Set 1	Set 2	Set 3	Set 4	Set 5	Set 6	Set 7	Set 8	Set 9	Set 10
11	out <i>mm/dd hh:mm</i>	<i>mm/dd hh:mm</i>								
12	in <i>mm/dd hh:mm</i>									
13	out <i>mm/dd hh:mm</i>									
14										
15										
16										
17										
18										
19										
20										

CONTROL PACKET TIME LOG

- A** **Transfer the control packet(s) to Duplication (see page 75)**
  - Date & time to Duplication Team
- B** **Check in the completed control packet (see page 75)**
  - Date & time from Duplication Team
- C** **Transfer the completed control packet (see page 75)**
  - Date & time to VBC Processing Team
- D** **Check for outstanding control packets (see page 81)**
  - Date & time to Duplication, pending return

# INVALIDATING A BALLOT

A Ballot Opening member is assigned to track invalid ballots. A ballot may be invalidated at the counting center if:

- The return envelope appears to have been tampered with;
- The return envelope or secrecy sleeve is empty;
- There is more than 1 ballot in a return envelope or secrecy sleeve;
- The ballot is from the wrong election; or
- The D/P is unidentifiable.

**NOTE:** Do not secure the Invalid Ballot Log in the container of invalid ballots!

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team assigns a member to collect and track invalid ballots.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots like processing and securing invalid ballots.

## SUPPLIES

- automatic numbering machine
- invalid ballot container
- *Invalid Ballot Log*, see page 80
- invalid stamp, red
- pens, red
- scratch paper
- stamp ink, red
- stapler

## TASKS

**1**

### **Stamp the ballot invalid**

- Staple the ballot materials together. The ballot materials include the return envelope, secrecy sleeve, and/or ballot, depending on the invalid condition.
- Stamp the ballot materials invalid.

**2****Assign a control number**

Complete the *Invalid Ballot Log*. Using the automatic numbering machine, stamp the ballot materials to assign the control number. **See sample on page 80.**

**Setting up the automatic numbering machine**


Set the automatic numbering machine to “2” to duplicate the control number. Then, test that it is legibly stamping 2 copies of the same number on scratch paper. Re-ink the stamp pad as necessary by pouring a small amount of ink onto the dry pad and allowing it to soak in before using it.

**3****Store invalidated ballots**


- Store invalid ballot materials in the invalid ballot container. To secure the invalid ballot container, **see Secure the Work Area on page 81.**
- The invalid ballot container is reused each day of counting. Follow the “Certification of Unsealing” on the *Seal Certification* form to unseal.

# ASSIGN A CONTROL NUMBER

## Invalid Ballot Log



D/P	Return Envelope	Secrecy Sleeve	Ballot	Control No.	Comments
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election	000001	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty <input type="checkbox"/> ID required <input type="checkbox"/> Tampered	<input type="checkbox"/> Empty	<input type="checkbox"/> D/P unidentifiable <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong election		



**Assign a control number (see page 79)**

- district/precinct (D/P)
- reason for invalid
- control no.

# SECURE THE WORK AREA

Before Election Day, the Ballot Opening Team must complete processing any secrecy sleeves before closing the work area. Return envelopes that have not been opened or the content has not been removed may be secured during the scheduled counting days if the Team is unable to finish in the approximated shift time.

On Election Day, all ballots must be opened and transferred to the VBC Processing Team before closing the Ballot Opening work area.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team notifies the Counting Center Manager and VBC Processing Team once the last voted ballot container (VBC) has been transferred. Then, the Team secures the sensitive election materials, like the empty return envelope containers and the invalid ballot container.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transport of ballots including securing materials.

## SUPPLIES

- *Control Packet Time Log*, see page 77
- empty return envelope containers
- *Empty Return Envelope Seal Certification*, see page 84
- invalid ballot container
- *Invalid Ballot Log*, see page 80
- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*, see page 83
- unprocessed control packet container

## TASKS

1

### Check for outstanding control packets

- Complete outstanding control packets. **See Curing Defective Ballots on page 74.**
- Review the *Control Packet Time Log* to identify any control packets at the Duplication work area. **See sample on page 77.**

### Secure unprocessed control packets

Before Election Day, unprocessed control packets that have not been transferred to the Duplication Team may be secured in the designated container.

- Complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container. **See sample on page 83.**
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

## 2 Secure the unopened return envelopes

Before Election Day, the unopened return envelopes may be secured if the Ballot Opening Team is unable to complete the task within the estimated schedule. Ensure the container is clearly identifiable!

- Complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container. **See sample on page 83.**
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

## 3 Secure the invalid ballot container

- Verify that the number of invalid ballots matches the *Invalid Ballot Log*.
- Complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container. **See sample on page 83.**
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

## 4 Secure the empty return envelope containers

- Complete the *Empty Return Envelope Seal Certification* form. **See sample on page 84.**
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal through the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

## 5 Pack the forms and supplies

- Store the forms and supplies in the supply bag.
- Notify the Counting Center Manager that the work area has been secured.

## 6 Check out and return badge

- Sign out on the *Volunteer Time Log*.
- Return the ID badge. ID badges are organized alphabetically by last name.

SAMPLE

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

**CERTIFICATION OF SEALING**

page 1 of 2

<b>1</b> Date <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">MM/DD</span>	Time <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">HH:MM</span>	Seal No. <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">0002002</span>
--	--	--

<b>2</b> Container <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ballot transport container (BTC) <input type="checkbox"/> discard box <input type="checkbox"/> equipment transport container (ETC) <input type="checkbox"/> security cage <input type="checkbox"/> voted ballot container (VBC) <input type="checkbox"/> voting equipment <input type="checkbox"/> written vDrive can <input type="checkbox"/> other:	Content <table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> certified results</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test &amp; accumulation)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written &amp; audit)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> test ballots</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> test results</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> other:</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	<input type="checkbox"/> certified results	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)	<input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test & accumulation)	<input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written & audit)	<input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock	<input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)	<input type="checkbox"/> test ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)	<input type="checkbox"/> test results	<input type="checkbox"/> other:	<input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets	
<input type="checkbox"/> certified results	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)																
<input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test & accumulation)																
<input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written & audit)																
<input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock	<input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____																
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)																
<input type="checkbox"/> test ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)																
<input type="checkbox"/> test results	<input type="checkbox"/> other:																
<input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets																	

3	Witnessed by (print name)  <span style="color: green; font-size: 1.2em;">Observer a</span>	Sign  <span style="color: green; font-size: 1.2em;">Observer A</span>
	Witnessed by (print name)  <span style="color: green; font-size: 1.2em;">Observer b</span>	Sign  <span style="color: green; font-size: 1.2em;">Observer B</span>
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign

# SECURE THE EMPTY RETURN ENVELOPE CONTAINERS

## Empty Return Envelope Seal Certification



Container No.	Date	Time	Seal No.	Official Observer		Comments
				print	sign	
1	mm/dd	hh:mm	0001001	Observer a	Observer A	
				Observer b	Observer B	
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

EMPTY RETURN ENVELOPE SEAL CERTIFICATION



### Secure empty return envelope containers (see page 82)

- Date
- Time
- Seal No.
- Official Observers, print & sign

---

**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

---

The VBC Processing Team tracks, handles, and secures voted ballot containers (VBCs) and written vDrives. The Team manage the flow of VBCs to and from the scanner stations operated by Hart Technicians. Scanned ballots are written to a vDrive for tabulation. The Team also receives VBCs and written vDrives from the voter service centers.

Starting on Election Day, the written vDrives are compiled to print the results reports. After Election Day, the VBC Processing work area continues to track and log VBCs and vDrives if an automatic recount is triggered.

The VBC Processing Team lifts and moves VBCs and equipment which range from 10-20 pounds. This work area requires a lot of walking and repetitive motions to move VBCs to and from the scanner stations and sealing materials.

## PROCESSING VOTED BALLOTS & ELECTION DAY

- Assign Audit VBCs & vDrives, page 86
- Logging VBCs & vDrives, page 89
- Curing Defective Ballots, page 95
- Receive VSC Voting Equipment & VBCs, page 101
- Transfer Audit VBCs, page 106
- Secure the Work Area, page 107

## REPORTING THE RESULTS

- Releasing Report 1, page 127
- Releasing Report 2, page 131
- Election Day Final Report, page 134
- Post-Election Count, page 145

## AUTOMATIC RECOUNT, IF ANY

- Rescan VSC Ballots, page 182
- Rescan Mail Ballots, page 187
- Cure Defective Ballots, page 189
- Tabulating the Recount, page 192
- Secure the Work Area, page 194

# ASSIGN AUDIT VBCS & VDRIVES

On the first day of processing voted ballots, the VBC Processing Team and Counting Center Manager assign audit voted ballot containers (VBCs) and log audit vDrives. Election audits ensure the accuracy and integrity of the results. The first VBC per scanner station is assigned for the audit. Make sure the audit VBCs and audit vDrives are identifiable.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager oversees assigning the audit VBCs and writing the audit vDrives.
- Hart Technicians operate and maintain the scanner stations and write vDrives.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots and vDrives.
- VBC Processing Team tracks and logs VBCs and written vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- audit VBC labels
- audit vDrive tags
- calculator
- Configuration Report folder
- pens, red
- scale
- *VBC Counted Log*, see page 92
- *VBC Time Log*, see page 90
- vDrive, blank, official
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*, see page 94

## TASKS

**1**

### Calibrate the scale

The scale estimates the number of ballots packed in a VBC as a check that all ballots are counted, and no ballots are added or removed. Calibrate the scale when opening the work area and as necessary throughout the day.

- Twist the feet and align the level to balance the scale. Tilting and jostling the scale, especially when calibrating, impacts the accuracy.

- Place an empty VBC on the scale and press “Zero/Tare.” The scale should read “0” indicating the weight of the VBC is not included.
- Add 5 ballots to the VBC and then wait while the scale calculates.
- Add 1 ballot to the scale and ensure it increments to “6”.

## 2

### Assign audit VBCs

- When receiving a VBC from the Ballot Opening work area, place it on the scale and fill out the *VBC Time Log*. **See sample on page 90.**
- Identify an audit VBC by adhering an audit VBC label above the container number and record “Audit” in the comments on the *VBC Time Log*.

## 3

### Scan the audit VBCs

- At the start of scanning, receive the Configuration Report from the Hart Technicians. Store it in the Configuration Report folder.
- Record the date and time the VBC is transferred on the *VBC Time Log*. Walk the VBC to the scanner station and notify the Hart Technician that it is an audit VBC.

#### Scanner stations

Hart Technicians load approximately 200 ballots per batch into the scanner hopper. For each scanned batch, a report is printed and rubber-banded to the ballots. The ballots are repacked into the VBC. Before transferring the VBC back to the VBC Processing Team, the Hart Technician confirms all ballots were resolved and completes the scanned label on the flap of the container.

If the scanner rejects a ballot, the Hart Technician will examine it to confirm that it is defective. Defective ballots are removed from the VBC and put in the defective tray at the station to be collected by the VBC Processing Team. A designated VBC Processing member prepares defective ballots for duplication.

**See Curing Defective Ballots on page 95.**

## 4

### Retrieve the scanned VBC

Hart Technicians raise their hands when they complete scanning a VBC. **Do not provide another VBC until the audit vDrive is written.**

- Complete the *VBC Time Log*. Confirm that the “Scanned total” approximately equals the “Scale count” recorded on the *VBC Time Log*. Do not re-weigh the VBC as reports are added at the scanner station changing the weight of the content.
- Complete the *VBC Counted Log* by recording the number of ballots by batch and keeping a running total (cumulative) of counted and defective ballots. **See sample on page 90.**

- Keep uncounted VBCs separated from the scanned VBCs. Scanned VBCs are identifiable by the completed scanned label and identifiers applied by the Hart Technicians indicating the scanner station.
- To securely store the scanned VBCs, **see Secure the Work Area on page 107.**

**NOTE:** *If there is a significant discrepancy (e.g.,  $\pm 25$  ballots), re-calibrate the scale, check the numbers of ballots scanned are recorded correctly, and alert the Counting Center Manager. The Counting Center Manager notifies the Statewide Counting Center Manager of repeated discrepancies.*

## 5

### Write the audit vDrive

Official Observers select a blank official vDrive from the equipment transport container (ETC) to provide to Hart Technicians to write the Central-audit vDrive. The Hart Technician provides the Central-audit vDrive to the VBC Processing Team.

- Attach an audit vDrive tag to the written Central-audit vDrive so that it is identifiable.
- Record the written Central-audit vDrive on the *Written vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 94.**
- Store the written Central-audit vDrive in the written vDrive can. Official Observers monitor the written vDrive can at all times when it is not sealed.

# LOGGING VBCS & VDRIVES

Each voted ballot container (VBC) and written vDrive is tracked. The VBC Processing Team transfers 1 VBC at a time to each scanner station. Hold the checked in VBCs in queue at the work area until a scanner station is available. Additionally, the VBC Processing Team logs and secures the written vDrives, provided by the Hart Technicians, on the *Written vDrive Log*. Written vDrives are compiled starting on Election Day to release the results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Hart Technicians operate and maintain the scanner stations and write vDrives.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots and vDrives.
- VBC Processing Team tracks VBCs and written vDrives and transfers the VBCs to and from the scanner stations in flow. The Team also designates a member to collect defective ballots for duplication.

## SUPPLIES

- calculator
- Configuration Report folder
- pens, red
- scale
- *VBC Counted Log*, see page 92
- *VBC Time Log*, see page 90
- vDrive, blank
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*, see page 94

## TASKS

**1**

### Calibrate the scale

The scale estimates the number of ballots packed in a VBC as a check that all ballots are counted, and no ballots are added or removed. Calibrate the scale when opening the work area and as necessary throughout the day.

- Twist the feet and align the level to balance the scale. Tilting and jostling the scale, especially when calibrating, impacts the accuracy.

# TRACKING VOTED BALLOT CONTAINERS

## VBC Time Log



VBC No.	Sorting	from Ballot Opening		Scale count	to Scanner		from Scanner		Scanned total	Comments
		date	time	date	time	date	time			
1	##	MM/DD	HH:MM	698	MM/DD	HH:MM	MM/DD	HH:MM	700	AUDIT
2	##	MM/DD	HH:MM	651	MM/DD	HH:MM	MM/DD	HH:MM	652	AUDIT
3	##	MM/DD	HH:MM	702	MM/DD	HH:MM	MM/DD	HH:MM	703	AUDIT
4	##	MM/DD	HH:MM	688	MM/DD	HH:MM				
5	##	MM/DD	HH:MM	709						
6										
7										
8										
9										
10										

SAMPLE

VBC TIME LOG

**A** Check in the VBC (see page 91)

- Sorting
- from Ballot Opening, date & time
- Scale count

**B** Scan the ballots (see page 91)

- to Scanner, date & time

**C** Retrieve the scanned VBC (see page 91)

- from Scanner, date & time
- Scanned total

- Place an empty VBC on the scale and press “Zero/Tare.” The scale should read “0” indicating the weight of the VBC is not included.
- Add 5 ballots to the VBC and then wait while the scale calculates.
- Add 1 ballot to the scale and ensure it increments to “6”.

## 2 Check in the VBC

When receiving a VBC from the Ballot Opening work area, place it on the scale and fill out the *VBC Time Log*. **See sample on page 90.**

If a scanner station is not immediately available, hold the VBCs in the queue at the work area. Hart Technicians work with 1 VBC at a time.

## 3 Scan the ballots

- At the start of scanning, receive the Configuration Report from the Hart Technicians. Store it in the Configuration Report folder.
- Record the date and time to scanner on the *VBC Time Log* for the VBC when a scanner station is available. Walk the VBC to the scanner station.

### Scanner stations

Hart Technicians load approximately 200 ballots per batch into the scanner hopper. For each scanned batch, a report is printed and rubber-banded to the ballots. The ballots are repacked into the VBC. Before transferring the VBC back to the VBC Processing Team, the Hart Technician confirms all ballots were resolved and completes the scanned label on the flap of the container.

If the scanner rejects a ballot, the Hart Technician will examine it to confirm that it is defective. Defective ballots are removed from the VBC and put in the defective tray at the station to be collected by the VBC Processing Team. A designated VBC Processing member prepares defective ballots for duplication.

**See Curing Defective Ballots on page 95.**

## 4 Retrieve the scanned VBC

Hart Technicians raise their hands when they are ready to scan another VBC.

- Complete the *VBC Time Log*. Confirm that the “Scanned Total” approximately equals the “Scale Count” recorded on the *VBC Time Log*. Do not re-weigh the VBC as reports are added at the scanner station changing the scale count.
- Complete the *VBC Counted Log* by recording the number of ballots by batch, from the scanned label on VBC. Keep a running total (cumulative) of counted and defective ballots. **See sample on page 92.**

# RETRIEVE THE SCANNED VBC

## VBC Counted Log



VBC No.	Date	Batch A	B	C	D	E	Counted	Cumulative Counted	Defective	Cumulative Defective
1	MM/DD	counted 200	220	198	82		700	700	0	0
		defective							0	0
2	HH:MM	counted 190	186	202	74		652	1,352	0	0
		defective							0	0
3	HH:MM	counted 188	212	152	151		703	2,055	1	1
		defective			1				1	1
4		counted								
		defective								
5		counted								
		defective								
6		counted								
		defective								
7		counted								
		defective								
8		counted								
		defective								
9		counted								
		defective								
10		counted								
		defective								

VBC COUNTED LOG



### Retrieve the scanned VBC (see page 91)

- Date scanned
- Number of ballots counted by batch (A, B, C, D, E, etc.)
- Counted total
- Cumulative counted (VBC line + previous VBC line)
- Defective total
- Cumulative defective (VBC line + previous VBC line)

- Keep uncounted VBCs separated from the scanned VBCs. Scanned VBCs are identifiable by the completed scanned label and identifiers applied by the Hart Technicians noting the scanner station.
- To securely store the scanned VBCs, **see Secure the Work Area on page 107.**

**NOTE:** *If there is a significant discrepancy ( $\pm 25$  ballots), re-calibrate the scale, check the numbers of ballots scanned are recorded correctly, and alert the Counting Center Manager. The Counting Center Manager notifies the Statewide Counting Center Manager of repeated discrepancies.*

## 5

### Write vDrives

Official Observers select a blank official vDrive from the equipment transport container (ETC) to provide to Hart Technicians to write a vDrive. Official Observers monitor the vDrives at all times. The blank vDrives may be locked in the ETC when not directly monitored by Official Observers.

## 6


### Track written vDrives

The Hart Technician provides the written Central vDrives to the VBC Processing Team.

- Record the written Central vDrive on the *Written vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 94.**
- Store written Central vDrives in the written vDrive can. Official Observers monitor the written vDrive can at all times when it is not sealed.
- To add written vDrives, open the secured can following the “Certification of Unsealing” on the corresponding *Seal Certification* form on the lid of the can.
- To securely store the written vDrive can, **see Secure the Work Area on page 107.**

# TRACKING WRITTEN VDRIVES

## Written vDrive Log



### WRITTEN VDRIVE LOG

vDrive No.	Check in		No. of Ballots	Device	to Transmit		Local Tally	from Count		Comments
	date	time			date	time		date	time	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			AUDIT
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count			

A

**Track written vDrives (see page 93)**

- vDrive No.
- Check in, date & time
- No. of ballots
- Device

# CURING DEFECTIVE BALLOTS

A defective ballot may be damaged and unreadable by the scanner station. Common reasons include:

- Damaged barcodes may occur due to a stray mark too close to the barcode or if a voter colors in the timing marks on the ballot.
- Physical damage may occur during the normal marking and handling of the ballot.

The VBC Processing Team collects defective ballots that the scanner stations have rejected. The defective ballots are inventoried and transferred in numbered control packets, to ensure no ballots are added or removed between work areas, with Official Observers. Unprocessed control packets may be securely stored until the Duplication Team is available.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team transfers completed control packets to the VBC Processing Team to scan the duplicated ballots and store the defective ballots.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team remakes one-for-one duplicates of defective ballots.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots and vDrives including moving control packets between work areas.
- VBC Processing Team collects defective ballots from the scanner stations to prepare for duplication; and receives the completed control packets from the Duplication Team and Ballot Opening Team to secure the defective ballots and queue the duplicated ballots for scanning.

## SUPPLIES

- control packet
- *Control Packet Time Log*, see page 98
- defective ballot container
- defective stamp
- duplicated voted ballot container (VBC)
- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*, see page 100
- sealing hook

# TASKS

## 1 Prepare defective ballots

- Designate a member to collect defective ballots from the scanner stations and prepare control packets for the Duplication Team.
- Stamp the top left on the front of each damaged ballot with the red defective stamp. Avoid stamping near the barcodes.

## 2 Transfer control packet(s) to Duplication

- Prepare the control packet by recording the number of defective ballots and initialing. **See sample on page 97.**
- Record the time out on the *Control Packet Time Log*. Walk the control packet to the Duplication work area with Official Observers, and wait while the Duplication Team inventories and initials the control packet. **See sample on page 98.**
- Notify the Duplication Team when transferring the last control packet to be processed.

## 3 Check in the completed control packet

The VBC Processing Team receives completed control packets from the Duplication Team and Ballot Opening Team.

- Work with 1 control packet at a time. Confirm the inventory and check that each defective and corresponding duplicate is stamped with a control number.
- Initial the control packet to confirm the ballot inventory. If the inventory is incorrect, return the control packet to the Duplication Team or Ballot Opening Team to resolve the discrepancy.
- Complete the *Control Packet Time Log*.
- Remove the defective ballots to store them in a defective ballot container. Defective ballot containers start at container 1d. Use the corresponding duplicated VBC (e.g., VBC 1d) to pack the duplicated ballots.
- Return the empty Ballot Opening control packet to the Ballot Opening Team. Store empty VBC Processing control packets with supplies.

## 4 Queue the duplicated VBC to scan

When the duplicated VBC is full or once all control packets have been received for the day, queue the VBC for scanning. **See Logging VBCs & vDrives on page 89.**

A
B

SAMPLE

**CONTROL PACKET 1**

Return to VBC Processing

Set	Defective	to Duplication		Duplicated	from Duplication	
		VBC Processing initials	Duplication initials		Duplication initials	VBC Processing initials
1	1	PA	DU	1	DU	PA
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

**A** **Transfer control packet(s) to Duplication (see page 96)**

- Number of defective ballots
- VBC Processing initials to confirm inventory
- Duplication initials to confirm inventory

**B** **Check in the completed control packet (see page 96)**

- Number of duplicated ballots
- VBC Processing initials to confirm inventory
- Duplication initials to confirm inventory

# TRACKING CONTROL PACKETS

## Control Packet Time Log

Packet No.	Set 1 (Date & Time)	Set 3	Set 4	Set 5	Set 6	Set 7	Set 8	Set 9	Set 10
1	out MM/DD HH:MM in MM/DD HH:MM								
2									
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
8									
9									
10									

**A** Transfer control packet(s) to Duplication (see page 96)

- Date & time to Duplication Team

**B** Check in the completed control packet (see page 96)

- Date & time from Duplication Team

**5****Secure the defective ballot container**

Once the duplicated VBC is queued for scanning, seal the corresponding defective ballot container.

- With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container. **See sample on page 100.**
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

# CERTIFICATION OF SEALING

## Seal Certification

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

SAMPLE

### CERTIFICATION OF SEALING

page 1 of 2

<b>1</b>	Date <b>MM/DD</b>	Time <b>HH:MM</b>	Seal No. <b>0002003</b>
<b>2</b>	<p>Container</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ballot transport container (BTC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> discard box</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> equipment transport container (ETC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> security cage</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballot container (VBC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voting equipment</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> written vDrive can</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>	<p>Content</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> certified results</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> defective ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> test ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> test results</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test &amp; accumulation)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written &amp; audit)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>
<b>3</b>	<p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <p><b>Observer a</b></p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <p><b>Observer b</b></p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p>	<p>Sign</p> <p><b>Observer A</b></p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <p><b>Observer B</b></p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p>	

# RECEIVE VSC VOTING EQUIPMENT & VBCS

The County Elections Divisions transfer voter service center (VSC) voting equipment and voted ballot containers (VBCs) to the counting center. At the counting center, the VBC Processing Team checks in and stores the materials. The voting equipment includes:

- vDrives that are secured in the Verity voting equipment to define the election and write ballots for tabulation.
- Verity Print is a ballot-on-demand device for the County Elections Divisions to issue blank ballots.
- Verity Scan is an in-person ballot counter for voters to cast their ballot.
- Verity Touch Writer is an accessible ballot marking device (BMD) that allows voters to mark and print a tabulation-ready ballot.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- County Elections Divisions transfer VSC voting equipment and VBCs to the counting center.
- Hart Technicians operate and maintain the Verity voting equipment.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots and vDrives.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager confirms the VSC results are reported.
- VBC Processing Team receives, logs, and stores the VSC voting equipment and VBCs.

## SUPPLIES

- cut seals envelope
- pens, red
- *Verity Print Seal Certification*, see page 102
- Verity Print & Verity Touch Writer vDrives envelope, in written vDrives can
- *Verity Scan Seal Certification*, see page 102
- *Verity Touch Writer Seal Certification*, see page 102
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*, see page 103
- *Voter Service Center VBC Log*, see page 105
- wire cutter

# UNSEALING VERITY DEVICES

## Verity Seal Certification forms



Location	Device No.	vDrive No.	Seal No.	Sealed		Unsealed		Unsealed by	
				date mm/dd	time hh:mm	date MM/DD	time HH:MM	print	sign
Hawaii 1	S000001	###	0000510	Observer a	Observer a	PROCESSING A	Processing A	Observer B	Observer B
Hawaii 2	S000002	###	0000511	Observer a	Observer a	PROCESSING A	Processing A	Observer B	Observer B



Location	Device No.	vDrive No.	Seal No.	Sealed		Unsealed		Unsealed by	
				date mm/dd	time hh:mm	date MM/DD	time HH:MM	print	sign
Hawaii 1	TW00001	###	0000512	Observer a	Observer a	PROCESSING A	Processing A	Observer B	Observer B
Hawaii 2	TW00002	###	0000513	Observer a	Observer a	PROCESSING A	Processing A	Observer B	Observer B
Hawaii 3	TW00003	###	0000514	Observer a	Observer a	PROCESSING A	Processing A	Observer B	Observer B
Hawaii 4	TW00004	###	0000515			PROCESSING A	Processing A		



Location	Device No.	vDrive No.	Seal No.	Sealed		Unsealed		Unsealed by	
				date mm/dd	time hh:mm	date MM/DD	time HH:MM	print	sign
Hawaii 1	P000001	###	0000516	Observer a	Observer a	PROCESSING A	Processing A	Observer B	Observer B
Hawaii 2	P000002	###	0000517	Observer a	Observer a	PROCESSING A	Processing A	Observer B	Observer B

VERITY PRINT SEAL CERTIFICATION

**A** Collect VSC vDrives (see page 104)

- Unsealed, date & time
- Unsealed by, print & sign
- Official Observers, print & sign

SAMPLE

**WRITTEN VDRIVE LOG**

vDrive No.	Check in		No. of Ballots	Device	to Transmit		Local Tally		from Count		Comments
	date	time			date	time	date	time	date	time	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				AUDIT
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
#	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				



**A** Collect VSC vDrives (see page 104)

- vDrive No.
- Check in, date & time
- Device
- to Transmit, date & time

# TASKS

1

## Collect VSC vDrives

- Complete the *Verity Seal Certification* forms to unseal the vDrive compartment and remove the vDrive on each device. **See sample on page 102.**
  - *Verity Print Seal Certification*
  - *Verity Scan Seal Certification*
  - *Verity Touch Writer Seal Certification*
- Store cut seals in a cut seals envelope.
- Complete the *Written vDrive Log* and transfer the written VSC vDrives to the Verity Count work area. **See sample on page 103.**

2

## Check in the voter service center VBCs

Complete the *Voter Service Center VBC Log* for each VBC. Do **not** unseal the voter service center VBCs! **See sample on page 105.**

### Receiving uncounted voted ballots

Uncounted voted ballots may be identified by the County Elections Division. Notify the Counting Center Manager to confirm with the County Elections Division before scanning.

- Record the VBC on the *VBC Time Log* and queue for scanning.
- Notify the Hart Technician at the scanner station to change the method of voting to “in-person.” Failure to do so results in the ballots being counted as “mail” on the results reports.



# TRANSFER AUDIT VBCS

The audit voted ballot containers (VBCs), assigned on the first day of scanning, are audited on Election Day. The Audit Team retrieves the audit VBCs from the VBC Processing Team and returns them once their task is completed.

## PERSONNEL

- Audit Team creates a hand-tally of the audit VBC ballots to compare with the results.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of audit VBCs between work areas.
- VBC Processing Team tracks, logs, and secures the VBCs and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- audit VBCs
- Audit VBC Seal Certification folder
- pens, red
- *Seal Certification*
- transparent tape
- *VBC Seal Certification*
- wire cutter

## TASKS

### 1 Check out the audit VBCs

With Official Observers, the Audit Team retrieves the audit VBCs from the VBC Processing Team.

- Confirm the seal on the VBC matches the *VBC Seal Certification*.
- Complete the “Certification of Unsealing” on a *Seal Certification* form and remove the seal. Tape the *Seal Certification* form to the lid of the audit VBC.

### 2 Check in the audit VBCs

With Official Observers, the Audit Team returns the audit VBCs to the VBC Processing Team.

- Seal the audit VBCs by completing the “Certification of Sealing” on the *Seal Certification* form taped to the lid of the container.
- Store the completed *Seal Certification* forms in the Audit VBC Seal Certification folder.

# SECURE THE WORK AREA

When closing the work area, the VBC Processing Team seals sensitive election materials including the voted ballot containers (VBCs), written vDrive can, and defective ballot containers.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team notifies the VBC Processing Team when they are closing their work area.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Hart Technicians operate and maintain the voting equipment.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transport of ballots and vDrives.
- VBC Processing Team secures the ballots and written vDrives at the work area.

## SUPPLIES

- Configuration Reports folder
- *Control Packet Time Log*
- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*, see page 108
- sealing hook
- unprocessed control packet container
- *VBC Seal Certification*, see page 110
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*

## TASKS

1

### Check for outstanding control packets

Complete outstanding control packets. **See Curing Defective Ballots on page 95.**

### Secure unprocessed control packets

Before Election Day, unprocessed control packets that have not been transferred to the Duplication Team may be secured in the designated container.

- With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

# CERTIFICATION OF SEALING

## Seal Certification

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

SAMPLE

### CERTIFICATION OF SEALING

page 1 of 2

<b>1</b>	Date <b>MM/DD</b>	Time <b>HH:MM</b>	Seal No. <b>0002004</b>
<b>2</b>	<p>Container</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> ballot transport container (BTC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> discard box</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> equipment transport container (ETC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> security cage</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballot container (VBC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voting equipment</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> written vDrive can</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>	<p>Content</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> certified results</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> test ballots</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> test results</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test &amp; accumulation)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written &amp; audit)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other:</p>
<b>3</b>	<p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <p><b>Observer a</b></p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <p><b>Observer b</b></p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/> <p>Witnessed by (print name)</p> <hr/>	<p>Sign</p> <p><b>Observer A</b></p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <p><b>Observer B</b></p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/> <p>Sign</p> <hr/>	

**2****Secure the queued VBCs**

Before Election Day, the queued VBCs, if any, may be secured if scanning cannot be completed in the estimated schedule. On Election Day, all VBCs must be scanned before closing the work area.

- With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the VBC. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

**3****Secure the written vDrives**

- Verify the inventory of written vDrives matches the *Written vDrive Log*.
- With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Latch the written vDrive can and hook on the corresponding seal. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

**4****Secure scanned VBCs**

- Complete the *VBC Seal Certification* form for each scanned VBC. **See sample on page 110.**
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the VBC. Hook the corresponding seal through the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

**5****Pack the forms and supplies**

- Store the forms and supplies in the supply bag.
- Notify the Counting Center Manager that the work area has been secured.

**6****Check out and return badge**

- Sign out on the *Volunteer Time Log*.
- Return the ID badge. ID badges are organized alphabetically by last name.

# SECURE SCANNED VBCS

## VBC Seal Certification



VBC No.	Date	Time	Seal No.	Official Observer		Comments
				print	sign	
1	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000001	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
2	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000002	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
3	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000003	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
4	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000004	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
5	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000005	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

VBC SEAL CERTIFICATION



### Secure scanned VBCs (see page 109)

- Date
- Time
- Seal No.
- Official Observers, print & sign

---

**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

---

Duplication is the process of replacing defective ballots by remaking them onto tabulation-ready ballots. This process is critical to ensuring valid ballots are counted. A defective ballot is unreadable by the scanner station.

Common reasons for duplication include:

- Electronic ballots are records of voters’ selections that must be remade onto a tabulation-ready ballot. Electronic ballots are received by the Ballot Opening Team to prepare for the Duplication Team.
- Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWABs) are records of voters’ selections that must be remade onto a tabulation-ready ballot. FWABs are received by the Ballot Opening Team to prepare for the Duplication Team.
- Damaged barcodes may occur due to a stray mark too close to the barcode or if a voter colors in the timing marks on the ballot. A defective ballot with a damaged barcode is likely to be rejected by the scanner for collection and preparation by the VBC Processing Team.
- Physical damage may occur during the normal marking and handling of the ballot. A physically damaged ballot may be identified by the Ballot Opening Team or VBC Processing Team.

The Duplication Team receives and returns control packets of defective and duplicated ballots which requires walking between counting center work areas. Additionally, the Duplication Team works in sub-groups which may require some walking to pass out and collect ballots. Duplication Team Members may be required to handle the duplicate ballot stock containers of up to 10 pounds.

## TEAM PROCESSES

- Receive Control Packets, page 112
- Duplicating Defective Ballots Electronically, page 115
- Duplicating Defective Ballots by Hand, page 117
- Assign a Control Number, page 119
- Return the Control Packet, page 122
- Securing the Work Area, page 123

# RECEIVE CONTROL PACKETS

Ballots for duplication are transferred between the work areas in a control packet to track the custody and inventory. The Duplication Team works with 1 control packet at a time in sub-groups to complete tasks in flow.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team prepares defective ballots (e.g., electronic ballots and damaged ballots) for duplication.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team receives control packets of defective ballots to remake one-for-one duplicates.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots, like control packets between work areas.
- VBC Processing Team prepares defective ballots (damaged ballots) for duplication.

## SUPPLIES

- control packet inbox
- *Control Packet Time Log*, see page 114
- pens, red

## TASKS

1

### Inventory the control packet

- Work with 1 control packet at a time. Confirm that each ballot is stamped defective and the number of defective ballots matches the number recorded on the control packet.
- Initial the control packet to confirm the defective ballot inventory. **See sample on page 113.** If the inventory is incorrect, return the control packet to the originating Team to resolve.

2

### Check in the control packet

Record the time on the *Control Packet Time Log*. **See sample on page 114.**

Determine if the defective ballots should be duplicated electronically or by hand. Do not mix the contents of multiple control packets. Store control packets to process in the control packet inbox.

- Electronic ballots are duplicated by printing a tabulation-ready ballot. **See Duplicating Defective Ballots Electronically on page 115.**
- A damaged ballot, or an electronic ballot with a barcode that cannot be scanned or with selections made in pen, must be duplicated by hand. **See Duplicating Defective Ballots by Hand on page 117.**

SAMPLE

**CONTROL PACKET 11** Return to Ballot Opening

Set	Electronic	Damaged	Defective	to Duplication		Duplicated	from Duplication		to VBC Processing			
				Ballot Opening initials	Duplication initials		Duplication initials	Ballot Opening initials	Ballot Opening initials	VBC Processing initials		
1	10	+	1	=	11	ha	DU	11	DU	ha	ha	PA
2	10	+		=	10	ha	DU					
3		+		=								
4		+		=								
5		+		=								
6		+		=								
7		+		=								
8												
9												
10												

**A** Inventory the control packet (see page 112)

- Confirm the number of electronic ballot defective ballots
- Confirm the number of damaged defective ballots
- Confirm the total number of defective ballots
- Duplication initials to accept custody

**B** Inventory the completed control packet (see page 122)

- Number of duplicated ballots
- Duplication initials to confirm inventory

**C** Transfer the completed control packet (see page 122)

- Originating work area initials to accept custody

# CHECK IN THE CONTROL PACKET

## Control Packet Time Log

**A**

**B**

Packet No.	Set 1 (Date)	Set 2	Set 3	Set 4	Set 5	Set 6	Set 7	Set 8	Set 9	Set 10
11	In <i>mm/dd/yy hh:mm</i>	<i>mm/dd/yy hh:mm</i>								
	Out <i>mm/dd/yy hh:mm</i>									
12										
13										
14										
15										
16										
17										
18										
19										
20										

**CONTROL PACKET TIME LOG**

- A** Inventory the control packet (see page 112)
  - Date & time to Duplication Team
- B** Transfer the completed control packet (see page 122)
  - Date & time from Duplication Team

# DUPLICATING DEFECTIVE BALLOTS ELECTRONICALLY

On the electronic ballot, voters confirm their selections which are also stored in a barcode printed on the ballot. The Duplication Team uses a barcode reader to scan the ballot barcode to print a tabulation-ready ballot. Only votes that can be confirmed on the electronic ballot are valid for duplication.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team works with 1 control packet at a time to remake defective ballots.
- Hart Technicians set up and support the ballot-on-demand application.
- Official Observers review each duplicated ballot to ensure it corresponds to the original defective.

## SUPPLIES

- marker, red
- paper clips
- stapler

## TASKS

**1**

### Sort the electronic ballots

Working with 1 control packet at a time, check the barcode on the electronic ballot and sort it into 3 piles:

- Good (will scan)
- Questionable (might scan)
- Bad, will not scan or missing barcode. These electronic ballots must be manually duplicated. **See Duplicating Defective Ballots by Hand on page 117.**

**2**

### Print tabulation-ready ballots

Hart Technicians scan the ballot barcode and print the tabulation-ready ballot.

- Scan the barcode on the electronic ballot. If the barcode does not scan, the electronic ballot must be manually duplicated. **See Duplicating Defective Ballots by Hand on page 117.**
- Keep the electronic ballots in scanned order to match to the printed tabulation-ready ballots.
- Paper clip the duplicated (tabulation-ready) ballot to the defective ballot.

**3****Confirm the votes match**

Official Observers confirm the votes on the defective ballot match the duplicate ballot.

- Initial next to “Official Ballot” on the front of the defective and duplicated ballot using a green pen. Do not initial near a voting position or barcode. **See sample on page 120.**
- If a vote does not match, the ballot must be re-duplicated. Notify the Team to spoil the ballot. **See Spoiling a duplicated ballot.**
- Keep the defective and duplicate ballot paper clipped together.
- After all ballots are confirmed, the Duplication Team assigns a control number for tracking. **See Assign a Control Number on page 119.**

**Spoiling a duplicated ballot**

- Use a red marker to strike through the barcodes and record “Spoiled” at the top left of the front of the ballot. This ensures that a spoiled ballot cannot be accidentally read at the scanner station.
- Staple the spoiled ballot to the defective ballot.
- Manually duplicate the defective. **See Duplicating Defective Ballots by Hand on page 117.**

# DUPLICATING DEFECTIVE BALLOTS BY HAND

Defective ballots may be remade by hand by replicating the marks on the defective ballot onto a blank ballot using a black pen. Official Observers verify that the duplicate ballot was copied correctly and may provide guidance on how a mark would have been read by the voting equipment.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team works with 1 control packet at a time to remake defective ballots.
- Hart Technicians set up and support the ballot-on-demand application.
- Official Observers review each duplicated ballot to ensure it corresponds to the original defective.

## SUPPLIES

- cut seals envelope
- duplicate ballot stock container
- marker, red
- paper clips
- pens, black
- transparent tape
- wire cutter

## TASKS

**1**

### Retrieve a blank duplicate ballot

A blank ballot can be pulled from the duplicate ballot stock or printed.

#### Using duplicate ballot stock

- Unseal the duplicate ballot stock container by completing the “Certification of Unsealing” on the corresponding *Seal Certification* form with Official Observers. Store the completed *Seal Certification* form in a cut seals envelope. Official Observers monitor the duplicate ballot stock container when it is not sealed.
- Identify the D/P of the defective ballot and pull a corresponding blank ballot from the duplicate ballot stock. Paper clip the blank duplicate ballot to the defective ballot.

#### Printing a blank ballot

Identify the D/P of the defective ballot and print a ballot of the corresponding D/P. Paper clip the blank duplicate ballot to the defective ballot.

## 2

### Mark the duplicate ballot

- Mark the votes on the defective ballot onto the duplicate ballot by completely darkening the voting position. Any over votes are marked as they appear on the defective ballot. Official Observers may assist by indicating how a mark would have been read by the voting equipment.
- Go slowly and pay attention to detail when hand marking a duplicate ballot. A marking error or a stray mark (e.g., initialing too close to the barcode) must be re-duplicated.

### Spoiling a duplicated ballot

If there is an error on the duplicate ballot, it is spoiled and re-duplicated.

- Use a red marker to strike through the barcodes and record “Spoiled” at the top left of the front of the ballot. This ensures that a spoiled ballot cannot be accidentally read at the scanner station.
- Staple the spoiled ballot to the defective ballot.
- Retrieve another blank duplicate ballot. **See 1 Retrieve a blank duplicate ballot.**

## 3

### Confirm the votes match

Official Observers confirm the votes on the defective ballot match the duplicate ballot.

- Initial next to “Official Ballot” on the front of the defective and duplicated ballot using a green pen. Do not initial near a voting position or barcode. **See sample on page 120.**
- If a vote does not match, the ballot must be re-duplicated. Notify the Team to spoil the ballot.
- Keep the defective and duplicate ballot paper clipped together.

After all ballots are confirmed, the Duplication Team assigns a control number for tracking. **See Assign a Control Number on page 119.**

# ASSIGN A CONTROL NUMBER

Each defective ballot and corresponding duplicate is assigned a control number. Only duplicated ballots with a control number are valid.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team assigns a control number to each defective and paired duplicate.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots.

## SUPPLIES

- automatic numbering machine
- *Ballot Tracking Log*, see page 121
- pens, red
- scratch paper

## TASKS

1

### Assign a control number

- Complete the *Ballot Tracking Log*. Check “Spoiled Duplicate” if a spoiled ballot is stapled to the defective ballot. **See sample on page 121.**
- Use the automatic numbering machine to stamp the face (one side only) of the defective ballot, the duplicated ballot, and the *Ballot Tracking Log*. Cross out and initial any errors. If the automatic numbering machine is out of sync, move forward by stamping scratch paper.

#### Setting up the automatic numbering machine

Set the clip on the automatic numbering machine to “3” to work in triplicate. Then, test that it is legibly stamping 3 copies of the same number on scratch paper. Re-ink the stamp pad as necessary by pouring a small amount of ink onto the dry pad and allowing it to soak in before using it.

**NOTE:** *If using multiple automatic numbering machines, ensure the numbers will not overlap (e.g., 000001 and 50001).*

2

### Organize the defective and duplicated ballots

Remove the paper clip and separate the ballot into stacks of defective and duplicated ballots. Keep each stack in order by control number. These ballots are inventoried and packed into the control packet, with duplicated ballots in one pocket and defective ballots in a separate pocket as labeled.

# CONFIRM THE VOTES MATCH

**DEFECTIVE**      Official Ballot *ea* **000012**

STATE OF HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT      **00-00**

**Start Voting Here**

You MUST select ONE island below:

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)

Kauai Party (K)

Oahu Party (O)

**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kiholo Bay

**Office of Shave Ice Affairs**

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Azuki Beans

Condensed Milk

Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**  
Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

Guava

Kiwi

Li Hing Mui

Lychee

Mango

Pineapple

Strawberry

Vanilla

Watermelon

**Maui Party (M)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hookipa

Kaanapali

Makena

**Kauai Party (K)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kalua Pork

Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Poipu

**Oahu Party (O)**

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Lanikai


Sunset

Waikiki

**Instructions**

- You MUST select ONE island preference from the box above for your votes to count.
- Vote ONLY for choices within your selected preference. Votes for another island preference will not be counted.
- You are eligible to vote for BOTH of the Shave Ice Contests.

**Making Selections**



Completely fill in the box to the left of your choice with a black or blue pen.

If you vote for more choices than allowed in a contest, your votes for that contest will not be counted.

**If you make a mistake, request a replacement ballot by contacting your County Elections Division. Do not use whiteout.**

Official Ballot *ea* **000012**

STATE OF HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT      **00-00**

**Start Voting Here**

You MUST select ONE island below:

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)

Kauai Party (K)

Oahu Party (O)

**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hapuna

Kiholo Bay

**Maui Party (M)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hookipa

Kaanapali

Makena

**Kauai Party (K)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kalua Pork

Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Poipu

**Oahu Party (O)**

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Lanikai


Sunset

Waikiki

**Instructions**

- You MUST select ONE island preference from the box above for your votes to count.
- Vote ONLY for choices within your selected preference. Votes for another island preference will not be counted.
- You are eligible to vote for BOTH of the Shave Ice Contests.

**Making Selections**



Completely fill in the box to the left of your choice with a black or blue pen.

If you vote for more choices than allowed in a contest, your votes for that contest will not be counted.

**If you make a mistake, request a replacement ballot by contacting your County Elections Division. Do not use whiteout.**



# SAMPLE

## BALLOT TRACKING LOG

D/P	Check Defective Reason			Control No.
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000001
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000002
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000004
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000005
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000006
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000007
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000008
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000009
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000010
00-00	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic	<input type="checkbox"/> Damaged	<input type="checkbox"/> Spoiled duplicated stapled to defective.	000011

A

**Assign a control number (see page 119)**

- district/precinct (D/P)
- defective type
- spoiled ballot attached, if any
- control number

# RETURN THE CONTROL PACKET

Ballots are transferred between counting center work areas in a control packet to track the custody and inventory of defective and duplicated ballots. The Duplication Team returns completed control packets (defective ballots that have been duplicated) to the originating work area - Ballot Opening or VBC Processing, with Official Observers. On the control packet, the number of defective ballots and duplicated ballots is recorded and verified. Additionally, each Team tracks custody of the control packets.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team receives their completed control packets to check in and inventory.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team transfers completed control packets of defective and corresponding duplicate ballots.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots like control packets between work areas.
- VBC Processing Team received their completed control packets to check in and inventory.

## SUPPLIES

- *Control Packet Time Log*, see page 114
- pens, red

## TASKS

### 1 Inventory the completed control packet

- Work with 1 control packet at a time. Confirm that each defective and corresponding duplicate is stamped with a control number. Then, verify the number of defective ballots matches the control packet.
- Count the number of duplicated ballots and record the total on the control packet. The number of ballots duplicated must match the number of defective ballots. Resolve any discrepancies by matching the control number and district/precincts (D/Ps). Initial the control packet.

### 2 Transfer the completed control packet

- Record the time out on the *Control Packet Time Log*. With Official Observers, return the control packet to the originating work area noted on the control packet. **See sample on page 114.**
- Wait while the originating work area inventories the control packet. They initial the control packet to accept custody.

# SECURING THE WORK AREA

The Duplication Team closes after the VBC Processing Team confirms there are no rejected defective ballots at the scanner stations. These ballots are transferred to the Duplication Team and the final ballots are scanned before both Teams can close their work areas.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Duplication Team secures the work area once their tasks have been completed.
- Official Observers monitor the handling, transport, and security of ballots.

## SUPPLIES

- *Duplicate Ballot Stock*, see page 124
- duplicate ballot stock container
- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*
- sealing hook

## TASKS

- 1 Secure the duplicate ballot stock container**
  - For each district/precinct (D/P), count the number of ballots remaining in the duplicate ballot stock container. Record the date, quantity remaining, and initial. **See sample on page 124.**
  - With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container. **See sample on page 125.**
  - Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.
- 2 Pack the forms and supplies**
  - Store the forms and supplies in the supply bag.
  - Notify the Counting Center Manager that the work area has been secured.
- 3 Check out and return badge**
  - Sign out on the *Volunteer Time Log*.
  - Return the ID badge. ID badges are organized alphabetically by last name.



# CERTIFICATION OF SEALING

Seal Certification

SAMPLE

Office of Elections  
Seal Certification

## CERTIFICATION OF SEALING

page 1 of 2

<b>1</b> Date <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">MM/DD</span>	Time <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">HH:MM</span>	Seal No. <span style="color: red; font-size: 1.2em;">0003004</span>
--	--	--

<b>2</b> Container <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ballot transport container (BTC) <input type="checkbox"/> discard box <input type="checkbox"/> equipment transport container (ETC) <input type="checkbox"/> security cage <input type="checkbox"/> voted ballot container (VBC) <input type="checkbox"/> voting equipment <input type="checkbox"/> written vDrive can <input type="checkbox"/> other:	Content <table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> certified results</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test &amp; accumulation)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written &amp; audit)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> test ballots</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> test results</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> other:</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	<input type="checkbox"/> certified results	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)	<input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test & accumulation)	<input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written & audit)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock	<input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____	<input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)	<input type="checkbox"/> test ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)	<input type="checkbox"/> test results	<input type="checkbox"/> other:	<input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets	
<input type="checkbox"/> certified results	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (blank)																
<input type="checkbox"/> Count USB archive	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (test & accumulation)																
<input type="checkbox"/> defective ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> vDrives (written & audit)																
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> duplicate ballot stock	<input type="checkbox"/> Verity Transmit device no. _____																
<input type="checkbox"/> invalidated ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (counted)																
<input type="checkbox"/> test ballots	<input type="checkbox"/> voted ballots (uncounted)																
<input type="checkbox"/> test results	<input type="checkbox"/> other:																
<input type="checkbox"/> unprocessed control packets																	

<b>3</b>	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	<span style="color: green; font-family: cursive;">Observer a</span>	<span style="color: green; font-family: cursive;">Observer A</span>
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	<span style="color: green; font-family: cursive;">Observer b</span>	<span style="color: green; font-family: cursive;">Observer B</span>
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign

# ELECTION DAY RESULTS REPORTS

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**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

---

The results reports are compiled with the written vDrives at the counting center (mail turnout) and the voter service centers (in-person turnout). Hart Technicians use the transmission application to send vDrives from the Neighbor Island Counting Centers to the Oahu Counting Center. The results reports are compiled at the Oahu Counting Center using the tabulation application, Verity Count.

Results reports are publicly released by the Oahu Counting Center only. The Oahu Counting Center notifies the Neighbor Island Counting Center Managers, media, and County Elections Divisions when the results reports are released. The results reports are publicly distributed online at [elections.hawaii.gov](https://elections.hawaii.gov). A paper copy of the Statewide Summary report is made available at the counting center as volunteers may not use electronic mobile devices within the counting center.

- Report 1 is released after the voter service centers are confirmed to be closed on Election Day. **See Releasing Report 1 on page 127.**
- Report 2 is released at 10:30 PM on Election Day. **See Releasing Report 2 on page 131.**
- Election Day Final Report is released once all return envelopes that have been signature checked by the County Elections Division are processed at the counting center. **See Election Day Final Report on page 134.**

# RELEASING REPORT 1

Before tabulating the results reports, Official Observers verify that there are no votes in Verity Count, the tabulation application, to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the election.

Results reports are publicly released by the Oahu Counting Center only. The Statewide Counting Center Manager, Neighbor Island Counting Center Manager, and Hart Technicians at each location coordinate the transmission of the vDrives to the Oahu Counting Center. At the Oahu Counting Center, the vDrives are compiled in Verity Count, the tabulation application, to disseminate. Report 1 will be released once the County Elections Divisions confirm that the voter service centers have closed.

## PERSONNEL

- Audit Team creates a hand tally of expected results for the audit voted ballot containers (VBCs).
- Counting Center Manager tracks the number of ballots to be counted and reported. The Manager also ensures a zero report is printed, certified, and stored, and coordinates the printing of the audit reports.
- County Election Division contacts the Oahu Counting Center as each of their voter service centers closes.
- Hart Technicians operate the Verity Count work area to compile and print the results reports. Hart Technicians at the Neighbor Island Counting Centers communicate with the Oahu Counting Center when transmitting vDrives and receiving the results reports.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots and vDrives at the counting center.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager coordinates the release of results.
- VBC Processing Team tracks and secures vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- certified reports envelope
- pens, red
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*, see page 129

# TASKS

## 1 Certify the zero report

*Counting Center Manager*

- With Official Observers, ask the Hart Technician to confirm the computer system time, as it will be printed on the report. Then, ask them to print a county cumulative report.
- Ask the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests indicating that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling the results. Official Observers certify by signing and dating the first page of the report.
- Pack the certified zero report in the certified reports envelope.

*Oahu Counting Center*

Verify the zero Statewide Summary report.

## 2 Retrieve the written Central vDrives from preprocessing

The VBC Processing Team tracks written Central vDrives on the *Written vDrive Log* and securely stores them in the written vDrive can. The written Central vDrives must be transferred to the Verity Count work area to appear on Report 1.

*VBC Processing Team*

- Complete “to Transmit” for each vDrive on the *Written vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 129.**
- Transfer the written vDrives to the Verity Count work area with Official Observers. Official Observers monitor the vDrives at the Verity Count work area at all times.

## 3 Pause scanning to write vDrives

*Counting Center Manager*

If there are still ballots to be scanned about 1 hour before voting closes:

- Notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager at the Oahu Counting Center.
- Notify the VBC Processing Team to hold the remaining VBCs in the queue at the work area.
- Ask the Hart Technicians to finish their open VBCs and then write vDrive(s). Official Observers choose blank official vDrive(s) for the Hart Technicians.



## 4 Retrieve any additional written Central vDrives

*VBC Processing Team*

- Ensure written Central vDrives are tracked and transferred, following the *Written vDrive Log*, to the Verity Count work area in time to Verity Transmit for Report 1.

# TRANSFERRING WRITTEN VDRIVES TO THE VERITY COUNT WORK AREA

Written vDrive Log

SAMPLE

**WRITTEN VDRIVE LOG**

vDrive No.	Check in		No. of Ballots	Device	to Transmit		Local Tally		from Count		Comments
	date	time			date	time	date	time			
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				AUDIT
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
				<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer			<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				

**A** Retrieve the written vDrives (see page 128)

- to Transmit, date & time

**B** Compile the written vDrives (see page 130)

- Neighbor Islands read written vDrives into Verity Count for local tally following the Election Night Final report.

- Resume transferring VBCs to the scanner stations.

## 5 Compile the written Central vDrives

### *Counting Center Manager*

Provide the *Written vDrive Log* to the Hart Technician to account for all written vDrives.

### *Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

Hart Technicians contact the Oahu Hart Technicians to Verity Transmit vDrives. The Hart Technicians at each counting center confirm the number of vDrives and ballots sent and received.

### *Oahu Counting Center*

Hart Technicians receive transmissions from the Neighbor Island Counting Centers and write vDrives. The transmissions from each counting center must be completed promptly to ensure the results from all Counties are reported. The Transmit vDrives and the written Central vDrives from the Oahu Counting Center are read into Verity Count. The results reports are printed in order by the number of votes (winner to the top).

### *Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

After transmitting to the Oahu Counting Center, read the written vDrives locally into Verity Count:

- To print the audit reports, **see Print the audit reports on page 130.**
- To prepare for the local tally, **see Compile local tally on page 135.**

## 6 Distribute the results reports

### *Oahu Counting Center*

Oahu Hart Technicians notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager when the results reports are compiled and available to print. The Statewide Counting Center Manager waits for confirmation from the County Elections Divisions that each voter service center has closed before releasing Report 1.

After confirmation, Oahu Hart Technicians notify the Neighbor Island Hart Technicians to access the report to print. The Statewide Counting Center Manager also notifies the Counting Center Manager to work with their Neighbor Island Hart Technician to print and distribute the results reports.

## 7 Print the audit reports

### *Counting Center Manager*

Identify the written Central-audit vDrives. An audit tag should be attached to the written Central-audit vDrive and review the *Written vDrive Log* to confirm.

Ask the Hart Technician to print a cumulative report for each scanner station (1 scanner station = 1 audit VBC). The audit results report is cumulative by contest for each audit VBC. Do not release the audit results report to the Audit Team until the voter service centers have closed.

# RELEASING REPORT 2

Report 2 adds any mail ballots that were counted between releases and the Election Day voter service centers (VSCs). At the VSCs, as the Verity Scan devices are closed by the Hart Technicians, the vDrive is remotely transmitted to the Oahu Counting Center. After closing, the VSC voting equipment and voted ballot containers (VBCs) are transferred to the counting center.

At the Oahu Counting Center, vDrives are compiled in Verity Count, the tabulation application. Results reports are publicly released by the Oahu Counting Center only.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager tracks the number of ballots to be counted and reported.
- Hart Technicians operate the Verity Count work area to compile and print the results reports. Hart Technicians at the Neighbor Island Counting Centers communicate with the Oahu Counting Center when transmitting vDrives and receiving the results reports.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots and vDrives at the counting center.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager coordinates the release of results.
- VBC Processing Team tracks and logs written vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- pens, red
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*, see page 133

## TASKS

**1**

### **Pause scanner stations to write vDrives**

*Counting Center Manager*

If there are still ballots to be scanned when preparing Report 2:

- Notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager at the Oahu Counting Center.
- Notify the VBC Processing Team to hold the remaining VBCs in the queue at the work area.
- Ask the Hart Technicians to finish their open VBCs and then write vDrive(s). Official Observers choose blank official vDrive(s) for the Hart Technicians.

- Ensure the written vDrives are tracked and transferred, following the *Written vDrive Log*, to the Verity Count work area in time to Verity Transmit for Report 2.
- Notify the VBC Processing Team to resume transferring VBCs to the scanner stations.

## 2 Retrieve the written vDrives

The VBC Processing Team checks in the VSC voting equipment and transfers the device vDrives to the Verity Count work area. **See Receive VSC Voting Equipment & VBCs on page 101.**

### *VBC Processing Team*

- Complete the *Written vDrive Log* for each vDrive. **See sample on page 133.**
- Transfer the vDrives to the Verity Count work area with Official Observers. Official Observers monitor the vDrives at the Verity Count work area at all times.

## 3 Compile the written vDrives

Provide the *Written vDrive Log* to the Hart Technician to account for all written vDrives.

### *Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

Hart Technicians contact the Oahu Hart Technicians to check if the Verity Scan vDrives were successfully received or use Verity Transmit to send Verity Scan and written Central vDrives as necessary. The Hart Technicians at each counting center confirm the number of vDrives and ballots sent and received.

### *Oahu Counting Center*

Hart Technicians receive transmissions from the Neighbor Island Counting Centers and write vDrives. The transmissions from each counting center must be completed promptly to ensure the results from all Counties are reported. The Transmit vDrives and the written Central vDrives from the Oahu Counting Center are read into Verity Count. The results reports are printed in order by the number of votes (winner to the top).

### *Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

Hart Technicians read the written vDrives locally into Verity Count to prepare a local tally. Check “Local Tally” for each written vDrive on the *Written vDrive Log*. **See 4 Compile local tally on page 135.**

## 4 Distribute the results reports

### *Oahu Counting Center*

Oahu Hart Technicians notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager and Neighbor Island Hart Technicians when the results reports are compiled and available to print.

The Statewide Counting Center Manager also notifies the Counting Center Manager to work with their Neighbor Island Hart Technician to print and distribute the results reports.



SAMPLE

**WRITTEN VDRIVE LOG**

vDrive No.	Check in		No. of Ballots	Device	to Transmit		Local Tally		from Count		Comments
	date	time			date	time	date	time	date	time	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				AUDIT
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count				

**A** Retrieve the written vDrives (see page 132)

- to Transmit, date & time

**B** Compile the written vDrives (see page 132)

- Neighbor Islands read written vDrives into Verity Count for local tally following the Election Night Final report.

# ELECTION DAY FINAL REPORT

The Election Day final report includes the ballots collected by the County Elections Divisions by the close of voting, then validated and forwarded to the counting center. The County Summary report is posted, for the specific County only, shortly after the counting center finishes scanning ballots. Once all counting centers have finished scanning the ballots, the Statewide Summary and Precinct Detail reports are compiled and disseminated.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager tracks the number of ballots to be counted and reported.
- Hart Technicians operate the Verity Count work area to compile and print the results reports. Hart Technicians at the Neighbor Island Counting Centers communicate with the Oahu Counting Center when transmitting vDrives and receiving the results reports.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots and vDrives and certify the results reports.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager coordinates the release of results.
- VBC Processing Team tracks and secures vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- certified results envelope
- pens, red
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*

## TASKS

**1**

### Retrieve the written Central vDrives

Continue scanning until all ballots have been counted and vDrives are written. Provide the remaining written Central vDrives to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area.

- Complete “to Transmit” for each vDrive on the *Written vDrive Log*.
- Transfer the written vDrives to the Verity Count work area with Official Observers. Official Observers monitor the vDrives at the Verity Count work area at all times.

**2****Compile the written vDrives**

Provide the *Written vDrive Log* to the Hart Technician to account for all written vDrives.

*Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

Hart Technicians contact the Oahu Hart Technicians to Verify Transmit vDrives. The Hart Technicians at each counting center confirm the number of vDrives and ballots sent and received.

*Oahu Counting Center*

Hart Technicians receive transmissions from the Neighbor Island Counting Centers and write vDrives. The Transmit vDrives and the written Central vDrives from the Oahu Counting Center are read into Verity Count. The results reports are printed in order by the number of votes (winner to the top).

*Neighbor Island Counting Centers*

Hart Technicians read the written vDrives locally into Verity Count to prepare a local tally. Check “Local Tally” for each vDrive on the *Written vDrive Log*. **See 4 Compile local tally.**

**3****Distribute the County Summary report***Oahu Counting Center*

Oahu Hart Technicians notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager and Neighbor Island Hart Technicians when the results reports are compiled and available to print.

The Statewide Counting Center Manager also notifies the Counting Center Manager to work with their Neighbor Island Hart Technician to print and distribute the results reports.

**4****Compile local tally***Counting Center Manager*

The Neighbor Island Counting Centers confirm the results were transmitted correctly by reconciling a local tally with the County Summary report.

- Following the *Written vDrive Log*, confirm the Hart Technician has read all the vDrives into Verity Count. Ask the Hart Technician to print a cumulative report.
- Provide the County Summary report and cumulative report to the Official Observers to match. If the results report and local tally do not reconcile, review the *Written vDrive Log* to re-inventory.

**5****Certify the County Summary report**

- Ask the Official Observers to certify the Election Day Final County Report by signing the first page of the report. Pack the certified report in the certified reports envelope in the equipment transport container (ETC).
- Direct the Official Observers and Hart Technicians to conduct the Post-Election Test. **See Election Day Observers’ Test on page 138.**

# TRANSFERRING WRITTEN VDRIVES FROM THE VERITY COUNT WORK AREA

## Written vDrive Log



SAMPLE

**WRITTEN VDRIVE LOG**

vDrive No.	Check in		No. of Ballots	Device	to Transmit		Local Tally		from Count		Comments
	date	time			date	time	date	time	date	time	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	AUDIT
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM	#####	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scan <input type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	
###	MM/DD	HH:MM		<input type="checkbox"/> Central <input type="checkbox"/> Print <input type="checkbox"/> Scan <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Touch Writer	MM/DD	HH:MM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Read into Count		MM/DD	HH:MM	

**A** Retrieve the written vDrives (see page 134)

- to Transmit, date & time

**B** Compile the written vDrives (see page 135)

- Neighbor Islands read written vDrives into Verity Count for local tally following the Election Night Final report.

**C** Secure the vDrives

- from Count, date & time, to VBC Processing

**6****Secure the vDrives**

With Official Observers, return the vDrives and *Written vDrive Log* to the VBC Processing Team.

- Complete “from Count” for each vDrive on the *Written vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 136.**
- Ensure that the vDrives listed on the *Written vDrive Log* are accounted for and securely stored in the written vDrive can. **See Secure the Work Area on page 107.**

**7****Archive Verity Count**

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.

**8****Distribute the Statewide Summary report**

Oahu Hart Technicians notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager and neighbor island Hart Technicians when the results reports are compiled and available to print.

**9****Determine if there is an automatic recount**

The Oahu Counting Center determines if an automatic recount is triggered based on the vote difference between candidates who would have qualified to appear on the General Election ballot or would be elected.

**NOTE:** *The Statewide Summary Report is required for statewide contests.*

# ELECTION DAY OBSERVERS' TEST

Official Observers test the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment and certify that the ballots are counted correctly. The Election Day Observers' Test is conducted after the Election Day final results report is released, by County, using the counting center voting equipment and tabulation application. One (1) Official Observer is assigned to run their test ballot packet per scanner station.

- Scanner stations use the Verity Central application to count the voted ballots.
- vDrives are used to define the election and write ballots for tabulation.
- Verity Count is the tabulation application to compile and print the results.

# SCAN TEST BALLOTS

Test ballots are counted using the scanner stations. For the Election Day Test, 1 Official Observer per scanner station scans their test ballots. The test ballots are written to a vDrive to tabulate the test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager administers the logic and accuracy test.
- Hart Technicians operate and write vDrives at the scanner stations.
- Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots, creating a tally of expected results, and matching their results to the voting equipment results report.

## SUPPLIES

- pens, red
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test zero report envelope
- vDrive(s), blank, test

## TASKS

**1**

### Scan test ballots

- Assign 1 Official Observer per scanner station and provide them with their test ballot packet from the equipment transport container (ETC).
- Ask the Official Observers to remove any paper clips or rubber bands to batch their test deck.

#### Scanner stations

Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations.

- Print a zero *Configuration Report* for the Official Observers to certify. The certified report is provided to the Counting Center Manager to pack in the test zero report envelope.
- Scan the test ballots and then return the test deck to the Official Observer. Official Observers store their test ballots in their test ballot packets.

**2**

### Write test vDrive

- Ask an Official Observer to select a blank test vDrive and record it on the *Test vDrive Log*.
- With Official Observers, transfer the test vDrive to the Verity Count work area to print the test results.

# PRINT THE TEST RESULTS & RECONCILE

Before tabulating the test vDrives, Official Observers verify that there are no votes in Verity Count, the tabulation application. Then, test vDrives are read into Verity Count to print the test results by packet number. Official Observers reconcile their test results with their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager collects the zero report and disseminates the test results. The Manager also assists Official Observers in resolving discrepancies when reconciling.
- Hart Technicians operate Verity Count to print the zero report, and then test results. Each Official Observer is provided printed test results based on their assigned district/precincts (D/Ps).
- Official Observers certify that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling the test results. Then, they receive their test results to match to their previous test results. After reconciling, the test ballot packet is returned to the Counting Center Manager to inventory and securely store.

## SUPPLIES

- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

### 1 Certify the zero report

Before tabulating written test vDrives, the Hart Technician prints a zero report.

- Provide the zero report to the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests.
- Ask Official Observers to sign and date the first page of the zero report. Pack the certified report in the test zero report envelope.

### 2 Distribute the test results

- Provide the test vDrives to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area. The Hart Technician prints the test results in ballot face order by packet number.
- Collect the tabulated test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope at the Verity Count work area.

- Identify the Official Observer by packet number to provide the test results. Instruct each Official Observer to reconcile the test results with their tally of expected results, and certify their test results.

### 3

#### **Certify the test results**

The following procedures are completed by the Official Observers.

- Match the test results to the previous test results. Confirm the number of ballots, and votes for candidates, blank (under) votes, and over votes in each contest.
- Certify by signing and dating the first page of the test results.
- Pack the test ballots and certified test results into the test ballot packet and return them to the Counting Center Manager for inventory.

# PACK THE ETC

The test materials are securely stored in the equipment transport container (ETC). This includes the test ballot packets, test vDrives, and the Count USB.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Hart Technician archives Verity Count to USB.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- Count USB envelope
- *Election Day Test Certification*, see page 143
- rubber fingers
- pens, red
- *Test Ballot Inventory*
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

### 1 Inventory the test ballots

Test ballots are inventoried as each Official Observer returns their test ballot packet.

- Complete “Election Day” on the *Test Ballot Inventory*.
- Store inventoried test ballot packets in the ETC, lowest to highest.
- Ask each Official Observer who conducted the test to sign the *Logic & Accuracy Test Certification*.

### 2 Pack the test vDrives

Check the *Test vDrive Log* to confirm the number of test vDrives. Pack the test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.

LOGIC & ACCURACY TEST CERTIFICATION

<p><b>1</b></p> <p>Pursuant to the rules and regulations governing elections, we the undersigned certify to have conducted a logic and accuracy test of the voting and vote counting system at the date and time stated and approve the same as being correct.</p>	Date	Time

<b>2</b>	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign
	Witnessed by (print name)	Sign

**3****Archive Verity Count**

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.

**4****Pack the test materials into the ETC**

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- test ballot packets, mail & VSC
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope
- unused test ballots envelopes, mail & VSC
- vDrives, blank, official
- vDrives, blank, test

**5****Secure the counting center**

Proceed to secure the counting center. **See Securing the Counting Center on page 55.**

# POST-ELECTION COUNT

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**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

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The post-election count is conducted at each counting center no sooner than closing on the fifth business day after Election Day. Voters have up to 5 business days following Election Day to fix an issue with their signature on their return envelope and have their ballot counted.

# RELEASING FINAL REPORT

A Final report is released after the signature curing deadline. The statewide reports are released once all Counties have finished counting.

## PERSONNEL

- Ballot Opening Team receives and opens valid return envelopes to prepare the ballots for scanning.
- Counting Center Manager tracks the number of ballots to be counted and reported.
- County Elections Divisions transfers cured return envelopes to the counting center.
- Duplication Team receives control packets of defective ballots to remake one-for-one duplicates.
- Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations and Verity Count work area. Hart Technicians at the Neighbor Island Counting Centers communicate with the Oahu Counting Center when transmitting vDrives and receiving the results reports.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transport of ballots and vDrives and review and certify the reports.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager coordinates the release of results.
- VBC Processing Team tracks and secures voted ballot containers (VBCs) and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- certified results envelope
- pens, red
- transparent tape
- *Volunteer Time Log*
- wire cutter
- written vDrive can
- *Written vDrive Log*

## TASKS

**1**

### **Retrieve the written Central vDrives**

Written vDrives are tracked on the *Written vDrive Log* and securely stored in the written vDrive can.

Only the written vDrive for the post-election count is transferred to the Verity Count work area.

*VBC Processing Team*

On the *Written vDrive Log*, complete “to Transmit” and walk the vDrive(s) to the Verity Count work area with Official Observers.

## **2** Compile the written vDrives

Provide the *Written vDrive Log* to the Hart Technician to account for all written vDrives.

*Neighbor Island Counting Center*

Hart Technicians read the vDrives into Verity Transmit to send to the Oahu Counting Center. The Hart Technicians at each counting center confirm the number of vDrives and ballots sent and received.

*Oahu Counting Center*

Hart Technicians receive transmissions from the Neighbor Island Counting Centers and write vDrives. The Transmit vDrives and the written Central vDrives from the Oahu Counting Center are read into Verity Count. The results reports are printed in order by the number of votes (winner to the top).

## **3** Distribute the County Summary report

*Oahu Counting Center*

Oahu Hart Technicians notify the Statewide Counting Center Manager and Neighbor Island Hart Technicians when the results reports are compiled and available to print. The Statewide Counting Center Manager also notifies the Counting Center Manager to work with their Neighbor Island Hart Technician to print and distribute the results reports.

## **4** Compile local tally

*Counting Center Manager*

The Neighbor Island Counting Centers confirm the results were transmitted correctly by reconciling a local tally with the County Summary report.

- Ask the Hart Technician to read in the Post-Election Count written Central vDrive to the local tally in Verity Count, and to print a cumulative report.
- Provide the Final County Summary report and final local tally to the Official Observers to match. If the results report and local tally do not reconcile, review the *Written vDrive Log* to re-inventory.

## **5** Certify the Election Final report

*Official Observers*

The Official Observers sign and date the first page of the report. Pack the certified reports in the certified reports envelope in the equipment transport container (ETC).

**6****Secure the vDrives**

The vDrives are returned to the VBC Processing work area with Official Observers to securely store.

*VBC Processing Team*

Check in the vDrive(s) by recording the time “from Count” on the *Written vDrive Log*. Ensure that the vDrives listed on the *Written vDrive Log* are accounted for and securely stored in the written vDrive can.

**See Secure the Work Area on page 107.**

**7****Archive Verity Count**

*Counting Center Manager*

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.

**8****Pack and seal the ETC**

*Counting Center Manager*

- Ensure the certified reports envelope and Count USB envelope are packed in the ETC. Any remaining blank vDrives are returned to the Hart Technicians.
- Secure the ETC.
- Reset the padlock to **0000** for use in future elections.

**9****Secure the counting center**

Proceed to secure the counting center.

# ELECTION DAY AUDIT

---

**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

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Election audits ensure the accuracy of the voting equipment and the integrity of the election. The Election Day audit is conducted on a sample of ballots to confirm that the voting equipment is counting ballots accurately and the results are tabulated correctly.

Preparations for the Election Day audit begin on the first day of processing voted ballots. As ballots are opened and packed into voted ballot containers (VBCs), they are transferred to the VBC Processing Team to be counted. The VBC Processing Team designates the first VBC to each scanner station for the Election Day audit. After scanning, the ballots are written to a vDrive. On Election Day, the written Verity Central-audit vDrive is tabulated to print an audit tally report for the audit VBCs.

Auditors create a hand tally of expected results to match with a tally report compiled by the tabulation application, Verity Count. The auditors may begin tallying the expected results at any time on Election Day including before the results are released. However, the audit report, to compare and reconcile the results, is not released until voting closes.

The Audit Team may sit or stand while conducting the audit. The Audit Team should be able to carry VBCs of up to 10 pounds between work areas.

## TEAM PROCESSES

- Retrieve Audit VBCs, page 150
- Tally the Audit Ballots, page 151
- Secure the Work Area, page 156

# RETRIEVE AUDIT VBCS

To start the audit, retrieve the audit voted ballot containers (VBCs) from the VBC Processing work area with Official Observers. The auditors may work in sub-groups, based on the number of audit VBCs. Each sub-group works with 1 audit VBC at a time and selects 1 contest to audit.

## PERSONNEL

- Auditors retrieve the audit VBCs from the VBC Processing Team.
- Counting Center Manager directs operations of the work areas.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots.
- VBC Processing Team stores and secures the audit VBCs.

## TASKS

**1**

### **Check out the audit VBCs**

With Official Observers, retrieve the audit VBCs from the VBC Processing work area.

**2**

### **Select a contest to audit**

As an audit VBC may contain ballots of multiple district/precincts (D/Ps), it is recommended that a statewide or countywide contest that appears on each ballot is selected, like a contest for an Office of Hawaiian Affairs Trustee.

Select 1 contest per audit VBC with Official Observers. All voting positions (e.g., candidate A, candidate B, candidate C, blank, and over) for the selected contest must be tallied to create the expected results.

# TALLY THE AUDIT BALLOTS

The auditors sort the ballots into stacks for each voting position - candidates, blank votes, and over votes. Then, count the number of ballots for each voting position to compile the tally of expected results. The tally of expected results is matched to the audit tally report printed from the tabulation application. The auditors are responsible for thoroughness and confidence in the audit. If the auditors are not comfortable with the audit, confer with the Counting Center Manager and continue to resolve a discrepancy to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the election.

## PERSONNEL

- Auditors count the ballots and create a tally of expected results for each audit VBC.
- Counting Center Manager coordinates with the Hart Technicians to print an audit tally report for each audit VBC.
- Hart Technicians print the audit tally report for each audit VBC.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots.

## SUPPLIES

- *Audit Certification*, see page 155
- *Ballot Handling*, see page 152
- *Mail VBC Tally*, optional, see page 154
- pens, red

## TASKS

1

### Track ballot handling

Auditors work with 1 VBC at a time.

Complete 2 copies of the *Ballot Handling* worksheet for each audit VBC. Store 1 copy in the VBC, and file copy 2 in the form folder. **See sample on page 152.**

2

### Sort the ballots

- Remove the rubber bands and store the batch reports in the VBC. The batches may be collated to conduct the audit.
- Review the ballots and sort them into stacks by voting position. The number of stacks depends on the number of candidates. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**

### Primary Election & Partisan Contests

In the Primary Election, votes in partisan federal and state contests are dependent on the select-a-party contest (under Start Voting Here). To audit a partisan federal or state contest, first sort the ballots into

# TRACKING BALLOT HANDLING

## Ballot Handling



### BALLOT HANDLING

Complete 2 copies for each VBC. One copy is maintained with the team supplies, the other is stored with the ballot or batch in the VBC.

VBC No. <b>###</b>	Type <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mail <input type="checkbox"/> Voter service center	Date & time <b>MM/DD HH:MM</b>
Reason <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Audit content of VBC <input type="checkbox"/> Audit batch <input type="checkbox"/> Review questionable ballot <input type="checkbox"/> Other:	Batch IDs <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable for voter service center VBCs <b>###</b> <b>###</b> <b>###</b> <b>###</b> _____ _____	

Auditors handling the ballots and Official Observers monitoring print and sign below.

Print	Sign
<b>AUDIT A</b>	<i>Audit A</i>
<i>Audit B</i>	<i>Audit B</i>
<i>Observer a</i>	<i>Observer A</i>
<i>Observer b</i>	<i>Observer B</i>

**A** **Track ballot handling (see page 151)**

- VBC No.
- Type = Mail
- Date & time
- Reason = Audit content of VBC
- Batch IDs = from batch reports in the VBC
- Print & sign

stacks based on the votes of the select-a-party contest. Then separate and organize the ballots that are marked with the corresponding party, blank votes, and over votes into stacks of the audit contest.

- Party of the selected audit contest. **See sample on page 206.**
- No party selected. **See sample on page 208.**
- Multi-party voting. **See sample on page 210.**
- Other political affiliations selected.

Review the stacks (party of the selected audit contest, no party selected, and multi-party voting) of ballots again and sort them into stacks by the voting position of the audit contest.

### **3** Stack the ballots

- Determine the batch size before counting the stacks of ballots. The suggested batch size is 10 ballots as smaller batches may be easier to resolve if any discrepancies arise.
- For each stack, count the ballots into batches (e.g., 10 ballots). These batches can then be stacked together in alternating directions to save space in the work area.

### **4** Compile tally of expected results

- Auditors may complete the optional *Mail VBC Tally*. **See sample on page 154.**
- Complete the *Audit Certification*. **See sample on page 155.**

### **5** Pack the audit VBCs

- Repack the ballots into the audit VBC.
- Store the *Ballot Handling* worksheet on top of the ballots in the audit VBC.

### **6** Certify the audit

After releasing Report 1, the Counting Center Manager coordinates the printing of the audit tally reports to provide to the auditors. The audit tally report, 1 per audit VBC, is cumulative for each contest.

- Verify that the number of ballots audited matches the number of ballots in the VBC.
- Match the votes for each voting position to the audit report.
- Resolve discrepancies.
- Complete *Audit Certification*. **See sample on page 155.**

# CREATING THE AUDIT TALLY

Mail VBC Tally (optional)

A

B

VBC No.	Contest	No. of Ballots Audited								
1	OFFICE OF SHAVE ICE AFFAIRS	700								
Voting Position	Batch Size	x	No. of Batches	=	+	Remainder	=	Audit Tally		
AZUKI BEAN	10		9	=		90	+	3	=	93
CONDENSED MILK			21	=		210	+	4	=	214
MOCHI BALLS			28	=		280	+	4	=	284
Blank votes	10		10	=		100	+	8	=	108
Over votes							+	1	=	1
Other	N/A						+		=	N/A

MAIL VBC TALLY (OPTIONAL)

**A** Select a contest to audit (see page 150)

- VBC No.
- Contest

**B** Compile tally of expected results (see page 153)

- Voting position
- Batch size
- No. of Batches
- Batch size x number of batches
- Remainder (not a full batch)
- Audit Tally
- No. of Ballots Audited



# SECURE THE WORK AREA

After certifying the audit, the audit voted ballot containers (VBCs) are returned to the VBC Processing work area. The Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of the audit VBCs.

## PERSONNEL

- Auditors return the audit VBCs to the VBC Processing work area.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots.
- VBC Processing Team secures and stores the VBCs.

## TASKS

### 1 Check in the audit VBCs

With Official Observers, return the audit VBCs to the VBC Processing work area. The VBC Processing Team secures the audit VBCs.

### 2 Pack the forms and supplies

- Store the forms and supplies in the supply bag.
- Notify the Counting Center Manager that the work area has been secured.

### 3 Check out and return badge

- Sign out on the *Volunteer Time Log*.
- Return the ID badge. ID badges are organized alphabetically by last name.

# POST-ELECTION AUDIT

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**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

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Election audits confirm the accuracy and integrity of the results by creating a tally of expected results for a contest to match to the tabulation of the results reports. An audit is not a recount or a hand count. Instead, the audit confirms the voting system accurately counted and reported the votes.

After compiling the tally of expected results, that audit tally is compared to the results reports tabulated from the voting equipment. The auditors are responsible for thoroughness and confidence in the audit. If the auditors are not comfortable with the audit, continue to resolve a discrepancy to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the audit.

If the audit reveals an issue indicating that the voting system was not functioning properly causing reporting issues, the Office of Elections may expand the audit. An expanded audit may include reviewing another contest for the selected audit D/Ps or selecting additional D/Ps to audit.

The Audit Team may sit or stand while conducting the audit. The Audit Team should be able to carry voted ballot containers (VBCs) of up to 10 pounds between work areas.

## PROCESSES

- Select Audit Precincts, page 158
- Audit Mail Results, page 160
- Audit In-Person Results, page 168
- Secure the Work Area, page 174

# SELECT AUDIT PRECINCTS

The post-election audit confirms that the voting equipment counted the ballots accurately and the results were tabulated correctly. A hand tally of expected results is created to compare to the results reports.

## PERSONNEL

- Official Observers select the D/Ps to audit and may pick the contest to audit.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs operations of the post-election audit.

## SUPPLIES

- *Audit District/Precincts*, see page 159
- *Batch Log*, see page 161
- *Batch Tally*, see page 162
- D/P cards
- pens, red
- *Voter Service Center VBC Tally*, see page 171

## TASKS

### 1 Select audit D/P and contest

With the D/P cards faced down, shuffle the cards and allow the Official Observers to randomly select the audit D/Ps. Then select a contest for each audit D/P.

Complete the *Audit District/Precincts* by recording the selected audit D/Ps and contests, and asking Official Observers to certify. **See sample on page 159.**

### 2 Prepare audit forms

For each audit D/P, record the D/P, contest, and voting position on the *Batch Log*, *Batch Tally*, and *Voter Service Center VBC Tally*.

**NOTE:** Record the candidate names as listed on the ballot.

# SELECTING THE AUDIT PRECINCTS

*Audit District/Precincts*

SAMPLE

A

	D/P	Contest	
1	00-00	FAVORITE BEACH (H)	11
2			12
3			13
4			14
5			15
6			16
7			17
8			18
9			19
10			20

Pursuant to the rules and procedures governing elections, we the undersigned certify to have randomly selected the district/precincts (D/Ps) identified above to audit at the date and time stated and approve the same as being correct.

Official Observer (print)

Observer a

Observer b

Date & Time

MM/DD HH:MM

Official Observer (sign)

Observer A

Observer B

A

**Select audit D/P and contest (see page 158)**

- District/precincts (D/Ps)
- Contest
- Date & time
- Official Observers print & sign

# AUDIT MAIL RESULTS

The audit of mail ballots confirms the counting by the Verity Central scanner stations used at the counting center. Auditors review each ballot by batch for an audit district/precinct (D/P) to create a hand tally of the votes for the selected audit contest, verifying it was counted as marked. The compiled hand tally is reconciled with the results reports and the audit is certified. The auditors work on 1 audit D/P at a time at each scanner station.

## PERSONNEL

- Auditors hand tally the votes for each batch of ballots for the selected audit contest.
- Hart Technicians set up and support the use of the scanner stations.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs operations of the post-election audit.

## SUPPLIES

- *Audit Certification*, see page 167
- *Ballot Handling*, see page 165
- *Batch Log*, see page 161
- *Batch Tally*, see page 162
- pens, red
- *Questionable Ballot Log*, see page 164
- *Seal Certification*
- transparent tape
- *VBC Seal Certification*
- wire cutter

## TASKS

1

### Record batches

- Prepare the *Batch Log* to account for the ballots to be audited. **See sample on page 161.**
- At the scanner station, filter ballots to the audit D/P.

**NOTE:** *First initial(s) (e.g., Ta, Te, Ti, To, Tu) may be used to note candidate names.*

2

### Hand tally the expected results

- Prepare the *Batch Tally*. **See sample on page 162.**
- Open the batch and review each ballot.

**A** BATCH LOG

SAMPLE

**B**

D/P		Contest													
00-00		FAVORITE BEACH (H)													
Batch ID	Candidate A	Candidate B	Candidate C	Candidate D	Candidate E	Candidate F	Candidate G	Candidate H	Candidate I	Candidate J	Blank	Over	Question	Other	Total
1	H	K									4	0		41	201
2											1	1		57	177
3															
5															
21															
24															
25															
56															
58															
60															
63															
64															
188															
190															
191															
225															
227															
230															
32															
256															
Sheet Total															

**C**

- A Record batches (see page 160)**
  - District/precinct (D/P)
  - Contest
  - Candidates in order they appear on the ballot
  - Batch IDs
  
- B Hand tally the expected results (see page 160)**
  - Tally from the *Batch Tally*
  
- C Compile tally of expected results (see page 166)**

# CREATING A HAND TALLY OF EXPECTED RESULTS

## Batch Tally

A

B

SAMPLE

BATCH TALLY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Matched to physical ballots	
Date & time <b>MM/DD HH:MM</b>		Initials <b>aa</b>	
D/P <b>00-00</b>	Contest <b>FAVORITE BEACH (H)</b>	Batch ID <b>1</b>	No. of Ballots <b>201</b>
Candidate A <b>H</b>			Total
			<b>146</b>
Candidate B <b>K</b>			Total
			<b>10</b>
Candidate C			Total
Candidate D			Total
Candidate E			Total
Candidate F			Total
Blank votes			Total
			<b>4</b>
Over votes			Total
			<b>0</b>
Other			Total
			<b>41</b>

**A** Hand tally the expected results (see page 160)

- District/precinct (D/P)
- Contest
- Batch ID
- No. of ballots in the batch
- Candidates, in the order they appear on the ballot
- Tally and total by voting position
- Record the totals on the *Batch Log*.

**B** Match a batch to physical ballots (see page 163)

- Date & time
- Initials

- Review the vote for the audit contest. Keep in mind, in the Primary Election, partisan federal and state contests are dependent on the select-a-party contest. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**
- Tally the vote by voting position on the *Batch Tally*. In the Primary Election, votes for another political preference and invalid votes are tallied as “Other”. **See sample on page 162.**
- At the end of a batch, record the tally for each voting position and confirm that the total equals the number of ballots in the batch.
- Record the tally from the *Batch Tally* on the *Batch Log* for the corresponding batch ID.
- Repeat for all batches.

### **Review questionable marks**

A review of a physical ballot may be done to confirm the vote, as appropriate. The ballot review should be noted in flow, but wait to conduct the physical review of the ballot until the batch is complete.

- **Identify the ballot.** Complete the *Questionable Ballot Log*. **See sample on page 164.**
- At the scanner station, search for the ballot by unique ID to determine the VBC number and record.
- **Track ballot handling.** Confirm the seal number matches the seal certification with Official Observers. To unseal, complete “Certification of Unsealing,” on a *Seal Certification* form. Ensure the *Seal Certification* form is taped to the top of the VBC. The form will be used to secure the VBC.
- Complete 2 copies of the *Ballot Handling* worksheet. Store 1 copy in the VBC, and file copy 2 in the form folder. **See sample on page 165.**
- **Find the ballot.** Identify the batch and find the ballot for review by unique ID. In the VBC, the batches are bundled and rubber-banded with the batch report.
- **Review the ballot.** Remove the ballot from the batch, review it, and complete the *Questionable Ballot Log*. Tally an accepted vote on the *Batch Tally* or a questionable mark on the *Batch Log*.
- Repack the VBC. Keep the reviewed ballot and 1 copy of the *Ballot Handling* worksheet at the top of the pile in the VBC.
- Return the VBC to the VBC Processing work area for storage. Official Observers monitor unsealed VBCs at all times. The VBCs are sealed after reconciling and certifying the audit. **See Secure the Work Area on page 174.**

## **3**

### **Match a batch to physical ballots**

Ask the Official Observers to randomly select 1 batch ID to match the *Batch Tally* to the physical ballots. Identify the VBC of the selected batch ID.





**BALLOT HANDLING**

Complete 2 copies for each VBC. One copy is maintained with the team supplies, the other is stored with the ballot or batch in the VBC.

VBC No. <b>###</b>	Type <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mail <input type="checkbox"/> Voter service center	Date & time <b>MM/DD HH:MM</b>
Reason <input type="checkbox"/> Audit content of VBC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Audit batch <input type="checkbox"/> Review questionable ballot <input type="checkbox"/> Other:	Batch IDs <b>###</b> _____ _____ _____ _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable for voter service center VBCs

Auditors handling the ballots and Official Observers monitoring print and sign below.

Print	Sign
<b>AUDIT A</b>	<i>Audit A</i>
<i>Audit B</i>	<i>Audit B</i>
<i>Observer a</i>	<i>Observer A</i>
<i>Observer b</i>	<i>Observer B</i>

**A** **Track ballot handling (see page 163)**

- VBC No.
- Type = Mail
- Date & time
- Reason
- Batch IDs
- Print & sign

### Track ballot handling

- Confirm the seal number matches the seal certification with Official Observers. To unseal, complete “Certification of Unsealing,” on a *Seal Certification* form. Ensure the *Seal Certification* form is taped to the top of the VBC. The form will be used to secure the VBC.
- Complete 2 copies of the *Ballot Handling* worksheet. Store 1 copy in the VBC, and file copy 2 in the form folder. **See sample on page 165.**

### Sort the ballots

- Remove the batch from the VBC.
- Review the ballots and sort them into stacks by voting position. The number of stacks depends on the number of candidates. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**

### Stack the ballots

- Determine the batch size before counting the stacks of ballots. The suggested batch size is 10 ballots as smaller batches may be easier to resolve if any discrepancies arise.
- For each stack, count the ballots into batches (e.g., 10 ballots). These batches can then be stacked together in alternating directions to save space in the work area.
- Resolve any discrepancy and complete “Matched to physical ballots” on the *Batch Tally*. **See sample on page 162.**

### Pack the audit VBC

- Repack the VBC, keeping the reviewed batch and 1 copy of the *Ballot Handling* worksheet at the top of the pile in the VBC.
- Return the VBC to the VBC Processing work area for storage. Official Observers monitor unsealed VBCs at all times. The VBCs are sealed after reconciling and certifying the audit. **See Secure the Work Area on page 174.**

## 4

### Compile tally of expected results

- Complete the “Sheet Total” on each *Batch Log*. **See sample on page 161.**
- Complete the *Audit Certification*. **See sample on page 167.**

## 5

### Certify the audit

- Verify that the number of ballots audited matches the turnout on the results reports.
- Match the votes for each voting position to the results reports.
- Resolve discrepancies.
- Sign the *Audit Certification*. **See sample on page 167.**



# AUDIT IN-PERSON RESULTS

The audit is conducted on the in-person ballots counted at the voter service centers (VSCs). The VSC ballots are not organized by district/precinct (D/P) as ballots are cast by voters at the Verity Scan devices in flow. The auditors, working with 1 voted ballot container (VBC) at a time, sort the ballots to identify those associated with all audit D/Ps.

## PERSONNEL

- Auditors sort and count the ballots to compare with the results report.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs operations of the post-election audit.

## SUPPLIES

- *Audit Certification*, see page 172
- *Ballot Handling*, see page 169
- pens, red
- *Seal Certification*
- transparent tape
- *Voter Service Center VBC Log*
- *Voter Service Center VBC Tally*, see page 171
- wire cutter

## TASKS

1

### Track ballot handling

Auditors work with 1 VBC at a time.

- Follow the *Voter Service Center VBC Log* to account for the voter service center VBCs to audit.
- Confirm the seal number matches the *Seal Certification* with Official Observers. To unseal, complete “Certification of Unsealing,” on a *Seal Certification* form. Ensure the *Seal Certification* form is taped to the top of the VBC. The form will be used to secure the VBC.
- Complete 2 copies of the *Ballot Handling* worksheet for the audit VBC. Store 1 copy in the VBC, and file copy 2 in the form folder. **See sample on page 169.**



## BALLOT HANDLING

Complete 2 copies for each VBC. One copy is maintained with the team supplies, the other is stored with the ballot or batch in the VBC.

VBC No. <b>###</b>	Type <input type="checkbox"/> Mail <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Voter service center	Date & time <b>MM/DD HH:MM</b>
Reason <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Audit content of VBC <input type="checkbox"/> Audit batch <input type="checkbox"/> Review questionable ballot <input type="checkbox"/> Other:	Batch IDs <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable for voter service center VBCs	

Auditors handling the ballots and Official Observers monitoring print and sign below.

Print	Sign
<b>AUDIT A</b>	<i>Audit A</i>
<i>Audit B</i>	<i>Audit B</i>
<i>Observer a</i>	<i>Observer A</i>
<i>Observer b</i>	<i>Observer B</i>

**A** Track ballot handling (see page 168)

- VBC No.
- Type = Voter Service Center
- Date & time
- Reason = Audit content of VBC
- Batch IDs = N/A
- Print & sign

## 2

### Sort the ballots

Sort the ballots by D/P (i.e., audit D/Ps, not audit D/Ps). Keep audit ballots sorted together (e.g., 00-00 audit ballots are all stacked together).

For each audit D/P, review the ballots and sort them into stacks by voting position. The number of stacks depends on the number of candidates. **See Voting Positions on page 205.**

#### Primary Election & Partisan Contests

In the Primary Election, votes in partisan federal and state contests are dependent on the select-a-party contest (under Start Voting Here). To audit a partisan federal or state contest, first sort the ballots into stacks based on the votes of the select-a-party contest. Then separate and organize the ballots that are marked with the corresponding party, blank votes, and over votes into stacks of the audit contest.

- Party of the selected audit contest. **See sample on page 206.**
- No party selected. **See sample on page 208.**
- Multi-party voting. **See sample on page 210.**
- Other political affiliations selected.

Review the stacks (party of the selected audit contest, no party selected, and multi-party voting) of ballots again and sort them into stacks by the voting position of the audit contest.

## 3

### Stack the ballots

- Determine the batch size before counting the stacks of ballots. The suggested batch size is 10 ballots as smaller batches may be easier to resolve if any discrepancies arise.
- For each stack, count the ballots into batches (e.g., 10 ballots). These batches can then be stacked together in alternating directions to save space in the work area.

## 4

### Compile tally of expected results

- Complete a *Voter Service Center VBC Tally* for each audit D/P. **See sample on page 171.**
- Complete an *Audit Certification*. **See sample on page 172.**

## 5

### Pack the audit VBC

- Repack ballots not included in the audit at the bottom of the corresponding VBC.
- Keep the audit D/P ballots together, sorted by D/P, and pack them at the top of the pile in the VBC.
- Store the *Ballot Handling* worksheet on top of the audit ballots in the VBC.
- Return the VBC to the VBC Processing work area for storage. Official Observers monitor unsealed VBCs at all times. The VBCs are sealed after reconciling and certifying the audit. **See Secure the Work Area on page 174.**

# TALLYING VOTER SERVICE CENTER BALLOTS

Voter Service Center VBC Tally



VOTER SERVICE CENTER VBC TALLY

D/P	Contest										Audit Tally
00-00	FAVORITE BEACH (H)										
VBC No.	1	2	3	12	13						
Voting position											
HAPUNA	7	3	2	1	0						13
KIHOLO BAY	1										1
Blank votes	0	0	0	0	0						0
Over votes	0	0	0	0	0						0
Other	9	7	2	5	0						21

**A** Compile tally of expected results (see page 170)

- District/precinct (D/P)
- Contest
- VBC Nos.
- Voting positions in order candidates appear on the ballot
- Tally by VBC No. & Voting Positions
- Total by Voting Position



**6****Certify the audit**

- Verify that the number of ballots audited matches the turnout on the results reports.
- Match the votes for each voting position to the results reports.
- Resolve discrepancies.
- Sign the *Audit Certification*. **See sample on page 172.**

# SECURE THE WORK AREA

After certifying the post-election audit, voted ballot containers (VBCs) are securely stored.

## PERSONNEL

- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots.
- Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operation of the post-election audit.

## SUPPLIES

- *Audit VBC Seal Certification* folder
- pens, red
- *Seal Certification*
- *VBC Seal Certification*

## TASKS

**1**

### Secure the VBCs

- Complete page 1, "Certification of Sealing," on a *Seal Certification* form to secure each VBC.
- Store the completed *Seal Certification* forms in the VBC Processing Team *Audit VBC Seal Certification* folder.

#### Oahu Counting Center

Complete the *VBC Seal Certification* to secure each VBC.

**2**

### Pack the forms and supplies

Store the forms and supplies in the supply bag.

**3**

### Check out and return badge

- Sign out on the *Volunteer Time Log*
- Return the ID badge. ID badges are organized alphabetically by last name.

# RECOUNT OBSERVERS' TEST

Official Observers test the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment and certify that the ballots are counted correctly. The Recount Observers' Test is conducted at the start of an automatic recount using the counting center voting equipment and tabulation application. One (1) Official Observer is assigned to run their test ballot packet per scanner station.

- Scanner stations use the Verity Central application to count the voted ballots.
- vDrives are used to define the election and write ballots for tabulation.
- Verity Count is the tabulation application to compile and print the results.

## PROCESSES

- Scan Test Ballots, page 176
- Print the Test Results & Reconcile, page 177
- Pack the ETC, page 179

# SCAN TEST BALLOTS

Test ballots are counted at the scanner stations. For the Recount Observers' Test, 1 Official Observer per scanner station scans their test ballots. The test ballots are written to a test vDrive to tabulate the test results. The Official Observers match the test results with their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager administers the logic and accuracy test.
- Hart Technicians operate and write test vDrives at a scanner station.
- Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots, creating a tally of expected results, and matching their results to the voting equipment results report.

## SUPPLIES

- pens, red
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### Scan test ballots

- Assign 1 Official Observer per scanner station and provide them with their test ballot packet from the equipment transport container (ETC).
- Ask the Official Observers to remove any paper clips or rubber bands to batch their test deck.

### Scanner stations

Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations.

- Print a zero *Configuration Report* for the Official Observers to certify. The certified report is provided to the Counting Center Manager to pack in the test zero report envelope.
- Scan batch explaining each step taken to the Official Observers. Return the test deck to the Official Observer to store in their test ballot packets.

**2**

### Write test vDrive

- Ask an Official Observer to select a blank test vDrive and record it on the *Test vDrive Log*.
- With Official Observers, transfer the test vDrive to the Verity Count work area to print the test results.

# PRINT THE TEST RESULTS & RECONCILE

Before tabulating the test vDrives, Official Observers verify that there are no votes in Verity Count, the tabulation application. Then, test vDrives are read into Verity Count to print the test results. Official Observers reconcile their test results with their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager collects the zero report and disseminates the test results. The Manager also assists Official Observers in resolving discrepancies when reconciling.
- Hart Technicians operate Verity Count to print the zero report, and then test results. Each Official Observer is provided printed test results based on their assigned district/precincts (D/Ps).
- Official Observers certify that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling the test results. Then, they receive their test results to match to their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## SUPPLIES

- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Certify the zero report**

Before tabulating written test vDrives, the Hart Technician prints a zero report.

- Provide the zero report to the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests.
- Ask Official Observers to sign and date the first page of the zero report. Pack the certified report in the test zero report envelope.

**2**

### **Distribute the test results**

- Provide the test vDrives to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area. The Hart Technician prints the test results in ballot face order by packet number.
- Collect the tabulated test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope at the Verity Count work area.

- Identify the Official Observer by packet number to provide the test results. Instruct each Official Observer to reconcile the test results with their tally of expected results, and certify their test results.

### 3

#### **Certify the test results**

The following procedures are completed by the Official Observers.

- Match the test results to the tally of expected results or previous test results. Confirm the number of ballots, and votes for candidates, blank (under) votes, and over votes in each contest.
- Certify by signing and dating the first page of the test results.
- Pack the test ballots and certified test results into the test ballot packet and return them to the Counting Center Manager for inventory.

The test materials are securely stored in the equipment transport container (ETC). This includes the test ballot packets, test vDrives, and the Count USB backup.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Hart Technician archives Verity Count to USB.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- Count USB envelope
- rubber fingers
- pens, red
- *Recount Test Certification*
- *Test Ballot Inventory*
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Inventory the test ballots**

Test ballots are inventoried as each Official Observer returns their test ballot packet.

- Complete “Recount” on the *Test Ballot Inventory*.
- Store inventoried test ballot packets in the ETC, lowest to highest.
- Ask each Official Observer who conducted the test to sign the *Recount Test Certification*.

**2**

### **Pack the test vDrives**

Check the *Test vDrive Log* to confirm the number of test vDrives. Pack the test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.

**3****Archive Verity Count**

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.

**4****Pack the test materials into the ETC**

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- test ballot packets, mail & VSC
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope
- unused test ballots envelopes, mail & VSC
- vDrives, blank, official
- vDrives, blank, test

**5****Lock the ETC**

When the counting center is open, the ETC may be secured using the padlock when not directly monitored by Official Observers.

# RESCAN THE BALLOTS

---

**IMPORTANT:** *Counting center operations are conducted in the presence of Official Observers. Official Observers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the public to monitor the processing, handling, and transfer of election material within the counting center. When not directly handled, sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives, must be securely stored.*

---

Ballots for the impacted recount contest are rescanned at the scanner stations. Voted ballot containers (VBCs) to rescan would include those from the voter service centers (VSCs), mail VBCs, and duplicated VBCs. The scanner stations work with 1 recount VBC and method of voting at a time. At the scanner station, the method of voting must be changed between scanning the ballots from the VSCs (in-person) to the counting center (mail).

After rescanning the ballots, vDrives are written to tabulate. As the automatic recount is only related to a specific contest, only the results for the impacted candidates are reported.

# RESCAN VSC BALLOTS

First, rescan the voter service center (VSC) ballots in the designated VSC voted ballot containers (VBCs). After scanning the VSC ballots, Hart Technicians write recount VSC vDrives, which are tracked and logged.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs the operations of the work areas.
- Hart Technicians operates scanner stations to count ballots and Verity Count work area for tabulation.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots and vDrives.
- VBC Processing Team prepares the recount VBCs to be rescanned.

## SUPPLIES

- calculator
- cut seals envelope
- pens, red
- recount labels
- *Recount VBC Rescanned Log*
- *Recount VBC Time Log*
- *Recount vDrive Log*
- recount vDrive envelope
- *Voter Service Center VBC Log*
- wire cutters

## TASKS

**1**

### Prepare the recount VSC VBCs

- Adhere a recount label to each VSC VBC on the side or lid. Do **not** cover the original labels. The recount label is filled out by the Hart Technician at the scanner station for each batch rescanned.
- Complete the *Recount VBC Time Log*. **See sample on page 183.**
- Cut the seal on the VSC VBCs and pack them in a cut seals envelope.

**2**


### Scan the recount VSC VBCs

Rescan all VSC VBCs first before moving on to the mail VBCs. The Hart Technician must set the voting type of the recount VSC VBCs to “in-person.”

- Transfer the recount VBC to a scanner station and complete the time “to Scanner” on the *Recount*

# LOGGING RECOUNT VBCS

## Recount VBC Time Log



VBC No.	Seal No.	Unsealing	Unsealed by	Official Observers	Counted	to Scanner	from Scanner	Rescanned total	Comments
		date MM/DD time HH:MM	Initials PA	print Observer a Observer B	sign Observer a Observer B	date MM/DD time HH:MM	date MM/DD time HH:MM		
VSC 1	0000901		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B			756	
VSC 2	0000912		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B			789	
VSC 3	0000918		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B				
VSC 12	0000925		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B				
VSC 13	0000926		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B				
1	0000001		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B	700			
2	0000002		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B	652			
15	0000118		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B	694			
31	0000125		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B	712			
32	0000126		PA	Observer a Observer B	Observer a Observer B	35			

SAMPLE VBC TIME LOG

**A** Identify the recount VBCs and unseal

- VBC No.
- Seal No.
- Unsealing date & time
- Unsealed by, initials
- Official Observers, print & sign
- Counted, for mail VBCs only, from the original scanned label

**B** Scan the recount VBCs

- to Scanner, date & time

**C** Retrieve the scanned recount VBCs

- from Scanner, date & time
- Rescanned total

*VBC Time Log*. Hart Technicians work with 1 VBC at a time. If a scanner station is not immediately available, hold the VBCs in the queue at the work area.

- Confirm with the Hart Technician that the VBC is from a VSC and the voting type is set to “in-person”.

### 3 Retrieve the scanned recount VSC VBC

The Hart Technicians raise their hands when they are ready to scan another VBC. Check out the next VBC in the queue on the *Recount VBC Time Log* to deliver to the scanner station when picking up the completed VBC.

- Record the time “from Scanner” and the “Rescanned total” on the *Recount VBC Time Log*.
- Complete the *Recount VBC Rescanned Log* by recording the number of ballots by batch, from the Recount label on VBC. Keep a running total (cumulative) of counted and defective ballots. **See sample on page 185.**
- If there are any defective ballots with the impacted recount contest, the ballots must be duplicated to be counted. **See Cure Defective Ballots on page 189.**
- Keep queued recount VBCs separated from the scanned recount VBCs. Scanned recount VBCs are identifiable by the completed recount label. To securely store the scanned recount VBCs, **see Secure the Work Area on page 194.**

### 4 Write recount VSC vDrives

After all VSC VBCs have been rescanned, write the recount VSC vDrive(s). The recount VSC vDrive should be written before rescanning mail VBCs.

Official Observers select blank official vDrive(s) for the Hart Technician to write. Official Observers monitor the vDrives at all times. The blank vDrives may be locked in the ETC when not directly monitored by Official Observers.

### 5 Track recount VSC vDrives

- Receive the recount VSC vDrive from the Hart Technicians to record on the *Recount vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 186.**
- Store recount vDrives in the recount vDrive envelope to separate them from the election vDrives.
- Secure the recount vDrive envelope in the written vDrive can when not directly monitoring and when closing the counting center. **See Secure the Work Area on page 194.**

# LOGGING RECOUNT VSC VBCS

## Recount VBC Rescanned Log



SAMPLE

VBC No.	Date	Batch A	B	C	D	E	Rescanned total	Cumulative Rescanned	Defective	Cumulative Defective
VSC 1	MM/DD	rescanned	201	220	198	137	756	756		
		defective							0	0
VSC 2	MM/DD	rescanned	190	186	202	211	789	1,545		
		defective							0	0
		rescanned								
		defective								
		rescanned								
		defective								
		rescanned								
		defective								
		rescanned								
		defective								
		rescanned								
		defective								
		rescanned								
		defective								
		rescanned								
		defective								

**A** Retrieve the scanned recount VBC

- VBC No.
- Date scanned
- Number of ballots counted by batch (A, B, C, D, E, etc.)
- Rescanned total
- Cumulative rescanned (VBC line plus previous VBC line)
- Defective total
- Cumulative defective (VBC line plus previous VBC line)



# RESCAN MAIL BALLOTS

Identify the mail voted ballot containers (VBCs) to be rescanned based on the sorting on the VBC label, including duplicated VBCs.

After rescanning the voter service center (VSC) VBCs and writing the recount VSC vDrive(s), check that the Hart Technician changes the voting type at each scanner station to “mail” ballots. Then, after scanning the mail ballots, Hart Technicians write recount mail vDrives, which are tracked and logged.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs the operations of the work areas.
- Hart Technicians operates scanner stations to count ballots and Verity Count work area for tabulation.
- Official Observers monitor the handling of ballots and vDrives.
- VBC Processing Team prepares the recount VBCs to be rescanned.

## SUPPLIES

- calculator
- cut seals envelope
- pens, red
- recount labels
- *Recount VBC Rescanned Log*
- *Recount VBC Time Log*
- *Recount vDrive Log*
- recount vDrive envelope
- *VBC Time Log*
- wire cutters

## TASKS

1

### Identify the recount mail VBCs

- Adhere a recount label to each mail VBC that will be rescanned, including duplicated VBCs. Position the recount label on the side or lid of the VBC. Do **not** cover the original labels. The recount label is filled out by the Hart Technician at the scanner station for each batch rescanned.
- Complete the *Recount VBC Time Log*. **See sample on page 183.**
- Cut the seal on the recount VBC and pack them in a cut seals envelope.

## 2

### Scan the recount mail VBCs

Rescan mail ballots after writing the recount VSC vDrive. The Hart Technician must set the voting type to “mail” for the recount mail VBCs.

- Transfer the recount mail VBC to a scanner station and complete the time “to Scanner” on the *Recount VBC Time Log*. Hart Technicians work with 1 VBC at a time. If a scanner station is not immediately available, hold the VBCs in the queue at the work area.
- Notify the Hart Technician that it is a mail VBC.

## 3

### Retrieve the scanned recount mail VBC

The Hart Technicians raise their hands when they are ready to scan another VBC.

- Record the time “from Scanner” and the “Rescanned total” on the *Recount VBC Time Log*.
- Confirm that the “Rescanned total” equals the original “Counted.” If there are any discrepancies, compare the original and recount batch reports to resolve.
- Complete the *Recount VBC Rescanned Log*. **See sample on page 185.**
- If there are any defective ballots with the impacted recount contest, the ballots must be duplicated to be counted. **See Cure Defective Ballots on page 189.**
- Keep queued recount mail VBCs separated from the scanned recount mail VBCs. Scanned recount VBCs are identifiable by the completed recount label. To securely store the scanned recount VBCs, **see Secure the Work Area on page 194.**

## 4

### Write recount mail vDrives

Official Observers select blank official vDrive(s) for the Hart Technician to write. Official Observers monitor the vDrives at all times. The blank vDrives may be locked in the ETC when not directly monitored by Official Observers.

## 5

### Track recount mail vDrives

- Receive the recount mail vDrive from the Hart Technicians to record on the *Recount vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 186.**
- Store recount vDrives in the recount vDrive envelope to separate them from the election vDrives.
- Secure the recount vDrive envelope in the written vDrive can when not directly monitoring and when closing the counting center. **See Secure the Work Area on page 194.**

# CURE DEFECTIVE BALLOTS

A recount ballot may be accidentally damaged during scanning or storage causing it to be rejected by the scanner. The Hart Technician places the recount ballot in the defective tray for collection if the impacted contest appears on the ballot.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager directs the operations of the work areas.
- Hart Technicians operate and maintain the voting equipment.
- Official Observers verify the duplication of defective ballots.
- VBC Processing Team collects recount defective ballots from the scanner stations to duplicate.

## SUPPLIES

- control packet
- defective ballot container
- duplicated VBC
- marker, red
- paper clips
- pens, red
- *Recount Ballot Tracking Log*
- scratch paper
- *Seal Certification*
- sealing hook

### Duplication work area

- automatic numbering machine
- pens, black

## TASKS

1

### Prepare a control packet

- Collect damaged ballots from the defectives tray at each scanner station. Confirm that the recount contest appears on the ballot.
- Stamp the top left on the front of each damaged ballot with the red defective stamp. Avoid stamping near the barcodes.
- Collect the defective ballots in a control packet. When full or as the recount is concluding, record the number of defective ballots and initial the control packet.

**2****Print a blank duplicate ballot**

Identify the D/P of the defective ballot and ask the Hart Technician to print a blank ballot. If printing multiple blank ballots for the control packet, paper clip the blank ballot to the defective ballot.

**3****Transcribe the votes onto the duplicate ballot**

Mark the votes on the defective ballot onto the duplicate ballot by completely darkening the voting position. Mark over votes as they appear on the defective ballot. Official Observers may assist by indicating how a mark would have been read by the voting equipment.

**NOTE:** *A stray mark near a barcode or voting position may require the ballot to be spoiled and re-duplicated.*

**Spoiling a duplicated ballot**

If there is an error on the duplicate ballot, it is spoiled and re-duplicated.

- Use a red marker to strike through the barcodes and record "Spoiled" at the top left of the front of the ballot. This ensures that a spoiled ballot cannot be accidentally read at the scanner station.
- Staple the spoiled ballot to the defective ballot.
- Retrieve another blank duplicate ballot. **See 2 Print a blank duplicate ballot.**

**4****Confirm the votes match**

Official Observers confirm the votes on the defective ballot match the duplicate ballot.

- Initial next to "Official Ballot" on the front of the defective and duplicated ballot using a green pen. Do not initial near a voting position or barcode. If a vote does not match, the ballot must be re-duplicated.
- Keep the defective and duplicate ballot paper clipped together.

**5****Assign a control number**

- On the *Recount Ballot Tracking Log*, record the district/precinct (D/P) and check "damaged."
- Use the automatic numbering machine to stamp the face (one side only) of the defective ballot, the duplicated ballot, and the *Recount Ballot Tracking Log*. Cross out and initial any errors. If the automatic numbering machine is out of sync, move forward by stamping scratch paper.

**Setting up the automatic numbering machine**

Set the clip on the automatic numbering machine to "3" to work in triplicate. Then, test that it is legibly stamping 3 copies of the same number on scratch paper. Re-ink the stamp pad as necessary by pouring a small amount of ink onto the dry pad and allowing it to soak in before using it.

**6****Organize the ballots**

- Remove the paper clip and separate the ballot into stacks of defective and duplicated ballots. Keep each stack in order by control number. These ballots are inventoried and packed into the control packet, with duplicated ballots in one pocket and defective ballots in a separate pocket.
- Pack the defective ballots in a defective ballot container. Use the corresponding duplicated VBC (e.g., VBC 1d) to pack the duplicated ballots.

**7****Queue the duplicated VBC to scan**

After all control packets have been duplicated, queue the duplicate VBC to transfer to a scanner station. **See Rescan Mail Ballots on page 187.**

Once the duplicated VBC is queued for scanning, seal the corresponding defective ballot container.

- With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the container. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

# TABULATING THE RECOUNT

The results of the recount are tabulated using Verity Count, the tabulation application. Only the results for the impacted candidates are reported.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager oversees the automatic recount.
- Hart Technicians operate the Verity Count work area to compile the recount results.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of ballots and vDrives and certify the recount results.

## SUPPLIES

- certified reports envelope
- pens, red
- *Recount vDrive Log*
- recount vDrive envelope
- written vDrive can

## TASKS

### 1 Retrieve the recount vDrives

Recount vDrives are tracked on the *Recount vDrive Log* and securely stored in the written vDrive can.

- Complete “to Count” and walk the vDrives to the Verity Count work area with Official Observers.  
**See sample on page 185.**
- Official Observers monitor vDrives at the Verity Count work area at all times.

### 2 Compile the recount vDrives

The recount vDrives are read directly into Verity Count to compile the results and print. Only the results of the impacted contest are released.

**NOTE:** *If the recount is for a statewide contest, the results are compiled at the Oahu Counting Center using Verity Transmit.*

### 3 Certify the recount results

- Ask the Official Observers to certify the recount results by signing the first page of the report. Pack the certified report in the certified reports envelope in the ETC.
- Direct the Official Observers and Hart Technicians to conduct the Post-Recount Test. **See Post-Recount Observers’ Test on page 197.**

**NOTE:** *Marginal marks may not be read by the scanner the same way.*

**4****Secure the recount vDrives**

With Official Observers, return the recount vDrives and *Recount vDrive Log* to the VBC Processing work area.

- Complete “from Count” for each vDrive on the *Recount vDrive Log*. **See sample on page 186.**
- Ensure that the recount vDrives listed on the *Recount vDrive Log* are accounted for and packed in the recount vDrives envelope.
- Securely store the recount vDrives envelope in the written vDrive can. **See Secure the Work Area on page 194.**

# SECURE THE WORK AREA

When closing the work area, sensitive election materials including the voted ballot containers (VBCs) and written vDrive can must be sealed.

**OAHU:** *The VBCs may be sealed in security cages until the post-election audit is completed.*

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager oversees the conduct of the automatic recount.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and transport of ballots and vDrives.
- VBC Processing Team handles and secures the recount VBCs and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- pens, red
- seal
- *Seal Certification*
- sealing hook
- written vDrive can

## TASKS

### 1 Check for defective recount ballots

Collect impacted defective ballots and scan the duplicated ballots. **See Cure Defective Ballots on page 189.**

### 2 Secure the queued VBCs, if any

The queued recount VBCs, if any, may be secured if scanning cannot be completed within 1 day. On the final day of the recount, all VBCs must be scanned.

- With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the VBC. Hook the corresponding seal into the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

**3****Secure rescanned recount VBCs**

- Complete the *Recount VBC Seal Certification*. **See sample on page 196.**
- Insert the sealing hook through the holes of the VBC. Hook the corresponding seal through the eye of the sealing hook and pull through. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

**4****Secure the recount vDrives**

- Verify that the number of recount vDrives matches the *Recount vDrive Log*.
- With Official Observers, complete 2 copies of a *Seal Certification* form. Place 1 copy of the form in the container before sealing. Copy 2 is stored on top of the container.
- Latch the written vDrive can and hook on the corresponding seal. Squeeze the seal shut and tug to ensure it is secured.

**5****Pack the supplies**

Store the forms and supplies in the work area supply bag. Do not store any forms in a sealed container!

**6****Check out and return badge**

- Sign out on the *Volunteer Time Log*.
- Return the ID badge. ID badges are organized alphabetically by last name.

# SECURE SCANNED RECOUNT VBCS

## Recount Seal Certification



VBC No.	Date	Time	Seal No.	Official Observer		Comments
VSC 1	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000201	print Observer a	sign Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
VSC 2	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000202	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
VSC 3	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000203	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
VSC 12	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000204	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
VSC 13	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000205	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
1	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000206	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
2	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000207	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
15	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000208	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
31	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000210	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	
32	MM/DD	HH:MM	0000209	Observer a	Observer a	
				Observer B	Observer B	

RECOUNT VBC SEAL CERTIFICATION



### Secure rescanned recount VBCs

- VBC No.
- Date
- Time
- Seal No.
- Official Observers, print & sign

# POST-RECOUNT OBSERVERS' TEST

Official Observers test the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment and certify that the ballots are counted correctly. The Post-Recount Observers' Test is conducted after certifying the recount results using the counting center voting equipment and tabulation application. One (1) Official Observer is assigned to run their test ballot packet per scanner station.

- Scanner stations use the Verity Central application to count the voted ballots.
- vDrives are used to define the election and write ballots for tabulation.
- Verity Count is the tabulation application to compile and print the results.

# SCAN TEST BALLOTS

Test ballots are counted at the scanner stations. For the Post-Recount Test, 1 Official Observer per scanner station scans their test ballots. The test ballots are written to a vDrive to tabulate the test results. The Official Observers match the test results with their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager administers the logic and accuracy test.
- Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations and write vDrives.
- Official Observers test and certify the logic and accuracy of the voting equipment by marking test ballots, creating a tally of expected results, and matching their results to the voting equipment results report.

## SUPPLIES

- pens, red
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### Scan test ballots

- Assign 1 Official Observer per scanner station and provide them with their test ballot packet from the equipment transport container (ETC).
- Instruct the Official Observers to remove any paper clips or rubber bands to batch their test deck.

### Scanner stations

Hart Technicians operate the scanner stations.

- Print a zero *Configuration Report* for the Official Observers to certify. The certified report is provided to the Counting Center Manager to pack in the test zero report envelope.
- Scan batch explaining each step taken to the Official Observers. Return the test deck to the Official Observer to store in their test ballot packets.

**2**

### Write test vDrive

- Ask an Official Observer to select a blank test vDrive and record on the *Test vDrive Log*.
- With Official Observers, transfer the test vDrive to the Verity Count work area to print the test results.

# PRINT THE TEST RESULTS & RECONCILE

Before tabulating the test vDrives, Official Observers verify that there are no votes in Verity Count, the tabulation application. Then, test vDrives are read into Verity Count to print the test results. Official Observers reconcile their test results with their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager collects the zero report, disseminates the test results, and assists Official Observers in resolving discrepancies when reconciling.
- Hart Technicians operate Verity Count to print the zero report, and then test results. Each Official Observer is provided printed test results based on their assigned district/precincts (D/Ps).
- Official Observers certify that there are no votes in Verity Count before compiling the test results. Then, Official Observers receive their test results to match to their tally of expected results or previous test results.

## SUPPLIES

- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

**1**

### **Certify the zero report**

Before tabulating written test vDrives, the Hart Technician prints a zero report.

- Provide the zero report to the Official Observers to verify that the results are zero for all contests.
- Ask Official Observers to sign and date the first page of the zero report. Pack the certified report in the test zero report envelope.

**2**

### **Distribute the test results**

- Provide the test vDrives to the Hart Technician at the Verity Count work area. The Hart Technician prints the test results in ballot face order by packet number.
- Collect the tabulated test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope at the Verity Count work area.
- Identify the Official Observer by packet number to provide the test results. Instruct each Official Observer to reconcile the test results with their tally of expected results, and certify their test results.

**3****Certify the test results**

The following procedures are completed by the Official Observers.

- Match the test results to the tally of expected results or previous test results. Confirm the number of ballots, and votes for candidates, blank (under) votes, and over votes in each contest.
- Certify by signing and dating the first page of the test results.
- Pack the test ballots and certified test results into the test ballot packet and return them to the Counting Center Manager for inventory.

The test materials are securely stored in the equipment transport container (ETC). This includes the test ballot packets, test vDrives, and the Count USB backup.

## PERSONNEL

- Counting Center Manager inventories the test ballots and packs the ETC.
- Hart Technician archives Verity Count to USB.
- Official Observers monitor the handling and security of ballots and vDrives.

## SUPPLIES

- Count USB envelope
- rubber fingers
- pens, red
- *Post-Recount Test Certification*
- *Test Ballot Inventory*
- *Test vDrive Log*
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope

## TASKS

### **1** Inventory the test ballots

Test ballots are inventoried as each Official Observer returns their test ballot packet.

- Complete “Election Day” on the *Test Ballot Inventory*.
- Store inventoried test ballot packets in the ETC, lowest to highest.
- Ask each Official Observer who conducted the test to sign the *Post-Recount Test Certification*.

### **2** Pack the test vDrives

Check the *Test vDrive Log* to confirm the number of test vDrives. Pack the test vDrives in the test vDrives envelope to store in the ETC.

**3****Archive Verity Count**

Ask the Hart Technician to archive Verity Count to USB. The USB is stored in the Count USB envelope in the ETC.


**4****Pack the test materials into the ETC**

- accumulation vDrives envelope
- certified reports envelope
- Count USB envelope
- test ballot packets, mail & VSC
- test vDrives envelope
- test zero report envelope
- unused test ballots envelopes, mail & VSC
- vDrives, blank, official
- vDrives, blank, test

**5****Secure the counting center**

Proceed to secure the counting center.

# PROCESSING VOTED BALLOTS WORK FLOW





# VOTING POSITIONS



Office of Shave Ice Affairs	
Favorite Shave Ice Topping .....	
Vote For Not More Than One (1)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Azuki Beans
<input type="checkbox"/>	Condensed Milk
<input type="checkbox"/>	Mochi Balls



Office of Shave Ice Affairs	
Favorite Shave Ice Topping .....	
Vote For Not More Than One (1)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Azuki Beans
<input type="checkbox"/>	Condensed Milk
<input type="checkbox"/>	Mochi Balls



Office of Shave Ice Affairs	
Favorite Shave Ice Topping .....	
Vote For Not More Than One (1)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Azuki Beans
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Condensed Milk
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Mochi Balls

Office of Shave Ice Affairs	
Favorite Shave Ice Topping .....	
Vote For Not More Than One (1)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Azuki Beans
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Condensed Milk
<input type="checkbox"/>	Mochi Balls

Office of Shave Ice Affairs	
Favorite Shave Ice Topping .....	
Vote For Not More Than One (1)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Azuki Beans
<input type="checkbox"/>	Condensed Milk
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Mochi Balls

<b>A</b>	Votes for a candidate
<b>B</b>	Blank vote
<b>C</b>	Over vote

# PRIMARY ELECTION

Party Selected

Preview Ballot

ST. HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT

00-00

**A** Start Voting Here

**You MUST select ONE island below:**

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)


Kauai Party (K)

Oahu Party (O)

**Instructions**

- 1 You MUST select ONE island preference from the box above for your votes to count.
- 2 Vote ONLY for choices within your selected preference. Votes for another island preference will not be counted.
- 3 You are eligible to vote for BOTH of the Shave Ice Contests.

**Making Selections**



Completely fill in the box to the left of your choice with a black or blue pen.

If you vote for more choices than allowed in a contest, your votes for that contest will not be counted.

If you make a mistake, request a replacement ballot by contacting your County Elections Division. Do not use whiteout.

**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hapuna

Kiholo Bay

**Maui Party (M)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hookipa

Kaanapali

Makena

**Kauai Party (K)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kalua Pork

Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Poipu

**Oahu Party (O)**

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Lanikai

Sunset

Waikiki

**C** Office of Shave Ice Affairs

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Azuki Beans

Condensed Milk

Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**  
Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

Guava

Kiwi

Li Hing Mui

Lychee

Mango

Pineapple

Strawberry

Vanilla

Watermelon

**A** Party selected

**B** Votes for a candidate

- With the Hawaii Party (H) marked, voting positions associated with Hawaii Party (H) are counted.

**C** Votes for special nonpartisan contests

- Voting positions for special nonpartisan contests, like Office of Shave Ice Affairs, are counted.

**Preview Ballot**

ST. HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT

00-00

**A** Start Voting Here

**You MUST select ONE island below:**

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)

Kauai Party (K)

Oahu Party (O)

**B** Hawaii Party (H)

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hapuna

Kiholo Bay

**D** Office of Shave Ice Affairs

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Azuki Beans

Condensed Milk

Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**  
Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

Guava

Kiwi

Li Hing Mui

Lychee

Mango

Pineapple

Strawberry

Vanilla

Watermelon

**C** Maui Party (M)

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hookipa

Kaanapali

Makena

**C** Kauai Party (K)

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kalua Pork

Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Poipu

**C** Oahu Party (O)

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Waialae

**A** Party selected

**B** Votes for a candidate

- With the Hawaii Party (H) marked, voting positions associated with Hawaii Party (H) are counted.

**C** Invalid votes

- With the Hawaii Party (H) marked, votes for the candidates associated with the Kauai Party (K) are not counted.

**D** Votes for special nonpartisan contests

- Voting positions for special nonpartisan contests, like Office of Shave Ice Affairs, are counted.

# PRIMARY ELECTION

No Party Selected

Preview Ballot

STATE OF HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT

00-00

**A** Start Voting Here

You MUST select ONE island below:

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)

Kauai Party (K)

Oahu Party (O)

**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hapuna

Kiholo Bay

**Office of Shave Ice Affairs**

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Azuki Beans

Condensed Milk

Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**  
Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

Guava

Kiwi

Li Hing Mui

Lychee

Mango

Pineapple

Strawberry


Vanilla

Watermelon

**B** Instructions

- You MUST select ONE island preference from the box above for your votes to count.
- Vote ONLY for choices within your selected preference. Votes for another island preference will not be counted.
- You are eligible to vote for BOTH of the Shave Ice Contests.

**Making Selections**



Completely fill in the box to the left of your choice with a black or blue pen.

If you vote for more choices than allowed in a contest, your votes for that contest will not be counted.

If you make a mistake, request a replacement ballot by contacting your County Elections Division. Do not use whiteout.

**C** Maui Party (M)

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hookipa

Kaanapali

Makena

**Kauai Party (K)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kalua Pork

Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Poipu

**Oahu Party (O)**

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Lanikai

Sunset

Waikiki

**A** No party selected

**B** Votes for a candidate

- Because votes are marked within the Maui Party (M) only, voting positions associated with Maui Party (M) are counted.

**C** Votes for special nonpartisan contests

- Voting positions for special nonpartisan contests, like Office of Shave Ice Affairs, are counted.

Preview Ballot

STATE OF HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT

00-00



**Start Voting Here**

You MUST select ONE island below:

- Hawaii Party (H)
- Maui Party (M)
- Kauai Party (K)
- Oahu Party (O)



**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Chicken Katsu
- Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Hapuna
- Kiholo Bay



**Office of Shave Ice Affairs**

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Azuki Beans
- Condensed Milk
- Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**

Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

- Guava
- Kiwi
- Li Hing Mui
- Lychee
- Mango
- Pineapple
- Strawberry
- Vanilla
- Watermelon

**Instructions**

- 1 You MUST select ONE island preference from the box above for your votes to count.
- 2 Vote ONLY for choices within your selected preference. Votes for another island preference will not be counted.
- 3 You are eligible to vote for BOTH of the Shave Ice Contests.

**Making Selections**



Completely fill in the box to the left of your choice with a black or blue pen.

If you vote for more choices than allowed in a contest, your votes for that contest will not be counted.

If you make a mistake, request a replacement ballot by contacting your County Elections Division. Do not use whiteout.

**Maui Party (M)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Hookipa
- Kaanapali
- Makena

**Kauai Party (K)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Kalua Pork
- Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Poipu

**Oahu Party (O)**

**Favorite Beach**

Vote For Not More Than One (1)

- Lanikai
- Sunset
- Waikiki

**A** No party selected

**B** Invalid votes

- Because no party is selected and votes are marked in multiple parties, the votes for the candidates associated with the Maui Party (M) and the Kauai Party (K) are not counted.

**C** Votes for special nonpartisan contests

- Voting positions for special nonpartisan contests, like Office of Shave Ice Affairs, are counted.

# PRIMARY ELECTION

## Multi-Party Voting

Preview Ballot

STATE OF HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT

00-00

**A** Start Voting Here

You MUST select ONE island below:

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)

Kauai Party (K)

Oahu Party (O)

**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hapuna

Kiholo Bay

**Office of Shave Ice Affairs**

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Azuki Beans

Condensed Milk

Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**  
Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

Guava

Kiwi

Li Hing Mui

Lychee

Mango

Pineapple

Strawberry


Vanilla

Watermelon

**Instructions**

- You MUST select ONE island preference from the box above for your votes to count.
- Vote ONLY for choices within your selected preference. Votes for another island preference will not be counted.
- You are eligible to vote for BOTH of the Shave Ice Contests.

**Making Selections**



Completely fill in the box to the left of your choice with a black or blue pen.

If you vote for more choices than allowed in a contest, your votes for that contest will not be counted.

If you make a mistake, request a replacement ballot by contacting your County Elections Division. Do not use whiteout.

**B** Multi-party voting

**B** Votes for a candidate

- Because votes are marked within the Oahu Party (O) only, voting positions associated with Oahu Party (O) are counted.

**C** Votes for special nonpartisan contests

- Voting positions for special nonpartisan contests, like Office of Shave Ice Affairs, are counted.

Preview Ballot

STATE OF HAWAII - PRIMARY ELECTION DEMO BALLOT

00-00

**A** Start Voting Here

You MUST select ONE island below:

Hawaii Party (H)

Maui Party (M)

Kauai Party (K)

Oahu Party (O)

**B**

**Hawaii Party (H)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Chicken Katsu

Garlic Shrimp

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hapuna

Kiholo Bay

**Maui Party (M)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Loco Moco

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Hookipa

Kaanapali

Makena

**Kauai Party (K)**

**Favorite Plate Lunch**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Kalua Pork

Teriyaki Beef

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Poipu

**Oahu Party (O)**

**Favorite Beach**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Lanikai

Sunset

Waikiki

**C**

**Office of Shave Ice Affairs**

**Favorite Shave Ice Topping**  
Vote For Not More Than One (1)

Azuki Beans

Condensed Milk

Mochi Balls

**Favorite Shave Ice Flavors**  
Vote For Not More Than Three (3)

Guava

Kiwi

Li Hing Mui

Lychee

Mango

Pineapple

Strawberry

Vanilla

Watermelon

**A** Multi-party voting

**B** Invalid votes

- Because multiple parties are selected and votes are marked in multiple parties, the votes for the candidates associated with the Hawaii Party (H), Maui Party (M), Kauai Party (K), and Oahu Party (O) are not counted.

**C** Votes for special nonpartisan contests

- Voting positions for special nonpartisan contests, like Office of Shave Ice Affairs, are counted.

**Start Voting Here**

You MUST select ONE island below:

- Hawaii Party (H)
- Maui Party (M)
- Kauai Party (K)
- Oahu Party (O)

**Instructions**

- 1 You MUST select ONE island preference from the box above for your votes to count.
- 2 Vote ONLY for choices within your selected preference. Votes for another island preference will not be counted.
- 3 You are eligible to vote for BOTH of the Shave Ice Contests.

**Making Selections**



Completely fill in the box to the left of your choice with a black or blue pen.

If you vote for more choices than allowed in a contest, your votes for that contest will not be counted.

If you make a mistake, request a replacement ballot by contacting your County Elections Division. Do not use whiteout.

**A** Multi-party voting

**B** Invalid votes

- Because multiple parties are selected and votes are marked in multiple parties, the votes for the candidates associated with the Hawaii Party (H), Maui Party (M), Kauai Party (K), and Oahu Party (O) are not counted.

**C** Votes for special nonpartisan contests

- Voting positions for special nonpartisan contests, like Office of Shave Ice Affairs, are counted.

# GLOSSARY

## A

### **acceptance testing**

Examination of voting equipment and testing of basic functionality including validation that the delivered system is, in fact, the certified system purchased.

### **accumulation Official Observers**

Assigned Official Observers whose test results are used to compile and tabulate test results from the 4 counting centers as an accumulation test. The accumulation Official Observers are assigned at the Official Observers' Test and the Statewide Observers' Test.

### **accumulation test**

A wide-area network test ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the tabulation of the results reports.

### **accumulation vDrive**

A test vDrive identified for use during the accumulation test. The accumulation vDrives are tagged for the accumulation test at the Statewide Observers' Test and stored in the accumulation vDrives envelope.

### **accumulation vDrives envelope**

An envelope used to store the accumulation vDrives used for the Statewide Observers' Test. The accumulation vDrives envelope is securely stored in the equipment transport container (ETC).

### **affirmation statement**

A statement on the return envelope the voter certifies that they are a resident of the district/precinct in which they are registered and entitled to vote.

### **air gap**

A physical separation that describes how voting system components relate to each other and manage data. A variety of methods can support a physical 'air gap,' primarily the absence of any network connection between components. These air gaps act as a physical firewall for all data and access ensuring integrity and security.

### **audio ballot**

A ballot in which a set of contests is presented to the voter in spoken, rather than written, form.

### **audio-tactile interface (ATI)**

Voter interface designed to facilitate accessible voting. Audio is used to convey information to the voter and sensitive tactile controls allow the voter to communicate ballot selections to the voting system.

## **Audit**

The counting center team assigned to create a hand-tally of voted ballots to confirm the accuracy and integrity of the results.

## B

### **ballot**

A written or printed, or partly written and partly printed paper or papers containing the names of persons to be voted for, the office to be filled, and the questions or issues to be voted on. A ballot may consist of one or more cards or pieces of paper or one face of a card or piece of paper or a portion of the face of a card or piece of paper, depending on the number of offices, candidates to be elected thereto, questions or issues to be voted on, and the voting system in use. It shall also include the face of the mechanical voting machine when arranged with cardboard or other material within the ballot frames, containing the names of the candidates and questions to be voted on.

### **ballot box**

A container used to collect and securely store voted ballots.

### **ballot count**

The number of ballots processed on a device for the current election. The ballot count is reset to zero when a new election is loaded.

### **ballot marking device (BMD)**

A device at which a voter can make selections and then print a marked ballot, which the voter takes to a scanning device to be cast. No vote records are stored on the ballot marking device itself.

### **Ballot Opening**

The counting center team assigned to open and pack voted ballots for scanning.

### **ballot position**

The order on the ballot in which a candidate's name appears. For example, candidate B may have the 2nd position, meaning there is 1 candidate's name ahead of candidate B for that contest.

### **ballot question**

Any state constitutional amendment, county charter amendment, initiative, or referendum issue that has qualified for placement on the ballot.

**ballot style**

A grouping of precincts with identical contests. Every precinct's ballot is linked to 1 ballot style and there may be several precincts with the same ballot style.

**ballot text**

Informational text embedded in the ballot that does not have the properties of a contest and cannot be voted. Ballot text is often used to identify a section of the ballot.

**ballot transport container (BTC)**

A container to collect and securely store ballots. For example, invalidated ballots at the Ballot Opening work area are secured in BTCs.

**blank vote**

A contest that is not marked or not detectable by the voting equipment. No vote is recorded for a voting position and is reported as "Blank" on the results reports.

**BMD**

See ballot marking device.

**BTC**

See ballot transport container.

**C****candidate**

A person who has qualified for placement on the ballot.

**canvass**

Compilation of election returns and validation of the outcome that forms the basis of the official results by a political subdivision.

**cast vote record (CVR)**

An anonymous record of the contest options that a voter selected on their cast ballot.

**certified reports envelope**

An envelope to store the copies signed by the Official Observers of the Election Day Final and Election Final results reports.

**chief election officer**

The chief election officer directs the operations of the Office of Elections.

**Clerk's Office**

See County Elections Division.

**contest**

A choice to be made on the ballot; a race. Contest types can include offices, amendments, and initiatives.

**control packet**

A control packet is used to transfer defective/duplicated ballots between counting center work areas (Ballot Opening, Duplication, and VBC Processing). Official Observers monitor the handling and transfer of control packets between work areas.

**counting center**

The facility and surrounding premises designated by the chief election officer where ballots or other electronic voting system votes are processed, counted, and tabulated. The counting center is a secure area and no person shall be permitted in the counting center without the written authorization of the chief election officer.

**Counting Center Manager**

The director of operations at the counting center.

**Counting Center Officials**

Counting Center Officials are responsible for 1) developing an audit trail to account for all ballots; 2) conducting operations in accordance with federal laws, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) and Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR); and 3) maintaining the integrity of the electoral system by conducting operations with the highest professional and ethical standards.

**Counting Center Operations (CCOPS)**

A section of the State Office of Elections responsible for processing, tabulating, and disseminating election results in an accurate and timely manner statewide.

**county**

County refers to the County of Hawaii, County of Maui, County of Kauai, and City & County of Honolulu. For elections, the County of Kalawao shall be included in the County of Maui.

**County Elections Division**

A part of the Office of the County Clerk in each county. The County Elections Division is responsible for voter registration, mailing and receipt of ballots, and voter service centers. County of Hawaii serves the island of Hawaii, County of Maui serves the islands of Maui, Lanai, and Molokai, County of Kauai serves the islands of Kauai and Niihau, and City & County of Honolulu serves the island of Oahu.

**County Summary report**

A cumulative results report for each county.

**cured ballot**

A return envelope received by the County Elections Divisions by the close of voting on Election Day with a deficiency, like missing the signature, and corrected (cured) within 5 business days following the election.

**cut seals envelope**

An envelope used to store seals that have been removed following seal certification procedures.

**CVR**

See cast vote record.

**D****D/P**

See district/precinct (D/P).

**damaged ballot**

A ballot that has been torn or otherwise damaged to the extent that it cannot be read using a ballot scanning device.

**damaged contest**

A contest where the voting position cannot be read by the scanner due to an obstruction (e.g., white-out).

**defective ballot**

A defective ballot is a valid ballot that is not tabulation-ready and must be remade for the votes to count.

**deficient return envelope**

A return envelope that has an issue with the voter's signature. The voter may cure a deficient return envelope within 5 business days for counting.

**digital scan**

A process where ballots are scanned and the electronic, or digital, images of the ballot are captured in whole.

**direct record electronic (DRE)**

The term for an electronic machine at which a voter can view, vote, and cast a ballot.

**discard box**

A sealable container to securely store election materials including empty return envelopes. The box is 14" H x 20 W x 20 D with a hinged cover and hand holds.

**district**

A representative district.

**district/precinct (D/P)**

The representative district and precinct number assigned to voters based on their residence address. D/P is also the ballot type of all contests voters are eligible to vote for.

**duplex**

Two-sided. In Verity, ballots are printed and scanned on both sides of the ballot sheet.

**duplicate ballot stock**

A stock of pre-printed ballots for each D/P provided to the Duplication Team to use to create duplicate tabulation-ready ballots. The duplicate ballot stock must be inventoried to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the election.

**Duplication**

The counting center team responsible for tracking and marking one-for-one duplicates of defective ballots onto tabulation-ready ballots.

**E****election**

A primary, special primary, general, special general, special, or county election unless otherwise stated.

**Election Day registration**

See same-day registration (SDR).

**Election Day Observers' Test**

A logic and accuracy test conducted by Official Observers after all ballots have been counted and reported on Election Day.

**electronic ballot**

**A type of ballot that may be sent to uniformed and overseas voters, special needs voters, and any voter who needs a replacement within 5 days of Election Day.** These voters receive the electronic ballot by email to vote using a compatible personal device like a computer or tablet. After marking their ballot, they return it to their County Elections Division to validate and transfer to the counting center. At the counting center, the electronic ballots are received and inventoried by the Ballot Opening Team to prepare for the Duplication Team.

**emergency ballot slot**

A special receptacle in the Verity Scan ballot box that can be used to securely store uncounted voted ballots.

**empty return envelope container**

Empty return envelopes are securely stored in a discard box. Before leaving the counting center, the Ballot Opening Team secures these containers.

**equipment transport container (ETC)**

A container for test ballot packets, blank vDrives, certified results, and other election materials.

**ETC**

See equipment transport container (ETC).

## F

### **federal election**

A presidential, U.S. senatorial, or congressional election.

### **federal write-in absentee ballot (FWAB)**

A type of ballot available to uniformed and overseas citizen absentee voters who do not receive their ballot. These voters may print an FWAB and write in their votes for the contests they are eligible to vote for. The FWABs are transferred to the counting center and must be duplicated onto a tabulation-ready ballot.

### **functionality test**

Testing of hardware functionality (e.g., testing to see that an access button responds correctly when pressed).

### **FWAB**

See federal write-in absentee ballot (FWAB).

## G

### **General Election**

Election in which voters, regardless of party affiliation, select candidates to fill public office and vote on ballot issues. General Elections are held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in every even-numbered year.

## H

### **HAR**

Hawaii Administrative Rules

### **Hart InterCivic**

The voting system vendor which is responsible for the setup, maintenance, operation, and breakdown of the voting equipment.

### **Hart Technician**

An employee of Hart InterCivic. Hart Technicians operate the voting equipment including the scanner stations and Verity Count work area at the counting center.

### **HAVA**

Help America Vote Act of 2002

### **HRS**

Hawaii Revised Statutes

## I

### **invalid ballot**

A ballot that does not meet the requirement for the ballot to be counted. Invalid ballot scenarios include 2 ballots in the return envelope or secrecy sleeve, or the return envelope or secrecy sleeve is empty. The Ballot Opening Team handles invalid ballots.

### **invalid vote**

An instance where A) a voter in an open primary has voted for a candidate for an opposing party after first declaring affiliation with another party, or B) a voter has made a selection in a dependent contest without making the proper selection(s) in the determining contest.

## L

### **LAT**

See logic and accuracy test (LAT).

### **lifetime count**

A number, shown on a Verity device, indicating how many ballots have been voted on the device over its lifetime. The lifetime count cannot be reset.

### **logic and accuracy test (LAT)**

A test to check the accuracy of the voting system tabulation. A LAT is accomplished by casting test ballots for which the results are already known (i.e., a test deck) through the ballot counting system and comparing the results with the expected results. If an error occurs (i.e., the actual test deck count does not match the expected count), then the problem is investigated and corrected.

## M

### **mail ballot packet**

The packet sent to every voter containing a ballot, secrecy sleeve, and postage-paid return envelope.

### **marginal mark**

A mark that may or may not be readable by the voting equipment. This may include hesitation marks; making slashes or x's instead of completely darkening the box; or using colored pens or markers - like red, green, sparkles, highlighters, pencil, or erased pencil. Marginal marks may result in a valid vote, blank vote, or over vote.

**mark**

A mark is made by a voter, with a prescribed marking device, in the manner instructed by the chief election officer, within the voting position next to an option, indicating the voter's choice or vote.

A **mark** is also a signature of an illiterate or physically disabled voter.

**multi-party voting**

Multi-party voting may occur in a primary election when the voter marks choices for candidates in political preferences or over votes the select-a-party contest.

**multi-seat contest**

Contest in which multiple candidates can run, up to a specified number of seats. Voters may vote for no more than the specified number of valid choices.

**N****Non-Disclosure of Election Results & Payroll**

Volunteers must submit a Non-Disclosure of Election Results & Payroll form. This form is used to process payment after working in the counting center.

**nonpartisan office**

An elected office for which candidates run without a political party affiliation.

**O****OE**

See Office of Elections (OE).

**Office of Elections (OE)**

A State of Hawaii office which provides secure, accessible, and convenient election services to all citizens statewide. The Office of Elections is responsible for the printing and counting of ballots and voter education.

**Official Observer**

Designated volunteers who monitor counting center operations.

**Official Observers' Test**

A logic and accuracy test of the in-person voting equipment deployed to the voter service centers.

**OHA**

Office of Hawaiian Affairs

**option**

A choice on a ballot.

**over vote**

An instance where a voter has marked more than the allowed number of options for a given contest.

**P****partisan office**

An elected office for which candidates run as representatives of a political party.

**place of deposit**

A location of a ballot drop box for collection by the County Elections Division.

**political party**

A group that satisfied the requirements to field candidates.

**poll watcher**

A representative appointed by a political party and authorized by the clerk to monitor the election process at the voter service center.

**post-election count**

A post-election count is conducted following the deadline for voters to cure a deficient ballot 5 business days following the election and before the contest for cause deadline. The post-election count is the last scheduled release of results.

**precinct**

A precinct is the smallest political subdivision.

**Pre-Election Test**

A logic and accuracy test conducted by Official Observers before scanning election ballots on the first day of counting center operations.

**preview ballot**

Replicas of a ballot by D/P. Preview ballots are distributed to Official Observers as a tool to create a tally of expected results for their test ballots.

**Primary Election**

Election held to determine which candidate will represent a political party for an office in the general election. Hawaii conducts a single-party primary election where the voter selects 1 political preference and then votes for candidates affiliated with the selected political preference only.

**proper mark**

A completely darkened box using a black or blue pen.

**provisional ballot**

A ballot provided to individuals who claim they are eligible to vote but whose eligibility cannot be confirmed when they present themselves to vote. Validated provisional ballots may be counted at the post-election count.

## R

### **ranked choice voting**

Practice that allows voters to rank candidates in a contest in order of choice. A candidate receiving a majority of the first choice votes wins that election. If no candidate receives a majority, the last place candidate is eliminated, and all ballots are counted again, with each ballot cast for the eliminated candidate applied to the next choice candidate listed on the ballot. The process of eliminating the last place candidate and recounting the ballots continues until a candidate receives a majority of the vote.

### **recount**

Re-scan and re-tabulation of the votes cast.

### **registered voter**

An eligible Hawaii resident who has signed up to receive a ballot. Voters must update their registration when they move or change their name or mailing address to remain properly registered.

### **replacement ballot**

A ballot that is designated by the election authority to be a replacement for a damaged ballot.

### **results reports**

The tabulation of ballots compiled from the counting centers. Results reports are disseminated by the Oahu Counting Center only.

### **return envelope**

A postage-paid return envelope is provided to every voter. Voters must sign their return envelope which will be validated by the County Elections Division to determine if the ballot should be counted.

## S

### **scanner stations**

The scanner stations use Verity Central to count the voted ballots. Scanner stations work with 1 voted ballot container (VBC) at a time.

### **seal**

A uniquely numbered tamper-proof non-reusable lock to secure sensitive election materials. Seals are used to deter and provide evidence of unauthorized access to the devices or compartments containing voted ballots.

### **Seal Certification**

A form used to track the security of sensitive election materials, like ballots and vDrives.

### **secrecy sleeve**

A secrecy sleeve is provided to voters to enclose the voted ballot. Use of the secrecy sleeve is optional.

### **sheet count**

The number of ballot sheets have been scanned on a device or workstation for the current election. The sheet count is reset to zero when a new election is loaded.

### **sip-and-puff**

A breath-controlled input device that enables persons with limited mobility to vote independently. A voter's personal sip-and-puff device may be connected to the Verity Touch Writer Access controller.

### **select-a-party contest**

The contest on the Primary Election ballot for voters to indicate a political preference for partisan federal and state contests. Voters must vote for candidates of the select political preference only. All voters can elect candidates for the contests of Office of Hawaiian Affairs and county office, regardless of political preference.

### **self-subscribing affidavit**

A self-subscribing affidavit must be signed by an applicant to affirm the truth of particular statements without the presence of a notary public.

### **spoiled ballot**

A spoiled ballot has been misprinted, illegibly printed, or marked incorrectly by the voter who is then issued a replacement ballot. Within the counting center, the Duplication Team may spoil a ballot by incorrectly copying the votes from the defective ballot onto the duplicate.

### **Statewide Counting Center Manager**

The Statewide Counting Center Manager directs the operations of the 4 counting centers. The Counting Center Managers report to the Statewide Counting Center Manager.

### **Statewide Observers' Test**

A logic and accuracy test using the counting center voting equipment and an accumulation test to confirm the results are tabulated correctly.

### **Statewide Summary report**

The cumulative results of all contests.

## T

### **tabulation**

The process of compiling votes to report the results.

### **tactile switches**

A tactile input device (e.g., jelly switches) of two large buttons of contrasting color. Tactile switches are used to enable persons with limited mobility to vote independently. Tactile switches may be connected to the Verity Touch Writer Access controller.

**tally of expected results**

The results of a hand tally of ballots to compare to the results reports. Official Observers create a tally of expected results for their test ballots and the Audit Team creates a tally of expected results for the audit ballots.

**test ballot**

Ballots for use in the logical and accuracy test.

**test ballot packet**

A packet of test ballots, pens, test tally worksheets, preview ballots, paper clips, and rubber bands distributed to Official Observers for use during the logic and accuracy tests.

**test deck**

The test ballots, identified and marked by the Official Observers, to scan as part of a logic and accuracy test. The test deck may include blank or mismarked ballots. The test deck is stored in the test ballot packet.

**test tally**

A worksheet provided in the test ballot packet to assist with making a tally of expected results.

**test vDrives envelope**

Test vDrives used during the logic and accuracy tests are stored in the test vDrives envelope.

**test zero report envelope**

An envelope for the certified reports test zero reports indicating that there were no votes in the system before tabulating the test results.

**turnout**

The total number of voters in an election as determined by the number of ballots tabulated by the computer including blank ballots.

**U****uncounted voted ballot**

A voted ballot that has not been scanned by the voting equipment.

**under vote**

See blank vote.

**Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)**

Federal law for eligible voters to be mailed or emailed their ballot 45 days before the election. UOCAVA voters submit a Federal Post Card Application for each election.

**unique identifier**

A number placed on the sheets of a ballot that uniquely identifies the ballot in order to prevent scanning of duplicate paper ballots. The unique identifiers are optional and cannot be tied to an individual voter (as there is no individual voter data in the Verity system). Unique identifiers contain no serial (i.e. sequential) data.

**unused test ballots envelope**

An envelope to separate and store any unused test ballots from an Official Observers test ballot packet. Unused test ballots envelopes are inventoried and securely stored.

**UOCAVA**

See Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act.

**V****VBC**

See voted ballot container (VBC).

**VBC Processing**

The counting center team that tracks and secures voted ballot containers (VBCs) to and from the scanner stations for counting.

**vDrive**

A portable flash media that is electronically written with the election data file and deployed for a variety of different voting types and devices, including Verity Touch Writer, Verity Scan, and Verity Central. vDrives are used to transfer digital ballot styles from Build to Verity devices and to transfer cast vote records from Verity Scan and Verity Central to Verity Count for tabulation.

**Verity Build**

The application to open an election, proof data, configure device settings, print ballots, and write vDrives and keys.

**Verity Central**

The application and network of scanners to count voted ballots at the counting center. Hart Technicians scan ballots and write vDrives for tabulation in Verity Count.

**Verity Count**

The tabulation application to compile the results reports by reading the vDrives.

**Verity Count work area**

The counting center work area operated by Hart Technicians to tabulate and print the result reports.

**Verity Data**

The Verity application to enter, import and manage election data, jurisdiction data, and translations, and record and import audio.

**Verity Print**

A device to print blank paper ballots on demand.

**Verity Relay**

A secure solution that provides fast reporting by transmitting directly from the Verity Scan device at the voter service center to the Oahu Counting Center.

**Verity Scan**

A digital scanner for casting paper ballots. Verity Scan is used with hand-marked ballots or Verity Touch Writer ballots. The counted ballots drop into its ballot box for secure storage.

**Verity Touch Writer**

A ballot marking device (BMD) voters use to mark a digital ballot using a touchscreen. After confirming their selections, the voter prints the marked ballot on the attached printer and casts the ballot using Verity Scan.

**Verity Transmit**

The application for remote transmission.

**vote**

To cast a ballot for counting and tabulation.

**voted ballot container (VBC)**

The secure container to transport and secure voted ballots.

**voter**

Any person duly registered to vote.

**voter registration application**

An affidavit for voter registration or other form, like the online voter registration system or DMV application, for voter registration.

**voter service center (VSC)**

Locations established by the County Elections Divisions to provide accessible in-person voting and voter registration. The locations may open 10 business days before and on Election Day.

**voting position**

The target area the voter marks in order to make a selection on a ballot.

**VSC**

See voter service center (VSC).

**Z****zero report**

A voting device report that must be printed before polls are opened on a device. A zero report must also be printed from a ballot scanning or tabulation workstation before scanning or counting ballots. This report lists the time, the contests and candidates on the ballot, and verifies that the current number of votes for each candidate or option is zero.

# SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT

## AUDIT TEAM

### Forms

- > *Audit Certification*
- > *Ballot Handling*
- > *Mail VBC Tally*

### Items

- > calculator
- > Election Day Audit Reports folder
- > eraser
- > highlighter
- > manual
- > paper clip
- > pen, red
- > pencil
- > pencil sharpener
- > post-it, 3"x3"
- > preview ballots
- > rubber band
- > rubber fingers
- > scratch pad
- > stapler

### Other

- > Audit VBCs from VBC Processing
- > Audit report from Counting Center Manager

## BALLOT OPENING TEAM

### Forms

- > *Control Packet Time Log*
- > *Empty Return Envelope Seal Certification*
- > *Invalid Ballot Log*
- > *Seal Certification*

### Items

- > automatic numbering machine
- > compressed air
- > control packet
- > cut seals envelope
- > defective stamp
- > empty return envelope label
- > gloves
- > invalid ballot container label
- > invalid stamp
- > letter opener
- > mail VBC label
- > mail VBC Counted label
- > manual
- > marker, red
- > masking tape
- > notes from voters envelope
- > paper clips
- > pen, red
- > post-it, 3"x3"
- > rubber band, #117B
- > scratch pad
- > seal
- > sealing hook
- > stamp ink, red
- > stapler
- > transparent tape
- > trash bag, clear
- > utility envelope
- > voted ballot container label
- > wire cutter

### Other

- > anti-fatigue mat
- > automatic envelope opener
- > empty return envelope container
- > invalid mail ballot container
- > mail voted ballot container (VBC)
- > unprocessed control packet container

## DUPLICATION TEAM

### Forms

- > *Ballot Tracking Log*
- > *Control Packet Time Log*
- > *Duplicate Ballot Stock*
- > *Seal Certification*

### Items

- > automatic numbering machine
- > control packet check in & out boxes
- > cut seals envelope
- > manual
- > marker, red
- > paper clip
- > pen, black
- > pen, red
- > post-it, 3"x3"
- > rubber band
- > scratch pad
- > seal
- > sealing hook
- > stamp ink, red
- > stapler
- > straight edge
- > transparent tape
- > wire cutter

### Other

duplicate ballot stock container(s)

## MANAGER

- > cut seals envelope
- > first aid kit
- > marker, red
- > masking tape
- > paper clip
- > pen, black
- > pen, green
- > pen, red
- > phone
- > post-it, 3"x3"
- > rubber band, #117
- > scissors
- > scratch pad
- > seal
- > sealing hook
- > stamp ink, red
- > stapler
- > transparent tape
- > trash bag, clear
- > wire cutter

### Check In

- > badges
- > *Non-Disclosure & Payroll* (blank)
- > pen, red
- > *Volunteer Time Log*

### Recount

- > *Ballot Tracking Log*
- > recount labels
- > recount vDrives envelope
- > *Seal Certification*
- > seals
- > *VBC Rescanned Log*
- > *VBC Seal Certification*
- > *VBC Time Log*
- > *vDrive Log*

## OFFICIAL OBSERVERS

### Test ballot packet

- > preview ballots, 2 per D/P
- > paper clips, 1 per D/P
- > pens, black, 2 per packet
- > rubber bands 2 per packet
- > test ballots

### Forms

- > *Election Day Test Certification*
- > *Pre-Election Test Certification*
- > *Seal Certification*
- > *Test Ballot Inventory*
- > *Test Ballot Tracking*
- > *Test vDrive Log*

### Items

- > calculator
- > cut seals envelope
- > manual
- > marker, red
- > paper clips
- > pen, green
- > post-it, 3"x3"
- > rubber bands
- > rubber fingers
- > scratch pad
- > seal
- > stapler
- > transparent tape
- > unused test ballots envelopes
- > wire cutter

### Other

- > accumulation tags
- > masking tape
- > *Official Observer Sign In*
- > padlock with reset key

### Secured in the ETC

- > accumulation vDrives envelope
- > certified reports envelope
- > Count USB envelope
- > test ballot packets
- > test vDrives envelope
- > test zero report envelope
- > unused test ballots envelopes

## VBC PROCESSING TEAM

### Forms

- > *Control Packet Time Log*
- > *Verity Print Seal Certification*
- > *Verity Scan Seal Certification*
- > *Seal Certification*
- > *Verity Touch Writer Seal Certification*
- > *VBC Counted Log*
- > *VBC Seal Certification*
- > *VBC Time Log*
- > *Voter Service Center VBC Log*
- > *Written vDrive Log*

### Items

- > *Audit VBC Seal Certification* folder
- > audit VBC label
- > audit vDrive tag
- > calculator
- > Configuration Reports folder
- > control packet
- > cut seals envelope
- > defective stamp
- > highlighter
- > mail VBC scanned label, blank
- > manual
- > marker, red
- > pen, red
- > post-it, 3"x3"
- > scratch pad
- > seal
- > sealing hook
- > stamp ink, red
- > transparent tape
- > voter service center VBC label, blank
- > wire cutter

### Other

- > defective ballot container
- > duplicate VBCs
- > Verity Print & Verity Touch Writer vDrives envelope
- > scale
- > unprocessed control packet container
- > written vDrive can

# EMERGENCIES & UNUSUAL EVENTS

The health and safety of all counting center personnel is everyone's responsibility. Generally, counting center personnel should:

- > Assess the situation.
- > CALL 911 IMMEDIATELY in case of emergency to receive assistance.
- > Promote health and safety first (e.g., evacuate, secure the facility).
- > Secure sensitive election materials when it is safe to do so.
- > Direct media inquiries to the Office of Elections.
- > Call the Oahu Counting Center.

Remember that each situation is unique and that emergency response must address the issue accordingly. When possible, counting center personnel will be notified by email of emergencies or unusual events impacting operations.

## TYPES OF PHYSICAL THREATS

Several types of emergencies could result in the evacuation or closure of the counting center. The evacuation plan is to provide for the orderly and timely emptying of a building to safeguard life. The following situations may require immediate emergency response:

### **Severe Weather**

Storms, high winds, and torrential rains may vary in intensity and duration. They may also impact counting center operations from travel difficulties to power failure.

In case of power failure during operations, the voting equipment is connected to an uninterrupted power supply (UPS) to power down the devices properly. Collect and secure any ballots as quickly as possible. Depending on the conditions related to the power failure, wait until power is restored.

Hurricanes are slow moving weather systems that have the potential to produce widespread disruption of normal activities. The most destructive aspect is the storm surge that affects the coast and can cause extensive flooding, property damage, and severe injuries. High winds have the potential to cause loss of power.

In case of power failure during operations, the voting equipment is connected to an uninterrupted power supply (UPS) to power down the devices properly. Collect and secure any ballots as quickly as possible. Depending on the conditions related to the power failure, wait until power is restored.

### **Fire**

There are 3 types of fires, and each requires a different strategy to extinguish. Ordinary combustibles such as paper, wood, or cloth may be extinguished with water. Flammable liquids like gasoline, oil, or alcohol may be extinguished by smothering. Fires involving electrical equipment, wiring, or appliances may be extinguished using a carbon dioxide extinguisher.

- > Notify counting center personnel.
- > Call 911.
- > Confine the fire and keep people away from the area.
- > Secure sensitive election materials, if possible and practical.
- > Evacuate the work area(s) as necessary and account for personnel.
- > Do not re-enter the facility until declared safe by a fire official.

### **Hazardous materials**

A toxic spill of hazardous materials (e.g., white powdered substance in an envelope) can occur without warning. Call 911 and stay away from the spill. Evacuate and secure the area until cleared by emergency responders.

- > Do not touch your eyes, mouth, nose or skin after exposure.
- > Remove any clothing or items that may be contaminated and store in plastic bag. If possible, do not remove clothes over head.
- > Wash skin thoroughly with cool water and soap.
- > Do NOT use hand sanitizer or alcohol-based cleaners or bleach as this may enhance absorption.

### **Bomb threat**

A bomb threat creates a sudden crisis period. Communication is disrupted, and emotions will be strained. It is important to maintain clear thinking and decisive action to keep order.

- > Call 911 immediately.
- > Follow the instructions of emergency responders.
- > If a suspicious device is found, report it but do not touch it.
- > Leave doors and windows open.
- > Account for all personnel.

### **PERSONAL SECURITY**

Be vigilant, watching for unusual behavior or people who loiter near the counting center without a known role, and report suspicious activity to the Counting Center Manager. Watch out for the following indicators:

- > Loitering without a reasonable explanation
- > Picture taking or other unusual focus on facilities or personnel, especially if there are attempts to hide the behavior
- > Attempts to avoid security, staff, check-ins areas, or security cameras
- > Threats of violence direct or implied
- > Leaving a backpack or other package behind

### **Tips for de-escalation**

- > Remain calm in your posture and tone.
- > Conduct yourself with firm but polite professionalism.
- > Listen to understand the issue and confirm your understanding of the situation.

### **COMMUNICATION**

Counting center personnel will be notified by email of the impacts to counting center operations due to a hurricane or severe weather. If the weather impacts travel to the counting center or communications, do not report to the counting center. To the extent possible, counting center personnel will be notified by email of any impacts. Personnel may also email questions to **[elections.volunteers@hawaii.gov](mailto:elections.volunteers@hawaii.gov)**.